



Call for Papers "Geopolitics & Values: what is the real power of the EU?"

Progressive realism as a model for Europe's new foreign policy

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Brussels, December 2020



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With the financial support of the European Parliament





EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Does Europe need more hammers to hit dangerously protruding nails into the ground or should it just be more cautious and better avoid sharp objects at all? Not wanting to spend too much time dealing with things that might hurt someone is never wrong, but to spend some money in materials that make it possible to construct some tools being useful in times of a crisis is neither. This is why this paper argues that Europe needs to adapt its foreign policy concept to the not necessarily peaceful 21. century by adding some aspects of hard power and realistic thinking to its current soft power approach, ending up as smart power. The article will therefore follow a concept called Progressive realism and examine the possibilities of future cooperation with the rest of the world by identifying so called success values, meaning aspects of shared interest between Europe and the respective partner.

Short bio

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Table of acronyms:

BMW: Bayerische Motoren Werke

EFTA: European Free Trade Association

EU: European Union

MERCOSUR: *Mercado Común del Sur*/ Southern Common Market

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

PLA: People's Liberation Army (of China)

SME: Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

SUV: Sport utility vehicle

TTIP: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

UAE: United Arab Emirates

US(A): United States (of America)

WHO: World Health Organization

WWII: Second World War

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1. Progressive realism as a model for Europe's new foreign policy

The European Union has faced a series of crises since 2008 that have shaken its core values and self-image. After years of deepening and expanding, the economic crisis, migration crisis, Brexit and climate crisis followed, to which the EU could only give inadequate answers. The provisional endpoint of this *decennium horribili* was the corona pandemic, which, in particular in the southern states, effectively nullified the positive effects of the introduction of the single market and the Euro and led to a further division of the EU (see Ettl & Zschäpitz, 2020). Nevertheless, Europe and the EU remain a part of the world with a high level of individual attraction as a continent of freedom and opportunity, as migration movements show. As a continent of values, though, it might have written down. Europe is no longer a shining “*city upon a hill*” politically, the concept of the EU as soft power seems exhausted. The EU's radiance weakened and other forms of government and value systems are gaining increasing influence within the Union. Tolerance towards same-sex love is falling again, emancipation of women is interpreted as a threat to European culture and the economic and political model of the Chinese single-party state with its New Silk Road or the authoritarian, personalized presidential systems of Russian or Turkish variant are becoming more popular. Not that Europe no longer exports values and norms sustainably into its neighbourhood, worse, in times of crisis it too often became the recipient of norms that weakened the cohesion of the Union, released fears and, based on them, centrifugal forces.

In this paper it shall therefore be argued that Europe needs to use Corona to reorganize its foreign policy concerning the way how it defines and finally achieves its goals. An institutional reform seems not very likely as too many states still see foreign policy as a *domain réservé* to the member states and insist on unanimity in the council of foreign minister, where conservative and liberal worldviews face and often threaten to block each other. The concept of smart power developed by Joseph Nye (see Nye, 2011) should act as the symbiotic basis, i.e. the thesis of combining realist hard and liberal soft power. Europe shall not want to become a hard power, but its role as soft power alone is not enough either. Robert Wright's approach, Progressive realism, should play a role in this (see Wright, 2006). Wright refers to Nye and asks how a one-sided foreign policy concept, in this case the interventionist hard power approach of the Bush-administration from 2000-2008, could be revised to increase global reputation again. He proposes a combination of measurable economic and diplomatic successes (realism) based on (progressive) values as a middle ground between selfishness and altruism, for example in the areas of weapon control, humanitarian interventions, trade or education. This means focusing multilaterally on topics where all participating sides clearly profit from the cooperation. Profit then sustains the cooperation and finally leads to a promotion of so-called success values with other partners as well.

This paper will therefore first briefly, and not exhaustively, revise the concepts of hard-, soft- and smart power and then explain the model of Progressive realism adapted to Europe's needs. The article will continue, making a detour around the world to identify success values for future cooperation to be promoted. Other values will be argued to be threatened more cautiously when dealing with this area. To describe these regions, the context under which politicians from these regions act, e.g. climate, natural resources, demography, history, religion and culture as well as security aspects, will be analysed as these factors have an impact on the specific values system of the region and its political system, which Europe's new foreign policy will have to take into account. This will finally bring the study to the point to advise Europe's foreign policy under the



aspect of values to redefine its perception and its approach towards some of these zones in the near future.

