



**Call for Papers "The European Green Deal: moving to action
Opportunities and challenges for the European citizens"**

EU AS A GREEN NORMATIVE POWER:

How could the European Green Deal become a normative tool in EU's climate diplomacy?

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The European Green Deal poses a blueprint for the goal of climate neutrality and an excellent tool of normative diffusion promoting the EU's interests in the global arena. The research aims to combine normative power with the Green Deal and formulate policy recommendations on the ways the EU could achieve a successful green diplomacy. The policy paper will first introduce the concept of normative power and investigate the key norms underpinning the EU's climate policy. It then analyses how the EU could employ the Deal as a normative tool to promote its climate aims and diplomacy. The EU should: a) ensure the unhindered implementation of the Green Deal on the European level; b) utilise it to maintain the discussion on climate change amid the hostility of the US-China and diffuse European goals and values; c) employ it to forge new bilateral and global alliances, alleviate tensions emerging from its implementation, and establish its role in the global climate governance as a green normative power.

Social Media summary

The analysis demonstrates how the EU could use the European Green Deal to become a green normative power

Keywords

#normativepower #EuropeanGreenDeal #greennormativepower #europeangeopolitics
#climatediplomacy #euvalues #climatechnage #europeanforeignpolicy

Short bio

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Table of acronyms

EU	European Union
EEAS	European External Action Service
EC	European Commission
EP	European Parliament
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
EGD	European Green Deal
G20	The Group of Twenty is an intergovernmental organization consisting of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union.
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
ASEAN	The Association of Southeast Asian Nations

1. Introduction

In July 2020, the EU adopted the European Green Deal (EGD) as part of its economic recovery package for the Covid-19 pandemic. Although the plan was initially confronted with national objections (mostly stemming from Central and Eastern European Member states), the coronavirus pandemic provided a window of opportunity for the adoption of one of the most ambitious European undertakings. While the EGD is a revolutionary policy package promoting a greener and more sustainable economic model in Europe, there are fears of the plan's global fall-out. Indeed, the set of policy initiatives with the overarching aim of making Europe climate neutral in 2050 prompted both the anxiety of policymakers and the criticism of activists about the plan's future implementation. A similar wave of anxiety swept across the world in the 1990s following the establishment of Europe's Single Market. Still, as this policy paper argues, like with the Single Market, it might set a global standard and become a major source of Europe's normative power.

The EU has already an impressive record of international climate leadership (Oberthür & Roche, Kelly 2008). Following the fiasco of the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit, the EU developed a new "leadiator" approach (*leader cum mediator*) relying on multilateralism and coalition-building (Bäckstrand & Elgström, 2013, p. 1370-1380). This role has served the EU well, since it helped it shape a high-ambition coalition crucial for bringing about the 2015 Paris Agreement, steer the climate politics throughout Trump's presidency, and keep involved in the process significant powers like China and India and countries from the Global South. In parallel, the EU's 'actorness' in environmental affairs has been also well recognised and illustrated by scholars such as Chad Damro (2008) and Tom Delreux (2014). The normative aspect of its climate diplomacy has prompted conversation on the role of normative power in its external relations (Lucarelli & Manners, 2006; Keleman, 2010, p. 335). Given that normative power is the ability to define what passes for 'normal' in world politics, a closer look at EU's climate diplomacy indicates that the Union has been continuously acting in a normative manner and using its normative tools to "extend its norms into the international system" (Manner, 2002, p. 252). Within this context, the EGD could become a tangible blueprint for other countries to pursue the goal of climate neutrality and an excellent instrument of normative diffusion furthering the EU's interests in the global arena.

