



**Call for Papers "The European Green Deal: moving to action
Opportunities and challenges for the European citizens"**

**KEY CLIMATE ALLIES FROM THE EAST:
Redefining the EU Climate Diplomacy Strategy towards Asia**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Climate change has been brought forward as a crucial international priority and the European Green Deal well identifies the need for a global response. Given the leading role that the EU and Asian countries want to play in global climate governance, it is crucial for the EU to redefine its Climate Diplomacy Strategy towards Asia and better recognize the Asian countries as key allies in the fight against climate change. The climate context in Asia — China, India, Japan and South Korea study cases — and response to the EU's climate dialogue vary greatly across the region. Although most Asian countries have signed the Paris Agreement, they are experiencing transitional difficulties and socioeconomic challenges slowing down the introduction of an efficient EU climate discourse in the region. Our analysis revealed the need for tailored and co-leading strategies from the EU, as well as promoting its assertiveness and national cross-sectoral climate initiatives.

Social Media summary

Key climate allies in Asia: Why should the EU redefine its Climate Diplomacy Strategy in the region?

Keywords

#EuropeanGreenDeal #EU #Asia #ClimateGovernance #ClimateDiplomacy
#ClimateAction

Short bio

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Table of acronyms

AIF	Asia Investment Facility
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India, China
CBDR	Common But Differentiated Responsibility
COP	Conference of the Parties
EGD	European Green Deal
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHGs	Greenhouse gases
NAPCC	National Action Plan on Climate Change
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
PA	Paris Agreement
RES	Renewable Energy Sources
UN	United Nations
US	United States



Introduction

"Climate change does not respect border; it does not respect who you are – rich and poor, small and big. Therefore, this is what we call 'global challenges,' which require global solidarity." (Ban Ki-moon Remarks at the "Momentum for Change" Initiative, 6 December 2011)


With the European Green Deal (EGD) launched in 2019 and consisting of more than 50 climate-friendly political projects, the Von der Leyen Commission is not only sustaining the momentum by initiating a new set of priorities for its Union but also building a stronger "Green Deal diplomacy". The Commission's ground-breaking Green Deal strategy is redefining the future of the European Union's (EU) foreign policy and diplomatic relations (Leonard, 2021), including its climate diplomacy strategy.

While the EU plans to become the first climate-neutral continent by 2050, its actions alone are not sufficient to turn the climate change situation around. For years, Europe has struggled almost single-handedly to bring international climate policy to the multilateral negotiating table as one of the most important global issues (Dröge, 2021). As claimed recently by the Council of the EU (2021): *"Action by all countries in the world is necessary to limit a global temperature rise in line with the Paris Agreement."* Indeed, internal EU climate policies alone are not enough, especially given its share of global emissions only accounting for 8%, and decreasing (see Figure 3). It is extremely urgent to step up global efforts and promote ambitious climate policies beyond Europe, which echoes the newly redesigned Green Deal climate diplomacy strategy. In her annual State of the Union address, Ursula von der Leyen (2021), President of the European Commission, also emphasised the EU's role as a global climate leader and the scope of the Green Deal in achieving the EU's ambitious plans.

Accounting among the largest contributors to climate change, Asian countries inevitably hold a crucial role in the EU's climate diplomacy strategy. While China, India, Japan, South Korea and Indonesia are ranked among the top ten world's largest carbon emitters, the Asian continent is also one of the most affected regions by climate change (Chou, 2020; Figure 1, Friedlingstein *et al.*, 2020). While they are key allies and represent a great opportunity for the EU in its fight against climate change, the Asian countries also represent a serious challenge given its extremely diverse region in terms of political regimes, development levels and governance approaches to climate change (Chou, 2020). For this reason, this article will focus on the EU climate diplomacy strategy towards Asia, and more particularly the four biggest emitters in the region that are China, India, Japan and South Korea. Our observations of the climate context and bilateral relations in each country will lead us to list the challenges and opportunities that characterise the Asian continent, with the aim of formulating policy recommendations to improve the EU's climate strategy in Asia and ensure its success. Although the EU has long understood the importance of international climate action, it is crucial to scale up efforts with key stakeholders. Asia is a pivotal ally in the fight against climate change, however, the appropriate diplomatic mechanisms and strategies need to be properly identified to succeed.