2. The concepts of power

The question of power is one of the core questions of political science. It can briefly be summarized as the active power of being able to do something and to bring other people to follow your will, but also as the defensive power to be in a position not to need to follow the will of someone else (see Nye, 2011 p.24,35). The means to exercise power do vary as do the preferences of states to use them. They reach from existing military capabilities to a large mercenary fleet to the aura of a fair negotiator or generous donor of goods. To intervene and to (re-)establish order, military forces like tanks, warships and war logistics are needed. This, as well as economic strength, is generally defined as hard power. On the contrary, role model function, the attractiveness of their own way of life and the spread of norms and values can be seen as central elements of states or regions that focus on a concept of soft power. There is no coercion in the concept of soft power, desire and role models are core elements instead. Soft power is currently used by Western states to promote their lifestyle and values such as democracy and human rights. The West used to set standards for other world regions with this. However, China, India, Islamic states and even Russia use their own soft power approaches for years now that do differ from the Western values and very often seriously challenge them. On a global level, the Western values do still prevail due to the lack of coherence of its challengers. But on a regional level, these new value systems are very often already fierce rivals, in particular in countries where the promises of freedom and economic wealth did finally not materialize to gain enough support within the local population. Here, the new value systems, very often based on old, traditional values of the region, regain ground on the cost of the Western values. This diminished the success of these Western norms as they are not seen as desirable anymore and rising new morals on the other hand question the legitimacy and the universal character of Western values. While the US can still rely on its armed forces, for Europe, these developments are more painful as the universal validity and acceptance of Western values are compellingly needed for the current European soft power approach. The EU at the moment does not have anything other but its values and the force of attraction. Thus Robert Kagan, considered a neoconservative political theoretician, was not completely wrong when stating that: *“If you have a hammer, all problems start to look like nails. But if you don't have a hammer, you don't want anything to look like a nail”* (Kagan, 2003 p.34). Kagan argues that the US might be criticized for having overused its hard power as under the Bush administration, but he on the contrary accuses the Europeans for not being willing nor able to use a hammer as they forgot to have some of them on stock even for very bad times. And times for Western values undoubtedly have even become stonier since then.

2.1 Smart power

This leads to the point where the question for a need of a new political approach arises. If the US were seen as having behaved too belligerent in the last decades, this was partly, as Kagan claims, as Europe was not sufficiently present in the hard power sector to defend Western values and left this to the US alone. Given the history of the EU, a union to unite its members in peace after two bloody wars, to abandon soft power and go on the warpath might not be a solution in accordance with its founding principles at all. So, the concept of smart power as defined by Joseph Nye might be a well-fitting solution for the EU to adapt to new challenges without leaving aside its moralist