Based on these premises, the research aims to apply Ian Manners' normative power to the EU's climate diplomacy, contribute to the academic debate, and formulate policy recommendations on the ways the EU could utilise both the EGD and its normative capacity to promote a greener and more sustainable climate approach on the regional and multilateral levels. The policy paper will first briefly introduce the concept of normative power and investigate the key norms and principles underpinning the EU's climate policy. It then goes on to analyse how the EU could employ the Green Deal as a normative tool to promote its climate aims and diplomacy and identify the conditions for the success of this endeavour. As the paper argues, the EU needs to combine a mix of internal and external policies. Specifically, the Union should: a) ensure the unhindered implementation of the EGD on the European level; b) utilise the EGD to maintain the discussion on climate change amid the hostility of the US-China and diffuse European goals and values; c) employ the EGD to forge new bilateral and global alliances, alleviate tensions emerging from its implementation, and establish its role in the global climate governance as 'green normative power.'

2. The EU's climate diplomacy and actorness in global climate governance

Over the course of the last decades, the EU's approach to climate suggests that the EU plays a crucial role in the shaping of the global agenda on climate-related policies. Traditionally, it was one of the first international actors to emphasise the external dimension of the issue and formulate the concept of climate diplomacy as exceeding the international negotiations at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). However, it is important to establish whether the EU continues to maintain this actorness in global environmental politics which is a necessary premise for the success of its EGD and 'green normative power.' To do so, the paper employs the three criteria of Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler (1999/2006): opportunity, capability, and presence.

Firstly, the EU has historically demonstrated that if given the opportunity, it can become a global player and pioneer in environmental diplomacy. Two excellent examples are the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the EU's strategy in the Conference of Paris meetings following the US withdrawal in 2016. In both instances, the EU proved capable of filling the gap created by its American counterparts and helped maintain not only the political balances but also the impetus to maintain cooperation and progress in the field of environmental policies (see: Zito, 2005; Oberthür & Dupont, 2021).

Secondly, it has the instruments and capabilities that are needed for the formulation of effective policies (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). Indeed, while the environmental policy was officially mentioned for the first time in the 1986 Single European Act, sustainable development was introduced as an integral part of all EU policies in the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam. Notably, sustainable development is one of the four minor defining norms of the EU (Manners, 2002). Since then, it has continued to refer to these principles in its legislation like the 2000 EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights, and cross-cutting external affairs documents, such as the EU Global Strategy 2016 and the 2017 EU's resilience framework. Interestingly, the adoption of the documents not only determines the EU's modus operandi but also shows how it perceives itself in terms of environmental policy. As Robert Falkner (2007) highlights, by adopting ambitious legislation in favour of the environment, it embraces universal values which place the global common good above national interests.

Thirdly, the EU has shown to be capable of influencing third states and institutions in the field of environmental policy. This ability not only distinguishes it from other global players but also is a mandatory requirement for its consideration as a normative power (Lightfoot et.al, 2005). Specifically, it has managed to repeatedly diffuse its environmental norms to Central Eastern Europe (Carmin & Fagan, 2010). Moreover, it has indicated leadership and presence in multilateral fora (see: Annex 1). Whereas Simon Lightfoot (2012) demonstrates the impact of the EU on the agenda of the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development and the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, Arnault Barichella (2017) shows how the EU accomplished the consensus between the US and China which was a crucial step in the adoption of the 2015 Paris Agreement. Hence, having successfully established that the EU has the capabilities, the experience, and the legitimacy to influence external players in the field of environmental policy, the question that arises is: Does the EU constitute a global green normative power? To answer this, the policy paper defines normative power and combines it with the EU's climate diplomacy.

3. The EU as a normative power

Normative power has been used repeatedly to describe the distinctive European “ideological influence on other members in international relations” (Manners, 2002, p. 238). Inspired by François Duchêne’s “civilian power” and Joseph Nye’s ‘soft power,’ Manner created the concept to operate as a sociological or cognitive framework, which aims to dismiss the formal faulty analysis of the EU’s role in a solely materialistic and power equilibrium fashion. For the scholar, the EU constitutes a normative power in international affairs for two reasons.