Figure 1. CO₂ Territorial emissions in 2019 (MtCO₂) - Top 10 global emitters



Source: Data from the Global Carbon Project, Friedlingstein *et al.*, 2020

The EU's climate diplomacy strategy towards Asia

Climate change has become a central element of the EU's external policy which encompasses two main elements: climate diplomacy and climate finance. This research will primarily focus on the former. Following the Council of the EU's definition (2021), climate diplomacy refers to "*the EU's work in both multilateral fora and at a bilateral level on promoting ambitious global climate goals and actions in pursuit of a planetary transition towards climate neutrality.*"

The EU's pioneering role in driving national and global climate action began in the early 1990s through GHG reduction targets and policies (Torney, 2015). Its role and focus towards Asia evolved over time and has been punctuated by successive momentum and dynamics. Only after 2005 and the Kyoto Protocol, did the EU direct its attention towards Asia, and in particular its emerging economies with rapidly growing GHG emissions like China and India (Torney, 2015). Traditionally adopting a "leadership-by-example" approach and top-down global climate governance under United Nations (UN) auspices, the EU's climate diplomacy strategy has undergone major transformations since the early 2010s, especially after the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit, and now focuses instead on strengthening its bilateral relations with the world's largest emitters (Schunz, 2021). With its EGD flagship initiative, the EU reinforces its will to become a global leader on climate and environmental issues via the development of "*a stronger 'green deal diplomacy' focused on convincing and supporting others to take on their share*" (European Commission, 2019). According to Schunz (2021), the EU's climate diplomacy strategy experienced a strategic turn from self-centred, one-way bilateralism to a multi-bilateralism approach that better considers its partners' positions, interests and values and resulting in greater flexibility and stronger bilateral relations with well-selected partners.

In parallel to the UN climate fora, the core body for global climate negotiations, the EU and other major carbon emitters have engaged even more in smaller multilateral arenas, such as G7, G8 or G20, and bilateral cooperation exchanges to prepare multilateral negotiation rounds. European policy-makers have seized this opportunity and put additional efforts and resources in



bilateral outreach activities with key countries such as China (i.e. EU-China Partnership on Climate Change since 2005) and India (i.e. India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change also launched in 2005) (Torney, 2015). The EU's cooperation with Asia takes place both at the regional and country level where informal dialogues about climate change policies are held within fora such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Additional projects are also proof of the EU's engagement in the region, such as the Asia Investment Facility (AIF) and the SWITCH-Asia programme supporting Asia's transition towards a greener economy (European Commission, n.d.).

The EU's climate diplomacy strategy has evolved in the past decades and now pursues objectives which are no longer centred on its own internal climate regime but rather with a comprehensive approach better reflecting its partners' perspective on climate change and the complexity of global climate politics (Schunz, 2021). However, while the EU has clearly expressed its intention to support its partners in committing to more ambitious climate targets including with Asian nations, it is important to identify the appropriate tools and mechanisms at its disposal to do so effectively. Petri (2020) argues that while the EGD implements a new set of highly ambitious and comprehensive green priorities, it does not qualify as a diplomatic outreach strategy *per se*. They emphasise the risk for the EGD of becoming an "*empty shell for third countries to pick and choose which 'green' components to follow*" (Petri, 2020). If the EU is to avoid this dramatic fate, it is necessary to implement tailor-made strategies towards third countries. In the case of Asia, the first step is to analyse the climate context of the continent's largest carbon emitters.


The climate context in Asia

China

The unprecedented economic growth China has experienced over the last 40 years, and still ongoing (see Figure 2), has come at a significant environmental cost. In a bid to join the coveted club of the world's largest economies, China has propelled itself into the position of the world's largest emitter, producing more than a quarter of the world's annual GHG emissions, one of the main drivers of climate change (Maizland, 2021). Air pollution, water scarcity and soil contamination are direct consequences and manifestations of climate change in China threatening the health and livelihoods of its people (Maizland, 2021). China's domestic consumption of coal, increasing energy demands and socioeconomic development challenges represent the biggest hurdles for ambitious national climate targets (Dröge, 2021; Geall, 2017; Schunz, 2021). Yet, surprisingly, the 14th Five-Year Plan covering the years 2021-2025, draws, for the first time, long-term objectives with a peak in emissions planned before 2030 and carbon-neutrality before 2060 (Asian Development Bank, 2021). Under President Xi Jinping, China has embarked on more ambitious climate policies and has invested heavily in clean technologies to gain a global competitive advantage (Schunz, 2021), even though it remains highly insufficient (Climate Action Tracker, 2020).