principles. Nye is to be seen as the “*inventor*” of the term smart power to describe a combination of soft and hard power approaches in late 2003 in delimitation from Kagan, after the popularity of the USA in the Islamic world dropped again significantly as a consequence of US-lead invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In his book, “*The Future of Power*”, he specified the concept of smart power in 2011 with the lessons learnt since 2003. First of all, Nye defines the power of a state by using a formula to combine hard power facts (military, territory, population, economy) and political genius (see Nye, 2011 p.35). Politicians have to use the resources they have in respect with the context of the negotiation partner. For him, to respect the context in which power is used is crucial, there cannot be an absolute truth anymore in foreign politics. So, it is about the own countries’ capabilities that need to be best adapted to the needs and demands of the potential partner. To reach the desired results, a state needs resources as well as skilled politicians and diplomats that know about the needs of the other side and are able to bring together the wishes of both sides to a good compromise. Secondly, he therefore defines power as the ability of proper political action a state is able to conduct. In order to influence and reach out to other states, a nation needs a platform for its values to be communicated. Here, he clearly speaks out in favour of multilateralism. Multilateral formats provide the best range and an excellent atmosphere for political bargaining and negotiating. In these negotiations, he rejects states behaving altruistic or pretending not to have interests. If a state or a region does not have strong own interests, for the Western states the bare minimum they need to reach in multilateral formats is always to maintain the status quo and not to give in to regional values or authoritarian thoughts. This is the minimum success and in order to reach it, a combination of force, threat and attraction will prove the most effective (see *ibid.* p.153). States and regions that stick to pure threat or appeasement will fail. Hard power approaches will not win over the other side’s hearts. It will create more and more enemies until the combined capabilities of all enemies combined exceed their own hard power potential (see *ibid.*, 2006). Soft power approaches will often not be taken seriously by the other side if the negotiation parties do not share the same values. A failure to detect the potential threat to their own value system bears the risk of being exploited by the other side in a hostile way. This makes a soft power approach very often only credible if there are capabilities left to reinforce one’s position if needed by hard power. Smart power here would combine both approaches under five principles. First of all, negotiators need to define primary goals and mustn’t overload negotiations by nice-to-have-goals. Secondly, negotiators have to respect the resources they have and the context they are negotiating under. Thirdly, one needs to know the preferences and objects of desire of the other side. If differences arise here, they shall be voiced and not ignored as ignorance of the other’s interests leads to nowhere. Only if the third point is respected properly, the fourth decision will be taken properly as well. This decision is, which means of power are appropriate to use. Is it hard power via force, or is it soft power via attraction that has higher chances to prevail in the end? And to prevail is essential to remain a respected partner as the fifth question is about the probability of success (see *ibid.* 2011, p.300-302). Nye is quite direct here. According to him: “*even the most noble concerns can cause horrible damage if they are pursued by excessive optimism or deliberate blindness for the real prospects of success*” (*ibid.* p.301).

2.2 Progressive realism as variant of smart power

Based on this thought, Robert Wright developed his concept of Progressive realism from 2006 on. To him, a choice between: “*chillingly clinical self-interest or dangerously naive altruism*” (Wright, 2006) is not an option, he instead wants to: “*reconcile the humanitarian aims of idealists with the powerful logic of realists*” (*ibid.*). Therefore, he picked the name Progressive realism as



this term might contain a version of realism: “*that could attract many liberals and a progressivism that could attract some conservatives*” (ibid.). He defines several key points. First of all, Progressive realism has a major point with the traditional realism: the purpose of foreign policy is to serve national interest. However, a progressive approach is that these national interests are best served when progress in wellbeing around the world is made and there is self-constraint imposed on strong nations by the risk of being attacked if too dominant. This means for example, even strong nations with huge capabilities are safest, if they ensure that wealth is growing and more equally distributed around the world by taking care of functioning trade and markets and the spread of modern technology. Nations should abstain from protectionism and prefer rule based multilateral organizations on regional and global level to address regional, global and even national problems there instead. States shall also fight pandemics and climate change with the aid of these institutions as these are global problems. Wright also addresses the problem of free riders. Going unilaterally causes a lot of costs and a huge amount of capabilities needs to be kept at stock all the time. Which nations can or want to spend that much resources to defend a status of civilization all other nations profit from, too, but without sharing the burden for its maintenance? To him, this is a huge waste of money, reputation and soldiers’ lives for one state to bear alone. He argues for strong: „*multilateral structures capable of decisively forceful intervention and nation building*” (ibid.), under the oversight of a third party and burden sharing. Going alone for him does therefore not pay at all. In addition, states need to have a close look at the insight of other states foreign policy. Here, Wright abandons the path of realist thinking by stating that the interior, social and cultural dimension of a state or region defines its policy as much as geopolitics and hard facts such as raw materials or a large territory. Moral imagination is a keyword, which means one needs to put on the shoes of the other side and try to walk a bit in them to understand how walking with them works. This shall lead to respectful understanding of the other side. Reputation matters as well to Wright, as: “*domestic security depends increasingly on popular sentiment abroad*” (ibid.), which means it is important for states or regions to be perceived as good global citizens. Self-constraint in this sense means that a nation uses its existing power not to build up capacities, but to reduce them globally and appear peaceful. The key here is arms control. The best approach for national security is not to invade another country and destroy its weapons, the best for both sides would be to have an open exchange about interest and then to reduce the threat to each other by disarming the arsenals. The open exchange is necessary to build up trust and own openness is needed to make it harder for the other side to cheat. If betrayal is detected, the global indignation then still allows sanctions and in the worst case and invasion to eliminate the threat. Nations should be prepared to fight if necessary, to their own interest, but a regime change is not essential nor useful without respecting the context under which it might occur. Wright argues that: “*authoritarianism’s demise is a key long-term goal*” (ibid), but prefers: “*more indigenous, more culturally authentic paths to democracy than flow from invasion*” (ibid.). Nations should be patient with others and use technological progress and economy to promote change and not weapons or morals.