On the one hand, the scholar observes that contrary to the other great powers, the EU shapes the international system not as much as with the use of ‘hard power’ (e.g., military power or economic sanctions), but through the attractiveness of the ideas, standards, and values driving the project of European integration (Ibid., p. 239). These norms include peace, liberty, democracy, supranational rule of law, and human rights, social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance (p. 240). Notably, while these norms are a manifestation of the EU’s identity, values, and ideas, they also force it to act in a normative way because of their legal nature as most of these principles constitute legally binding commitments (Dunne, 2008, p. 22). Thus, normative power denotes “a normative form of power, the emphasis is on the ability to use normative justification rather than on an ability to use material incentives or physical force” (Manners, 2011, p. 230).

On the other hand, the EU’s normative nature “pre-disposes it to act in a normative way” (Manners, 2002, p. 242). Manners (p. 240-245) suggest that contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion, and cultural filter are the six ways in which the EU’s norms are diffused. Among these six mechanisms, contagion, overt diffusion, and cultural filters are indirect mechanisms. Specifically, Manners define contagion as unintentional norm diffusion of the EU as a virtuous example in global governance, overt diffusion as an outcome of the physical presence of the EU in third states and international organizations, and cultural filter as “impact of international norms and political learning in third states and organizations leading to learning, adaptation or rejection” (Ibid.). As for the other three instruments, they rely on the direct diffusion and active promotion of EU’s norms at the regional and international levels. Indeed, information diffusion constitutes the result of strategic and declaratory communications of the EU; procedural diffusion is “the institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and a third party;” the transference diffusion is the diffusion of norms “when the EU exchanges goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties through largely substantive or financial means” (Ibid.).

A closer look at the EU’s climate diplomacy shows that it acts normatively and relies on its normative mechanism to shape the climate change governance in its likeness. As Birchfield (2013, p. 908-909) notes, for EU, the idea of normative power incorporates two approaches to conceptualizing and examining the EU’s external role: one is to “affirm the *sui generis* character of the EU as a unique and different kind of international actor”; and the other is to investigate “the ‘positivist’ dimension” of normative power, which refers to how the EU “acts to change norms in the international system”. As already established, it has repeatedly demonstrated its commitment through the adoption of legislation putting special emphasis on norms such as sustainable development and it still continues to stress out this issue in its conclusions and communication, always in connection with other values like democracy, good governance, and human rights. There are also other examples of the EU setting the standard or diffusing its norms to structure the international climate governance. For instance, it has constantly set quantifiable mitigation targets before major meetings on climate (EC, 2021a; see Annex 1). In the conferences of Copenhagen (2009) and Paris (2015), it had clearly stated its objective to spread its preferred mitigation arrangement in climate change governance (Oberthür & Groen, 2018, p. 708-727). Another

manifestation of its leadership by example is the 2015 adoption of binding targets, the so-called the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), to reduce the EU's domestic greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 (EU, 2015). By taking independent commitments, the EU seeks to persuade other major emitters to act in the same manner (Oberthür & Kelly, 2008, p. 41).

The EU has also developed a physical presence and collaborated with several third countries to help them curb their greenhouse gas emissions. Considering that it is not one of the leading global transmitters, the EU must establish bilateral and multilateral alliances and affect international institutions to address climate change. However, as Tom Delreux and Frauke Ohler (2019) show, the EU's influence has proven crucial at important international climate conferences such as those held in Kyoto (1997), Marrakesh (2001), and Paris (2015). All the above prove sufficiently that the EU is already a normative power, hence giving the Green Deal a normative dimension.

4. The European Green Deal

Against the initial negative political background, in December 2019, the EC published the EGD that is to be implemented through the European Climate Law, on which the EU reached a political agreement in April 2021. The EGD is a comprehensive long-term transformation program, with which the EU aims to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 (EC, 2021b). Based on the concept of environmental re-orientation, the Commission constructed a work program in areas: climate ambition, clean affordable and secure energy, industrial strategy for a clean and circular economy, sustainable and smart mobility, agriculture and fisheries, biodiversity, zero pollution and toxic-free environment, mainstreaming sustainability, trade and foreign policy and the European Climate Pact (see; Annex 2). Overall, the EGD provides a roadmap of 47 action points initialised (and some even completed) before the end of 2021. Through a combination of values like sustainability and protection with legal and financial discipline, the EGD is meant to transform the EU by 2050 into the state "fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy" and make it the first climate-neutral continent on the planet (EC, 2019a).