Figure 2. China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita trend (1980-2026)



Source: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund, April 2021.

Initially sceptical about the importance of climate and environmental issues, China started showing interest for international cooperation in the 1990s, and has since gradually addressed environmental governance and protection equally to other economic political priorities (Chou, 2020). Although the Chinese government's engagement in international climate negotiations remains ambivalent, particularly following the Copenhagen Conference¹, China has recently become an indispensable partner, in particular to other Asian and fellow emerging countries with high emissions such as the BASIC² coalition sharing the same socioeconomic development issues and defending the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)³ principle (Yan & Torney, 2016; Kaneti, 2020). According to Kaneti (2020), such leading position and global leverage in the fight against climate change have been obtained thanks to "*three opportune moments*" initiated by the Chinese government which allowed China: to align its climate policies with the different UN programmes and projects; to take the leadership on RES technologies and to build clout in international climate governance.

Both in terms of their large share of emissions and their global influence in finding solutions to the climate crisis, the EU and China are key players whose role in global climate governance has evolved over the past two decades (Yan & Torney, 2016). Despite many frictions in their general bilateral relationship, both nations are on "*rather solidly good terms*" when it comes to climate change, which explains the cooperative approach the EU is adopting towards the country (Schunz, 2021). As Torney (2005) argues, the EU has played a leading role in bringing climate change onto the international stage and in awakening Chinese national interest in the issue and willingness to learn from the European experience (i.e. setting a national Emission Trading

¹ In 2009, at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen, China rejected a global emissions reduction target (Yan & Torney, 2016; Kaneti, 2020; Geall, 2017).

² The BASIC coalition consists of China, India, Brazil and South Africa.

³ "*Climate change is a common concern of humankind and States have common but differentiated responsibilities in the fight against climate change*" as introduced by China in 1991 (Secretariat of China's Environment Protection Committee of the State Council 1995: 265).



System). The EU-China cooperation and dialogue on climate change policy has been mainly developed within the framework of the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change, established in 2005 at the EU-China Summit (European Commission, 2005), and more recently reiterated in the EU-China Leaders' Statement on Climate Change and Clean Energy (EU-China, 2018). Their cooperation strengthened following the Paris Agreement (PA), and in particular after the United States (US) withdrawal from the agreement, which created a "*leadership vacuum*" that China had the opportunity to step into (Geall, 2017; Schunz, 2021).

While China is unlikely to take an international leadership position on climate, it offers EU policymakers the opportunity to keep the dialogue going and push the country towards greater and greener ambitions, particularly where China finds it advantageous, for technological, economic and soft power purposes (Geall, 2017; Kaneti, 2020). Although the EU has been able to exert its influence on China due to favourable domestic conditions (energy security issues, environmental deterioration, competitive advantages of RES, etc.), it also faces recurrent constraints and obstacles due to China's systemic competitive rivalry with the EU, its reluctance to commit to international standards (e.g. the GHG measurement standard) and its CBDR discourse (Torney, 2015; Dröge, 2021). The context is propitious, but the EU needs to find the right balance and the appropriate tools to engage more sustainably with China in an effective climate dialogue.