Nye picked up the thoughts of Wright in the same year again. He agreed that the US need to develop an integrated grand strategy with four key pillars:

- (1) providing security for the US and its allies with the allies contributing more;
- (2) maintaining a strong domestic and international economy;
- (3) avoiding environmental disasters (such as pandemics and global flooding); and



(4) encouraging liberal democracy and human rights at home and, where feasible, abroad.

(Nye, 2006).

The restriction where feasible is very important here, as it determines the successful outcome. To anticipate the same interests and value system with all negotiation partners would be ignorant and lead to a disaster. A series of foreign policy disasters however is the long-term death of every smart power approach as a region would lose any credibility and reliability with its problem-solving competences damaged and diminished several times. As stated above, the context matters. This cannot be ignored as Nye still sees the role of the leading powers in the international system, and the EU should probably be one of them, to produce global public or common goods and by defining its interests in a way that benefits all in order to guarantee one's own security (see *ibid.*). Nye therefore sees Progressive realism as a concept very much fitting into his definition of smart power.

This brings the argument finally back to the topic of success values and their implementation. These values should allow it to make foreign policy success measurable and tangible to a large number of people within the respective region. Wright argues that global interdependence has grown rapidly and concerning economics, environment or global security, all people sit in one boat, making the outcome of negotiations a win-win or lose-lose situation to the world. Win-lose outcomes are not really useful anymore. This means, foreign policy results need to be delivered as win-win situations to all parties involved. A nation flourishes if its counterparts flourish as well. As resources are not endless, it is important to priorities. What is secondary or even obstructive to create a win-win situation, remains secondary or untouched. Here, Wright plays the realist card when stating that: *“a nation's foreign policy will always favour the interests of its citizens and so fall short of moral perfection”* (Wright, 2006). However, he adds: *“by intertwining the fates of peoples, history is bringing national interest closer to moral ideals”* (*ibid.*). This means, both sides need to identify points they agree on and that they can turn easily into win-win situations. These points shall be defined in this paper as success values. By leaving aside other values that might turn cooperation into a lose-lose situation and therefore failure, they do not get lost, as both sides stick to these values. In the course of time, as success built up trust, they will return to the negotiation table with a higher chance of being converted into success values as well. In times of a crisis and growing distrust it might however be necessary to silently accept dissonances under the above-mentioned concepts of moral imagination and respectful understanding.

3. Strategies for the world

3.1 Europe's (South-)Eastern dimension and Russia

The first region to have a look at is the EU's eastern vicinity with Russia as a key player. The region will be divided into states with accession perspective (Serbia, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia, Albania, Georgia, Moldova, Bosnia, Kosovo) and those with no realistic perspective (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan). The first group is quite close to the EU already. Although Russian influence might persist and China's influence grows, the only realistic perspective for them is EU accession in the next two generations. This means, the EU can be quite strict and does not need to be all too cautious as neither China nor Russia are real rivals here. Both of them are more interested in influencing states already within the Union. However, accession



should be a long-term goal, as Europe currently should abstain from expanding. Given the current split of the EU into East and West, North and South, further states with huge conflicts with each other and a weak economy are not really what the Union needs at the moment. To turn the back to them is nevertheless wrong as well. An honest approach stops accession talks for now and puts these states in the waiting room for a period of time again under clear conditions with economic support and close ties at first. The EU should still allow workforce from these countries to come to Europe and further extend educational cooperation. EFTA might be the first community to be joined. Inclusion into Schengen might follow after some judicial reforms as the next step then. Full accession can only be granted after a period of political and democratic stability not under 30 years. EU should help to maintain this stability but also make clear that it must be the politicians and the voters in those countries to want the political system liberal and democratic to join the EU. Otherwise, a relapse after entering the Union might be too likely.