What distinguishes the EGD from similar past European endeavours is that it has important implications for both the internal and external dimensions of the EU's climate diplomacy. On the domestic level, the review of each existing law on its climate merits combined with introducing new laws and initiatives in the previously mentioned policy areas could spur the change of a horizontal regulatory framework in the long and short term (Miccinilli, 2020, p. 15-17). Indeed, one priority of the EGD was to adopt a new EU-wide industrial strategy (adopted in March 2021), which redrew the market landscape (EC, 2021c). As Annex 2 indicates, besides industry, every major aspect of the European economy will have to be amended and updated, from energy generation to construction. As rightly emphasised in the existing literature (see: Makiyama, 2021; Macaulay, 2020) the EGD may deeply and successfully change the Union's economy, given that it remains a policy priority and triggers substantiated reorientation of financial measures and fund allocation (Siddi, 2020, p. 4-12). It is also important to note that the implication will not limit to the EU but also influence each Member State; however, initiatives like Just Transition Fund and Invest EU will support their efforts to meet the ambitious objectives. Notable is also the involvement of the private sector, as EGD leans on Horizon Europe to play a pivotal role in leveraging national public and private investments (EC, 2019).

The EGD has also far-reaching implications for the external dimension of European climate diplomacy as it offers a concrete operational, technical, and legislative roadmap for the EU's climate diplomacy. Given the EU's disproportionate contribution to emissions, it will put emphasis on the perspectives of partner countries and their own political ambitions for ecological

transformations. Indeed, the EU announced that it will prioritise climate and environment in its partnership with Africa, Latin America and mostly, Neighbourhood countries, and use its finance, expertise, and initiatives (like the Circular Economy Action Plan or EU Industrial Strategy) to push them towards a green transition (EC, 2021d). The EGD will also affect, in varying degrees, the partner countries, which could potentially stir up hostilities. For instance, the newly established Carbon Border Adjustment will require stable supply chains, a goal that might shift geopolitical dynamics and lead to new international tensions around contested issues. The importance of the external aspect of the EGD was also further stressed in the Council's conclusions on climate and energy diplomacy in "Delivering on the external dimension of the European Green Deal" (Council, 2021). The Council underlined the need for: a) partnerships and alliances; b) finance; c) cross-cutting diplomacy and appropriate capacity; d) focus on energy and carbon markets; e) development of international initiatives (Ibid.). Since their adoption, the EP and the European Council have reiterated and stressed the importance of these guidelines (Tätzler, Ivleva, & Hausotter, 2021, p. 6-8). Important is also the role of the EEAS, which employs its presence and tools to help to internationalise the EGD (EEAS, 2021).

Given the above, the EGD will become a crucial tool in the EU's efforts to shape the international climate change governance in its likeness. As the paper argues, while the EGD could contribute to the EU's normative power, it could also pose an excellent opportunity for the Union to spread its norms and values (see Annex 3). Indeed, the EGD offers not only new legislation with binding and ambitious commitments for the Union and its Member States, which could enhance the contagion of the EU's norms and values, but also it creates new instruments of normative diffusion for the Union to extend its climate leadership. Therefore, the paper will now examine the ways the EU could use both the Green Deal and its normative capacity to promote a greener and more sustainable climate approach on the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels.