India

As the third world carbon emitter (Friedlingstein et al., 2020), India is, alongside China, a key player in global climate governance. Highly vulnerable to climate change, India has experienced several deadly floods, droughts and cyclones over the past decades which forced the government to address climate risks through public programmes (Narain, 2009). However, India has long been reluctant to enact concrete domestic actions against climate change, which, until recently, was not on the country's priority list. In 2007, India established the Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change, marking a shift in its climate change policy from a refusal to act to a co-benefits approach, implementing policies that limit GHG emissions as long as they are in line with other policy objectives (Torney, 2015). The following year, it published its first National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) designing eight priorities to address both climate protection and adaptation (Islam *et al.*, 2011). In its first and last Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), India pledges to reduce the intensity of its GDP emissions by 35 percent compared to 2005 levels and to increase the share of its non-fossil power-generation capacity to 40 percent by 2030 (India, 2016). While India is in line with the 2°C target, its efforts are not sufficient to meet the Paris Agreement 1.5°C limit (Climate Action Tracker, 2020).

The EU's climate diplomacy strategy towards India echoes the one originally designed towards China that is based on the "leading-by-example" principle in the hope they would adopt EU-like policies (Schunz, 2021). Unfortunately, the EU met strong resistance from India. The India-EU initiative on clean development and climate change, launched in 2005 and mirroring the EU-China agreement of the same year, ended up being "significantly less substantive" due to the Indian government's strong opposition (Torney, 2015). In contrast to the Chinese case, Torney (2015) concluded that there is little evidence of effective diffusion of EU climate policies in India, partly explained by a strictly different approach and prioritisation of the issue as well as unequal socio-economic conditions between the two parties. Dröge (2021) even argues that the Indian government "*has always been reserved on international environmental commitments*" because it considers the industrialised countries mainly responsible for climate change. Although frictions



will remain at the multilateral level in international climate change negotiations, the EU has spared no efforts to strengthen its climate diplomacy ties with India over the last decade. India and the EU have made progress on many fronts and worked hard to overcome their ideological disagreements (Jayaram, 2021). Such progress were initiated, among other things, thanks to the establishment of a new EU-India Clean Energy and Climate Partnership in 2016 and an EU-India Strategic Partnership Roadmap for 2025 in 2020, which induced stronger policy dialogue and cooperation on RES and energy efficiency projects (Schunz, 2021). Although India's cooperation with the EU is growing, it is rather its cooperation with some EU Member States that is driving their climate diplomacy relation (Jayaram, 2021).

Shoulder to shoulder with China, India is gradually transitioning into a low-carbon society and needs partners to promote its efforts. Prime Minister Narendra Modi even vowed in 2017 to "*go above and beyond*" the Paris accord to fight climate change (Times of India, 2017). The EU-India collaboration in the field of climate change could benefit both parties but should focus on the effective implementation of the eight priorities of the Indian NAPCC to address the socio-economic and climate change issues at once (Jayaram, 2021). This would allow the EU to spread its climate diplomacy dialogue in the region and have the support of India in the international forum.


Japan and South Korea

Being respectively the fifth and ninth carbon emitters (Friedlingstein et al., 2020), Japan and South Korea are also key actors that the EU should include in its climate diplomacy strategy, and yet, it has not yet been clearly drafted. Moreover, the existing literature on those two important players remains scarce when their situation is very different from India or China and would therefore require a tailored approach. Both countries' environmental pledges are *highly insufficient* to meet the PA targets (Climate Action Tracker, 2020) and seen as lacking ambition (Dröge, 2021; Hasegawa, 2020; Kalinowski, 2020). In Japan, the climate change issue is not considered a political priority which translates into a lack of interest for the energy transition and a negative attitude towards climate mitigation action (Hasegawa, 2020). Following a similar path, the current South Korea's government is showing little interest in climate policies and is regarded as underperforming in terms of emission reductions (Kalinowski, 2021). However, both nations wish to lead the race of green technologies with the implementation of green industrial policies that would also benefit their economic development (Dröge, 2021; Kalinowski, 2021).

Based on the currently available literature, the EU's climate diplomacy strategy towards Japan and South Korea is largely limited by their historical economic partnership. Indeed, unlike China and India, the EU has not yet concluded a climate partnership with Japan nor South Korea. Although the EU-Japan strategic partnership agreement addresses environmental issues and obliges Japan to act in accordance with the PA, it remains mainly focused on trade (Nakanishi, 2020). Concerning the EU-South Korea strategic partnership, Park (2020) argues that a stronger policy dialogue and common efforts are required in the field of climate change and energy to "*make the bilateral relationship more meaningful and commensurate to the weight of the two parties in the global politics and economy.*"



Figure 3. Annual total CO₂ emissions, by world region



Source: Our World in Data based on the Global Carbon Project

OurWorldInData.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions

• CC BY

Note: This measures CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels and cement production only – land use change is not included. 'Statistical differences' (included in the GCP dataset) are not included here.