With the second group, Russia comes into play. The country with its rather hard power approach is a veto player in many states and the fate of these states is intertwined with the will of Russia. However, Russia is not only an aggressor, it is highly vulnerable. As Tim Marshall puts it (Marshall, 2016), Russia has no natural borders. The Baltics joining NATO was already a huge blow to its security interests. Here, Europe only saw the right of self-determination of states to join organisations they want to join. That's not an acceptable point for Progressive-realists as it ignores the Russian interests and Europe now for several times underestimated the Russian will to keep its zone of influence. Be it Georgia, the Ukraine, Crimea, Kirgizia, Syria and recently Belarus: if Russia feels overplayed on the green table, the Kremlin is still able to send in troops to defend or even occupy points of strategic interest. By doing so, it every time humiliates Europe's foreign policy as the EU cannot answer adequately to Russia. It is not united in sanctions nor does it have an army to react. If member states call for protection, the Brussels number they have to dial is the one of NATO and not of the European Commission. This is a lose-lose Situation. Russia is more afraid of China taking away its raw materials in Siberia than of a NATO landing in St. Petersburg, but can hardly do anything against growing Chinese influence in Central Asia and Mongolia. It however can risk a confrontation with the EU, which would not be needed at all if both sides could agree to find common ground and mark their territory. A top priority of EU foreign policy therefore has to be a European Army and an agreement with Russia that reflects both: the right of states to freely join the Union as well as Russia interests in a buffer zone.

Success values therefore would be the promotion of economic stability, human and citizens' rights, and democracy in the potential accession states. With Russia, economic exchange, Russia's role as energy supplier, treaties on weapon control as well as environmental and development aid are key. Europe should not want to convert Russia to Western values as it is not a member of the EU nor the Western values community. If Russia violates these values on the European ground, the Union shall be prepared to defend its values anyway, but in Progressive realist way priorities matter and it is more important to win over Russia to fight climate change or pandemics than to force it to accept Western views on social or human rights. This might come afterwards if successful cooperation in other fields creates a trustworthy base for additional success values.

3.2 Europe, the USA and the Global West

This region should probably mirror the best the European mindset. Economically, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the USA, the EFTA states and the European Union are almost on one



level concerning wealth. They generally share a common sense for economic cooperation, democracy, human rights and multilateralism. This is due to the fact that historically, most of them also share the same decisive events and turning points since 1900. The leading nation among this group is without doubt the USA. However, Europe should not expect to be able to mirror itself with the USA. There are historical facts that determined the political system and the values of the „*New World*“ another way as this happened on the „*Old Continent*“, going back longer than 120 years. There are certainly familiar ties over the Atlantic, but the USA are not Europe's lost sibling. So, when judging the USA, Europe should abstain from overmoralism. Minority rights, the right to bear and use weapons, the readiness to use force as a political medium to implement policy goals, all this might not be understandable at all if one puts not enough distance between Europe and the USA. The American role as world police was not natural as the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 or the Good Neighbour Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the late 1930s show. It was Europe and Asia that called twice for American help in 1914 and 1939. Critics of the US-behaviour argue that the Monroe Doctrine was even responsible for WWII as the Americans stayed away from the League of Nations and abandoned Europe in times of huge uncertainty. On the other hand, the USA was essential for the creation of Europe and its development to a non-communist, liberal democratic union of nations after the war. This should never be forgotten (see MacMillan, 2019). So, what is Europe's problem with the USA about? First of all, the relations with no other world region are better and friendlier than with the USA and the rest of the Western world. Europe can still find a lot of success values it can develop in cooperation with the USA and has hardly any points it needs to be cautious about. Nevertheless, going back to Robert Kagan's example of hammers and nails, Europe needs to learn how to use the hammer, too. A responsible use is needed and this means Europe has finally to buy a hammer of its own and should not always call its American neighbour to borrow one. It is obvious that every good household in the 21st century should have a hammer as this does not automatically mean that every household owner needs to have nailing as a favourite hobby. But standing on your own feet in military terms will definitely help to improve Europe's standing in the world. The USA could not accuse Europe of free riding tendencies and states like Russia or Turkey would know that there is an own European military besides NATO that is to be taken into account. The second problem might be an economic imbalance between imports and exports. This issue is home grown as well, but this time by the Americans. A free market as demanded by Progressive realists lives from the principle of demand and supply. However, there is not a lot of demand for all day goods from the USA in Europe as US companies often ignored the particularities of potential European consumers. One picture that was disturbing the negotiations of TTIP was the chlorinated chicken (see proplanta.de, 2014). For Europeans, this was the ideal picture they had from the US-agricultural business, overusing natural resources, pesticides and chemicals. The Americans could not understand these reservations as they considered their industry efficient and chlorinated products free of pathogens. This example shows that both sides wanting the same have often different access to issues. But if American companies want to regain ground in Europe, they will have to excel with their products according to European standards. This might be the only suitable way to get a better balance sheet in the end as it cannot be a state policy in Progressive-realist sense to introduce protectionist measures. On the other hand, Corona shows that both sides still can compete in a friendly and stimulating way on a very high level, e.g. with regard to vaccination research (see Welt.de, 2020). Also, American companies have only a few problems to establish themselves with new ideas in Europe, as the example of Tesla in Brandenburg recently showed. Vice versa the biggest BMW factory