5. Policy Recommendations:

A. Ensure the unhindered implementation of the Green Deal within the European context

The EU needs to successfully implement the EGD on the European level and not allow it to become another excuse for protectionism and internal divisions. While this point seems self-evident, it is also one of the most important ones due to the fragility (participation of 27 Member States with divergent agendas) and scope of the endeavour. Putting it simply, there is little room (or indeed patience) for debate as the collapse of the Deal would signalize a much broader European policy failure and cause internal friction between the institutions and the Member states (Politico, 2020). This outcome could have also potentially negative implications which would spill over and undermine other domains and actions of the Union, especially its climate diplomacy. Considering its established role as a norm-setter and standard-bearer in global efforts to tackle climate change (see section 2), the EU and the EGD would lose all their legitimacy and credibility, hence negatively affecting their indirect and direct normative mechanisms. As such, the EU should keep a close eye on implementing the corresponding legislation by the Member States and the well-functioning of EGD's initiatives while employing its economic and diplomatic tools to avert possible crises, which are also the source of its normative appeal.

At the institutional level, the EGD has received widespread support among the EU institutions and European capitals that will not diminish in the coming years (EP, 2020; Tagliapietra & Claeys, 2021). Yet, as the negotiations for the "Fit for 55" (a package of measures supporting Europe's

climate policy framework and putting it on track for a 55% reduction in carbon emissions by 2030) in September 2021 indicated, the EU institutions will need to show flexibility and adaptability to keep the momentum for the implementation of the EGD (Taylor, 2021; Nicolas, 2021). An analogous approach should also guide European efforts to reduce and mediate the EGD's economic consequences on a European scale: the EGD's official impact assessment points to a GDP loss of additional -0.3 to -0.7%, by 2030, relative to the previous level of ambition, hence the full loss could be up to 2.5% (Lee-Makiyama, 2021). In the past, such costs have proved nearly devastating for the future of the European undertaking. The EGD will also have huge implications for the regional industrial, energy, and private sectors, which could either hinder the goal of achieving carbon neutrality, create transnational antagonism or avert potential future private investments (Butler, 2020). Hence, the EU needs to employ its normative instruments, its economic, finance capabilities, and Single Market, to ease and tackle probable future shortcomings. Indicatively, it could offer long-term financing for companies in key sectors, invest in its research and technological innovation, scale-up operationally and financially the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan, and provide bigger fiscal capabilities with reformed European fiscal framework. These indicative measures would not require major legislation and would boost the EU's image as an innovator in climate governance.

The biggest challenges with the execution of the EGD lies at the intergovernmental level. The present-day reluctance of a few Member States in the fields of energy, agriculture, and fisheries indicates the possible arrays of issues that might manifest in the future. Furthermore, the Deal could conceivably lead to the prolongation of the existing economic and social divisions between east and western or northern and southern EU countries, as the transition could be more disruptive and expensive for these states (Simon, 2021). For instance, in the 25 May European Council meeting, the Polish Prime Minister already told fellow leaders that the bloc's carbon pricing system unfairly disadvantages Eastern and Southern Europe (Mathiesen & Barigazzi, 2021). As such, the burden of the transition could become a cause of disagreement among the Member States, but also a populist tool to foster anti-European narratives. Other issues that the Member States could object to are the distribution of the €17.5 billion Just Transition Fund, the subject of EU's Common Agricultural Policy, or the way of reforming the existing infrastructure. Hence, the EU needs to ensure fairness and transparency in the implementation of the EGD to avoid possible frictions and use its funds to achieve an even transition in line with its norms and values.

For Southeast European countries, the EU should systematically engage with local governments and stakeholders to facilitate the transition of countries facing the market and economic difficulties (e.g., interconnectivity, illiquid markets, or poor regulatory framework). Apart from delivering funds and expertise, the EU could mobilise private investments in sectors like renewable energy or use and boost local European initiatives like the Central and South-eastern Europe energy connectivity (CESEC) (Catuti, Kustova, & Egenhofer, 2020). As for central European states, similar to the Recovery Fund negotiations, the EU needs to employ diplomacy based on prevention, mediation, understanding, and most importantly, funding (see: Fusiek, 2020). Given that some states like Poland are already on their path of transformation (e.g., the new Polish Energy Policy until 2040), the EU should ensure appropriate financial resources, finance research, and green innovation to make the abandonment of coal-based electricity generation possible (Rees, 2020). Such measures have not only been already supported (See; the European Parliament proposal for allocation of more funds to the Just Transition Fund) but also could ease tensions between the two sides. Nevertheless, it is quintessential that the EU continues to act normatively and support initiatives and policies which are in line with its normative identity.