Source: Our World in Data based on the Global Carbon Project, Friedlingstein *et al.*, 2020

The future of the EU Climate Diplomacy Strategy in Asia?

Challenges and opportunities to an EU Climate diplomacy strategy in Asia

Although most Asian countries have signed the PA and therefore pledged to submit their NDC every five years with a long-term vision for their national climate action plans that includes targets, measures and policies, Chou (2020) argues that they are experiencing transitional difficulties as they remain trapped in a carbon-intensive economic system. This is one of the greatest hurdles to the EU's climate diplomacy clout towards Asia. Indeed, the economic development difference between Asian countries and the EU explains the discrepancy in political priority, especially with regard to climate change. The drivers for climate action are not only different from the EU but also from one Asian country to another. Moreover, what applies to a well-developed and long industrialised region in terms of green transition may not apply to the various economic levels present in Asia. Primarily focused on socio-economic development policies, Asian nations show varying degrees of climate action interest and favour policies that would primarily benefit them economically and, thus, give lower priority to environmental issues and a differing drafting of climate policies (Torney, 2015).

As observed above and described by Schunz (2021), the EU's climate diplomacy strategy shift in the last decade was a way for the Union to adapt to the new geopolitical reality shaped by other players like China and the US. The EU is no longer "leading-by-example" and expecting



other countries to mimic its climate and environmental policies because other key actors are emerging on the stage and also wish to lead the climate negotiations. Asian countries are confronting the predominant vision the EU has been imposing regarding global climate governance, which means the Union now needs to re-evaluate its own position (Yan, 2016).

The EU-Asia climate relationship is not only characterised by challenges. The opportunities, if properly identified, could offer a silver lining to counterbalance the difficulties listed above. As explained by Schunz (2021), EU policy-makers realised "leading-by-example" was no longer the appropriate approach, but rather that they needed to strengthen the EU's strategic capacity to strengthen its influence in global climate negotiations. The desire of many Asian countries to play a leading role in global climate governance challenges the EU's position, but also offers the Union the possibility to make them accountable for climate change and to negotiate concrete climate actions and projects on an equal footing. Such an approach would leave room for innovative ideas and local initiatives to emerge, supported by the experience and weight of the EU. As Asian countries prioritise economic policies, green technologies represent a great opportunity for them to achieve the PA's goals while benefiting their economies and strengthening their voice in international negotiations. The EU therefore has an opening to establish a deeper climate dialogue and to promote appropriate national climate policies through the lens of green technologies.

Although the year 2020 and its COVID-19 outbreak have put the climate momentum on hold and hindered climate action progress for the following years, the EU already possesses the climate diplomacy tools to put the environmental issue back at the centre of priorities and strengthen a multilateralism approach to address the issue (Sanzay, 2020). Much is expected of the 2021 international climate agenda to make up for lost time, as most climate summits have been postponed while the financial pressure is even greater than before. The EU must seize this occasion to ensure climate change is back on the podium of priorities and convince developing countries to trust the UN process despite the consequences of the pandemic (Dröge, 2021).

Policy recommendations

Our observations prove that the response to the EU climate strategy can greatly differ from one country to another, and may remain trapped in historical economic agreements that hinder progress and does not concretely nor directly address the urgent issue of climate change. The EU climate strategy towards Asian countries should be adapted to the climate and political context of each country, as well as the global context (i.e. COVID-19), and go beyond the already existing climate initiatives and projects to ignite a climate dialogue at the political level.