worldwide with an output of 1 500 cars per day is not situated in Bavaria, but in South Carolina, with a focus on SUVs for the American market (see Merkur.de, 2017).

So, Europe should not overemphasize minor differences and walk along in peaceful coexistence with its Western allies, promoting Western values and also be prepared to pay a fair share of the maintenance costs.

3.3 Europe, China and Eastern Asia

Speaking from the USA as a natural ally, China can be seen as the opposite: the natural rival of Europe. This is generally as China very successfully already developed a smart power strategy, but one that is not compatible with the values of Progressive realists at all. China invested a lot in both, its economic and military hard power capabilities as well as its soft power appeal, operating panda diplomacy, establishing Confucius Institutes and constructing harbours, streets and factories all over the world to promote development and progress. The difference between a global Progressive realist approach and the Chinese one is that China acts completely realist, hiding an authoritarian one-party regime that ignores the bare minimum standards of human rights behind a patient and friendly face. China expects other states to comply and not to criticise Chinese politics and, above all, to repay debts. So Chinese investment at best is borrowed and the main profiteer is always China which is accused of debt-trap a lot of countries in development in Africa and Asia (see TRT World, 2019). In other global policy fields, be it environment, trade or health, China does not assume the responsibility it has as the world's biggest national economy. Concerning global pollution, China wants to be threatened as a developing country and not as a highly industrialised state that might have to reduce its energy consumption. With respect to trade, China disrespects copyright agreements, is still not very open to foreign companies and runs a large number of its own businesses by the state. That makes it hard to establish trustful cooperation under free market conditions, in particular as Chinese technology is said to be an entrance gate for Chinese state espionage. Focusing on Corona, China sends a lot of masks and medical technology to support other states. But these masks mainly produced not more than nice pictures on airports as they did often not meet any quality standard required in hospitals. If China would have acted more transparent and responsible at the beginning of the crisis, a global pandemic might have been avoidable. This was not the case and even worse, China might have used its influence on the WHO to suppress early information given to the public by its own doctors and specialists from Taiwan (see Rother & Zantow, 2020). This shows the misuse of multilateral formats by China. It seems also not ready to accept any weapons control dialogue and invests year by year more into its People's Liberation Army, making it the second strongest army. Tibet seems already forgotten; Inner Mongolia was never a big issue in Europe. Today we speak about the Uyghurs and Hongkong. Tomorrow probably about Taiwan and some glaciers in the Chinese-Indian border area. China is expanding, becoming a real threat to its mostly pro-Western, democratic neighbours Japan, South Korea, Mongolia or already mentioned Taiwan. Europe needs to be prepared to stand by these states and has to learn from the example of Hongkong, where China exploited Europe's soft power approach. It is not that Margret Thatcher did not anticipate what was coming, but the British lease of the fragrant harbour was running out and a treaty was a treaty. With the British army not being able to stop the PLA at all, the handover of 1997 was inevitable due to diplomatic and military reasons. This made Thatcher to negotiate the Joint Declaration in 1984, where she tried to preserve as much civil liberties as possible. Nevertheless, she detested that Western minded people were handed over without a lot of reinsurance to an authoritarian regime into an uncertain



future and saw this as a disaster for the people and a big defeat for the West (see Moore, 2019 p.767f.).