B. Utilise the EGD and EU's normative power to progress the discussion on climate change amid the US-China hostility

The EU produces less than 10% of the global greenhouse-gas emissions (EC, 2021e). It needs thus to push the green transition beyond its borders to have a chance of tackling global warming. The paper has already established that the EU has indeed shown not only its actorness but also the capability to influence major players and developing countries, hence inaugurating it as a 'green normative power.' Within this context, the EGD could prove a significant normative asset in the EU's climate diplomacy as it offers both direct and indirect mechanisms of norms diffusion in third partners and international institutions. Notably, it also shows that pursuing climate neutrality by 2050 is both technically and economically possible (by providing a concrete roadmap) and politically rewarding (Tagliapietra, 2019).

This approach sends a powerful message to the global community regarding the importance of fighting climate change and constitutes the EU as a global standard-setter energy, sustainable development, and climate governance. Given that, it should utilise this window of opportunity to shape the global climate agenda based on both its norms and the EGD. However, due to the emerging geopolitical quarrels and instabilities, especially amplified following the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU needs to employ its mediating role and economic capabilities to steer and progress the global discussion on climate.

On the one hand, the EU should maintain an initiative-taking discourse promoting an EGD-based approach to tackling climate change while participating in global multilateral fora fitting its goals and values. In this manner, the EU will enhance its information, overt, and procedural norms diffusion capabilities on the bilateral and multilateral levels and keep the focus on tackling climate change through its participation and discourse in multilateral initiatives (cultural filter). Specifically, as Annex 4 suggests, the EU has adopted legislation or discussed the implementation of the EGD and climate change (almost) every month in 2021, hence indicating the gravity and significance with which it treats the two issues. Furthermore, the EU has a lot of opportunities to advance its climate ambitions, influence third players, and show climate leadership in the near future. Indeed, there are upcoming strategy discussions of multilateral organisations (e.g., UNDP, UNICEF, WFP), the climate conference in Glasgow (COP26) and the biodiversity conference (COP15) in Kunming (see: Annex 4). Successful European diplomacy will require: increased cooperation between the institutions and the Member States, substantive knowledge of the Green Deal by the EU's diplomats (green diplomacy), flexibility in building coalitions with third states, mediations between the major actors, and push for progress in the climate ambitions (Schunz, 2021; Koch & Keijzer, 2021). The EU will also participate and host many summits (e.g., EU-Western Balkans Summit in October, ASEM Summit in November, African Union-European Union Summit in February) that pose an excellent opportunity to promote the EU's climate agenda and boost discussion on climate governance with regional partners and third countries (European Council, 2021). In all these endeavours, the EU should look at the goals and priorities of the EGD as a useful beginning point and potential building blocks for entering key functional alliances with third countries to pursue global sustainable development (EC, 2021f).

On the other hand, the EU needs to keep track of contemporary geopolitical shifts and use them to its advantage. The post-Covid-19 pandemic era has revealed a heavily fragmented, shaky, and polarized international system which fuelled pre-existing power struggles among major players or brought to surface new regional tensions. This turn of events has not only shifted the global discussion from issues of low-politics (e.g., economy, trade) to high-politics (e.g., defence and military) but also set the possibility of progress in international climate governance questionable. Currently, the biggest threat to the latter is the ongoing hostility of China and the US. However, it

also constitutes a window of opportunity to further both its ambitions for strategic autonomy and image as a leading green normative power (contagion and cultural filter) while diffusing its norms through the internationalisation of the EGD (procedural and transference diffusion). Hence, the EU should “rise above” the ongoing hostility between the US and China by continuing to engage with the two sides as a third independent actor. To preserve the existing focus on climate change, the EU should function as a mediator between the two powers while promoting policies in line with its norms and values.