- **Drafting a tailored approach:** While the EU has identified key allies in Asia, it needs to draft a tailored climate diplomacy approach for each of its partners in the region. The Council of the EU (2020) already underlined the importance of a tailor-made approach and "taking into account the need for a just, as well as socially balanced transition". Yet, our analysis revealed a lack of academic research and climate initiatives towards key allies on the continent such as Japan and South Korea, even though they are among the top world emitters. The same observation applies to other Asian nations like Indonesia which was not studied in this research while remaining an important carbon emitter. The EU shall broaden its climate diplomacy scope beyond China and India while maintaining close links with them. As highlighted earlier, a similar approach towards India and China has resulted in very different responses, which is why the emphasis must be put on better analysis of the climate context in each targeted country,



taking into account previous attempts, failures and successes to improve the overall EU's climate strategy in Asia. An important asset the EU needs to develop to do so is *strategic patience* as to find the right balance between its own interests and values and acknowledging the development gap with its partners' governments and systems (Pastukhova *et al.*, 2020).

- **From "leading-by-example" to co-leading:** As other key actors are emerging on the international climate negotiation stage, the "leading-by-example" approach originally featured by the EU is no longer appropriate. The EU now needs to promote a co-leading approach and strengthen its cooperative multiple bilateral climate strategy to ensure all major emitters contribute to the implementation of the PA (Schunz, 2021). A co-leadership approach would suggest creating synergies between governments to share information, experiences and tools to promote existing climate initiatives at the local level and make room for the creation of joint ideas and projects with the ambition to double efforts and efficiency.

- **Build the EU's assertiveness in climate negotiations:** Although the EU should primarily seek cooperation in the climate domain, it is also important that the Union affirms its own interests and values. As explained by Dröge (2021), to secure its strategic position, the EU needs to appear as a strong actor with its own claims and ensure its own interests in negotiations are met. The EU should not hesitate to use confrontational multi-bilateralism when necessary, as a way of ensuring that the level of ambition of its partners is in line with their commitments (Schunz, 2021).

- **Promote local cross-sectoral climate initiatives:** In Japan and South Korea, the business sector has a stronger voice than other civil society actors when it comes to climate change issues, which hampers the efficiency and impartiality of projects and policies. The EU should give a voice to civil societies in Asia to share their local climate knowledge with national governments and implement climate projects that do not only benefit the private sector (Chou, 2020). A cross-sectoral approach to climate change that involves all key stakeholders - national and local authorities, the public and private sectors, civil societies and financial institutions - is already an objective of the EU internally, which should therefore also promote this approach among its key allies in Asia (Sanzay, 2020).

Conclusion

As its economies grow and its environmental impact increases, Asia is becoming a *de facto* major player in global climate governance. The EU has only recently acknowledged the importance of its role and has mainly directed its climate diplomacy towards the region's largest economies with a significant environmental impact, namely China and India. As far as the climate discussion is concerned, other Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea, as discussed in this paper, have been neglected. While the EU has recognised the growing importance of Asia for the success of its efforts to combat climate change, its position towards Asian nations needs to be rethought and adapted to the local and global climate context. With the EGD, the climate issue has become a central element of the EU's external policy strategy and comes first to the bilateral and multilateral negotiating table, or at least should. However, the EU's legitimacy in promoting ambitious climate actions abroad has often been questioned by Asian players which call on the CBDR principle. Indeed, although the EU is at the forefront of climate action and its emissions account for "only" 8% globally, the issue of its historical responsibility for climate change undermines its efforts to build a coalition with non-EU countries. Moreover, its climate actions to



reach the PA targets are often judged as insufficient (Climate Action Tracker, 2020), which discredits its original "leadership-by-example" approach.

Nonetheless, China, India, Japan and South Korea still have a major and growing role in addressing the climate crisis. Given the impact of climate change on their people and biodiversity, their desire to take the lead on climate issues as well as offer an alternative discourse, and the economic benefits of green technologies, there is a window of opportunity open to them to build a greener economy. So far, their transitional difficulties, socioeconomic challenges, lack of political interest for climate change and impermeability to the EU climate discourse has slowed down progress on the introduction of an efficient EU climate diplomacy strategy in the region. Yet, many opportunities are emerging which the EU needs to seize as to enhance its climate diplomacy strategy. Given the leading role that the EU and Asian countries want to play in global climate governance, it is crucial for the EU to redefine its Climate Diplomacy Strategy towards Asia and better recognise the Asian countries as key allies in the fight against climate change.

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