Bearing Hong-Kong in mind, Europe shall not hope for any Chinese self-restraint, it has to expect China to challenge its values and needs to develop an answer to this expanding power. Cooperating at best takes place in the field of trade and economy as China needs Europe's markets as an end point for its Belt and Road Initiative, whereas Europe should not hope to achieve much in the political and humanitarian arena when negotiating with China.

3.4 Europe and the Islamic world

The Islamic world is a chance and a risk to Europe, which means a mutual understanding is of utter importance. This is particularly true as these relations are also important from the point of domestic politics with Islam growing within several member states. Two aspects are mainly causing this tendency: the very high fertility rate- in Germany 44% of Muslim women get more than three children compared to 14% of autochthone German women (see Leubecher, 2019)- and rising migration from the Islamic world to Europe. The most prominent concept to better integrate Muslims into the European value system is the Euroislam. It would cut off ties between foreign Islamic centres and create a more Western and liberal version of Islam with new religious centres in Europe. However, success so far is very limited and critics call this concept completely naive cloistered as Muslims are linked all over the world via the Ummah as core value and cannot renounce this, as leaving the Ummah means to stop being Muslim. This brings into play the foreign dimension of Islam in Europe. If the rules of Islam are made abroad, Europe needs to try to influence them in a way of peaceful coexistence. Europe might need energy and workforce from these areas but above all it has an interest in peace and stability to limit flight and migration movements. The needs for qualified workforce might be to satisfy as for example the former Austrian foreign minister Karin Kneissl stated, that there are millions of potential migrants in Northern Africa and Arabia that: *"cannot create an adequate status for themselves at home"* (Siebenhaar, 2018). Given this, there is certainly a need within the governments in the Islamic world to accept a kind of exchange: they take back illegal immigrants or radicalized citizens and Europe in exchange provides young migrants with scholarships for education and work to study and earn money. Europe should promote this way quickly as the young people will have to find a workplace to make a life soon. This means the exchange to Europe has to be limited to the purposes of work and education in order not to repeat the mistake of the Gastarbeiter generation in North- and Central Europe of the 1960s. It should not be Muslim values coming from the Islamic world, but young Muslims taking Western values back to their home states. Therefore, the founding of families has to happen only there with a reduced number of children and a European lifestyle experience during the time abroad. The core principle of cooperation with the Islamic world has therefore to be defined as help to self-help. The admission of further permanent immigrants on the other hand seems not appropriate as long as already existing problems have not been solved and strengthen extreme political forces within the EU. When it comes to values besides hard facts like trade, energy or demography, Europe and the Islamic world are probably only neighbours in geographic terms due to the high influence of religion here and the high degree of non-religiosity there. A recent example would be the Mohammed caricatures. They caused uproar in the Muslim world whereas French president Macron insisted on the liberty of expression. But there were also some voices of disarmament, as some politicians e.g. in Egypt and the UAE stated, they feel outraged by the cartoons, but accept that they are part of the Western culture (see News Digital Hai, 2020). Here, the success value is reciprocal tolerance. The Muslim world needs to tolerate



this Western will to portrait even religious figures. However, the West should impose its quite absolute views on freedom of art and expression on the Islamic world. If Westerners go in holidays or work in predominantly Muslim states, they will have to accept the Islamic views on the matter and that it might not be allowed to hurt religious feelings. If Europe manages to accept the high level of religiosity and its importance to Muslims and vice versa, it can in the long run establish quite a lot of win-win agreements concerning the exchange of workforce, energy security, safe borders and via work exchange maybe also the implementation of Western democracy and human rights.