When it comes to China, there are a lot of obstacles hindering the evolution of a sound partnership or alliance. Still, as the 2015 Paris Conference indicated, the two countries can cooperate on issues of the environment (Cléménçon, 2016). For instance, the EU-China Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, agreed in 2020, includes a chapter on climate change and environmental protection (EEAS, 2020). Notably, for China, its relationship with the EU is less fraught with diplomatic tensions, compared to other leading climate actors like Japan and the US. Hence, the EU can use its bilateral tools like trade agreements and expertise in climate governance to help China in its difficult transition to low-carbon development, a move that would substantially improve the already negative image of the Chinese government. However, considering the rising polarization and EGD's geopolitical implications (the goal of green technology would mean the limitation of exports of raw material from China to the EU), the Union needs to remain extremely attentive and cautious of China's concerns.

In the case of the US, despite the recent fallbacks (see: Donald Trump's protections and the 2021 AUKUS security agreement), the two sides have not only remained key strategic partners in multilateral initiatives but also have continued to cooperate bilaterally on issues of technology, trade, and sustainability (EC, 2020). The EU should use the new administration's focus and interest on climate issues to employ big initiatives, boost the evolution of climate governance, and, most importantly, alleviate tensions with China (Tubiana, 2021). A failure of adoption of the global climate agenda because of the rivalry with China would go against Biden's pre-election claims and significantly harm his popularity domestically and globally (The Guardian, 2020). Finally, the EU could facilitate the engagement of the two actors by promoting cooperation on either urgent or non-politically charged issues. As Leonard et.al. (2021) argue, a good starting point would be the concerning issues of permafrost, which could release 1,600 gigatons of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, or the goal of the CO₂ emissions removal. In both cases, the EU could use the EGD as a roadmap to produce concrete suggestions for the resolution of these problems.

C. Employ the EGD to forge new bilateral and global alliances, alleviate tensions emerging from its implementation, and upgrade its role in the global climate governance as a green normative power

The EU needs to employ the EGD to enhance pre-existing partnerships, forge new alliances, formulate bilateral and regional initiatives, and eventually, create a European-led coalition to tackle climate change. To achieve these goals, the EU should turn to its normative power. The effective use of its normative tools relying on procedural, transference, and overt diffusion of its norms to third actors and international institutions could contribute greatly to the success of the EGD and the ambition of global leadership. At the same time, the EGD offers a plethora of tools that could help establish the EU as ‘a green normative power’ on the global level. In this endeavour, the EU's biggest weapons are its values, expertise, instruments, and economic weight. Concerning funding, the EU has two crucial instruments: the EU budget (MFF) and the Next Generation EU, and the EU development policy.

When it comes to the latter, the overall size of the recovery packet is 1,8 trillion euros: the MFF is 1074,3 billion euros and the Next Generation recovery fund is 750 billion euros. From this amount, the EU pledged to devote 37% to climate action, which provides 600 billion euro to green transition (EC, 2021g). Considering the Council's focus on the external dimension, a percentage from this amount will also be assigned to exporting the EGD abroad. What this means is that the EU could have the budget to create or expand existing initiatives in third countries, allocated funds to sustainable projects in partner countries, attain presence in new markets, and establish new partnerships. Apropos of the EU development policy, the EU and the Member States disbursed 55% of the global help in 2019 in the Official Development Assistance. The new budget for 2021-2027 will further this leitmotif as it offers a new tool designed to bring together EU funds for external policies: the Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) (EC, 2021h). Having a budget of 79,5 billion euros, these funds could prove essential for the exportation of the EGD and green practices in the developing world. It also offers a holistic framework for the employment of all the funds and instruments, thus tackling pre-existing gaps and inefficiencies. Furthermore, the funds and expertise induced by the EGD offer the EU the possibility to establish itself as a global standard-setter for energy transition and emerging markets like the green, social, and sustainability-related bond and nascent hydrogen markets (Leonard et. al., 2021, p. 20).