3.5 Europe and its environmental neighbours: Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia

The growing migration pressure, the failure of the Mercosur agreement and the need for renewable resources has shown that these regions are probably more key to the global future than generally assumed. They own a large population surplus that is still growing as well as large parts of the world's rainforests. They hardly export industrialized goods but depend on cash crops and raw materials, having a growing population. So, the ideal sales market for Europe? If you want to create a lose-lose situation as Mercosur did, yes. If you follow the principles of Progressive realism, then definitely not. First of all, Europe does not need a workforce to that amount these three regions could provide. It also does not need cash crops or food products grown on earlier deforested fields that in turn put pressure on European farmers. So, what are Europe's interests here? Europe primarily needs intact tropical forests. In order to keep them, it needs those states to have a stable demographic development and shall host only a limited number of skilled workforces from there and not allow these regions to export their population surplus to Europe or the rain forests. This would put high pressure on these regions to introduce family planning measures. Europe then should support these measures under a sugar bread and whip approach. A solid stance is necessary as these regions are environmentally highly vulnerable and not stopping those regions from settling these crucial areas will end in a climatic disaster for the world. The first victims would be in particular African states where soil degradation, water and food scarcity and desertification are making rapid progress whereas a high fertility rate is still in fact eating up the demographic dividend needed to develop the region (see Kaps & Schewe, 2019). Africa not able to develop will however put enormous demographic pressure on Europe to host a part of Africa's population which in turn will lead to the rise of authoritarian, anti-immigration parties from Lisbon to Helsinki. This would then change the political landscape of the EU in a drastic way or even destroy the Union. Latin America, India and Southeast Asia are doing better in terms of demographic dividend, but are constantly looking for new places for settlers from overcrowded regions and new fields for palm oil plantations, soybeans or cattle herds. Here, Europe shall set limits as well as the ecological balance of these goods grown in the southern hemisphere and consumed further north is devastating (see Milhahn, 2010). Europe therefore needs to reduce its use of these products on the one hand and on the other hand develop concepts to sustainably support these regions and bringing them closer to the EU as it becomes nowhere more evident that in the long run, due to the ecologic impact, Europe will only flourish if these regions do so, too.

Success values would therefore be education, in particular in the field of environment and family planning, environmental protection and economic cooperation with a focus on sustainability. This means for example that only food that is not available in Europe should be bought as a cash crop from these regions in limited numbers. A focus should be on renewable, meaning sustainable, energy sources instead, where there is a real demand in Europe. European companies might sell cars, chemicals and machines to these regions, but the bills might be partly paid by the European



Union which instead gets the right to put rain forest areas under its protection. It is also essential that European companies do not destroy the SMEs developing in these regions as these small companies provide work in the regions to the people and prevent them from migrating to Europe. Europe needs to impose a certain degree of self-restraint on its companies in order not to flood these markets with goods that could be produced in the regions themselves under ecologically better conditions. Goods that are really needed shall be traded and exchanged, but under strict regulations and rules that allow the local economies to breath and develop out of their own power.

4. **Progressive realism: A European conclusion**

With respect to the four points Nye demanded to have the USA in mind when developing its grand strategy (security and help for allies, strong economy and trade, avoid environmental problems and support liberal democracy at home and, where possible, abroad), the same can be done for Europe. The upcoming Debate on the Future of the EU does not make sense without a substantial reform of the foreign policy goals. Progressive realism here gives a guideline on how to reconcile Europe's conservatives and liberals. This paper has examined briefly Europe's potential amid its relations with other world regions and had identified core values and areas of self-restraint:

Europe and:	Success values:	Self- restraint:
All partners	Multilateralism	„Absolute truth“& overmoralism
Eastern Europe and Russia	Economic cooperation and development Long-term accession criterias Military independence	Limitless enlargement Regime changes
USA and Global West	Economic cooperation Human Rights Environment protection	False familiarity Free riding
China and East Asia	Technology and Economy Fair Trade	Human rights Western democracy Regime change
The Islamic world	Education and Tolerance Create jobs and work exchange Energy security	Religion Western democracy Regime changes
Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia	Education Environmental protection Economic development Demography	Overuse of economic power Unregulated and unfair trade

Table 1: Europe's new foreign policy: Success values and self-restraint. Source: Own work.

Given this, Europe's decision makers shall be advised to be aware of their limited resources at first. Secondly, they have to use the current debating process to consult its citizens and redefine



the main goals of European foreign policy. Europe shall produce common goods for the world, but it also has to clarify its own interests. This means, lawmakers shall prioritize and prefer the stable path via commonly shared success values over the risky trail of getting everything solved at once to European standards. Politicians shall furthermore always respect the need and the context (history, culture, religion, demographic situation, geography, climate, resources) of the other side and at the same time not forget Europe's interests as a community of liberal Western values. Given the failure of the last American administrations to behave progressive-realist, Europe could be the first region in the world to do so. It might be worth a try.

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