The EU should ease potential tensions emerging from the implementation of the EGD. Specifically, the EGD influences the EU's relations with different parts of the world: Africa, G20, Western Balkans, Eastern Partnership, Southern Neighbourhood, Latin America, and the Caribbean (EC, 2019). Given the EU's size as a (collective) actor and input in the global economy, the European policies introduced by EGD could have external negative effects which might undermine its efficiency and appeal on the international stage. For instance, Russia has already expressed its dissatisfaction with the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism at the WTO, while Brazil and Indonesia have referred to the EU's actions as a new form of 'colonialism' (Euractiv, 2021; Douo, 2021). Notably, the EU has so far aggravated countries in Southeast Asia (Indonesia and Malaysia) through its 2018 decision to exclude palm oils from renewable energy targets and biofuels (Argus, 2020). Hence, the EU should prioritise the management of the EGD's repercussions on the neighbouring oil and gas-exporting states. So, it needs to utilise the upcoming decade (the deadline for the transition is 2030) to either accomplish a smooth and non-problematic green transition, always with the support of its energy partners, or use climate finance to help the neighbouring oil and gas-exporting states to expand their energy portfolios with greener fuels, which could be in the future exported to Europe. The EU should also abstain from abstract energy initiatives and instead adopt tailored approaches fitting the specific context of each case and country.

The EU should also use its economic weight, EGD, and diplomacy to reinforce bilateral partnerships or regional initiatives with third countries, and eventually shape a global European led coalition to fight against climate change. Bilateral relations and multilateral diplomacy are excellent ways for the EU to increase its climate diplomacy impact and facilitate the diffusion of its norms. A good place to start would be by collaborating with similar-minded countries. For example, the EU could work with the US to establish a common carbon adjustment mechanism and cooperate with other countries like Canada, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India to achieve and establish a more ambitious agenda on climate (EC, 2021d; Brzozowski, 2020). Indicatively, only the US and the EU account for over 40% of global GDP and nearly 30% of global imports (Eurostat, 2021). An alliance of similar minded partners could easily attract other third actors, block potential future problems on multilateral fora, and help shape a global climate architecture based on EU's norms and values. Still, it is important to make this alliance inclusive and open to all countries to avoid potential polarizing and neo-colonial narratives.

Strong interaction with emerging economies is also crucial for the internationalisation of the EGD. Indeed, the EU has identified the relevance of emerging economies in the EGD by various references to the G20 (EC, 2019). The developing countries have a significant impact and shares in their regional economy and could be important allies in international fora. The EU could use its expertise, technology, and trade to help the green transition of these states that have not only high potential for renewable energy but are also the most susceptible to the negative effects of climate change (UN, 2019). Trade agreements pose an excellent instrument to achieve this goal. Furthermore, the EU needs to take advantage of existing initiatives (the 2019 EU-Mercosur Agreement lacks ratification, and the EU-Indonesia Agreement are currently being negotiated) and use upcoming meetings (e.g., with members of the ASEAN and African Union) to forge ambitious climate partnerships (EC, 2020j). However, in all these agreements and partnerships, the EU should be guided by its normative power, thus making compliance with the Paris Climate Agreement a prerequisite for new EU trade deals (EC, 2019, 21). Apart from developing countries, the EU needs to put emphasis on the ecological transition in its immediate neighbourhood, specifically the Western Balkans, the Southern Neighbourhood, and the Eastern Partnership countries. Similar to developing countries, the EU should use its funds, expertise, and already established institutions and initiatives (e.g., the Green Fund in Western Balkans or the 2020 Eastern Partnership Policy) to support green projects and efforts for climate change adaptation.

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
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
7. Annexes

Annex 1. The European global climate diplomacy focusing on mitigation targets.




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Annex 2. All the areas that the European Green Deal affects.




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Annex 3. The external dimension of the European Green Deal.



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Annex 4. The European Climate Agenda in 2021.



Retrieved from: <https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/whats-next-europe-timeline-european-climate-and-energy-policy>



The European Green Deal: moving to action. Opportunities and challenges for the European citizens

EU as a green normative power:

How could the European Green Deal become a normative tool in EU's climate diplomacy?