The Spatial Dispersion of Populist Voting in the European Union

An Early Warning System for the Just Transition

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The Spatial Dispersion of Populist Voting in the European Union. An Early Warning System for the Just Transition

Democracy versus autocracy

DEMOCRACY VERSUS AUTOCRACY. WHY THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM IS SUPERIOR AND HOW IT CAN DEFEAT AUTOCRACY

THE SPATIAL DISPERSION OF POPULIST VOTING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. AN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM FOR THE JUST TRANSITION

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The EU's ambitious GHG reduction targets foresee the eventual phase-out of coal, peat, oil shale, and other fossil fuels across its territory. This decarbonisation process will inevitably harm some regional economies more than others. Could worsening socio-economic disparities between regions set the stage for a new populist wave across Europe? A socially just transition away from coal and other fossil fuels should be the remedy. The following paper explores whether European coal regions exhibit the structural characteristics associated with higher support for populist parties. Consequently, it makes the case for targeted policy intervention to ensure the success of the just transition and hinder authoritarianist sentiments.

Social Media summary

The European Green Deal envisions Europe becoming the first climate neutral continent by 2050. Will this green transition be socially just, or will it produce losers, like globalisation did? Can those that were left behind rally under the banners of anti-environmentalist or eurosceptic populism? And what can the EU do about it in order to assert its capacity for governance?

Keywords

#justtransition #greentransition #populism #climatechange #coalphaseout

Short bio

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TABLE OF ACRONYMS

EC   European Commission
ECP   European Climate Policy
EGD   European Green Deal
EP   European Parliament
EU   European Union
GHG   Green House Gas
JTF   Just Transition Fund
JTM   Just Transition Mechanism
MW   Megawatt
NUTS   Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics
R&D   Research and Development
RWPP   Right-wing populist party

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Introduction

The European Green Deal's ambitious decarbonisation targets imply the eventual phase-out of coal and other fossil fuels across the European Union. Currently, 23 EU Member states have committed to a complete coal phase-out between 2021 and 2038. Under binding GHG emission reduction targets, the rest of the Member states are bound to follow. This process disproportionately endangers some European regions more than others, which could likely lead to growing social and economic disparities between regional communities, despite efforts to ensure the so-called *just transition*. Such developments have the grave potential of exacerbating the on-going wave of authoritarianist sentiment, which in the EU takes the form of populist 'anti-system' movements.

The EU's main policy lever to facilitate a just transition away from fossil fuels is the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM). The JTM will mobilize roughly €55 billion in the next five years, which will be funnelled towards those regions which have the highest stake in carbon dependent industries, and in particular Europe's coal regions. The aims of those funds are to create new employment opportunities, offer re-skilling programs, invest in low-carbon technologies in manufacturing industries, etc. Researchers emphasize that a successful just transition strategy must be carried out in conjunction with the regional economic, social, and political context and realistically requires at least 10-12 years (Galgóczi, 2019, pp. 26-27).

The following research aims to identify those European regions, whose socio-economic environment, as well as past voting behaviour, suggest a high risk of increase of populist support, which could be further exacerbated by the worsening economic conditions due to decarbonisation policies and coal phase-out in those regions. Consequently, a typology of regions will be constructed which can serve as a quasi-early-warning system for EU and national policy makers to target just transition policy measures accordingly and foster synergies between policy approaches and political objectives. A major strength of this research proposal is the utility it provides for policy action. One of the cornerstones of EU's JTM is the aim of fostering policy synergies, in order to maximise its effect given the budget constraint of the Just Transition Fund and other related financial sources. Therefore, it is advisable for national and EU transition strategies to target those harmful effects of the green transition which can not only deteriorate the economic situation of local economies, but also deteriorate trust in institutions and democratic values as a whole. Ultimately, the way in which the EU and its Members tackle the green transition will be detrimental for how multilateralism and the EU's governance capacity are perceived, especially by those people who could be considered 'left behind'.

Literature Review

The rise of right-wing populism across Europe has spurred intensive research on its causes and the contextual characteristics of the communities which are most susceptible to its political messages (Margalit, 2019; Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Muis and Immerzeel, 2017). While there are many definitions for what constitutes populism, this analysis will use Mudde's framework of populism as a 'thin-centred ideology', which focuses predominantly on the dichotomy between two homogenous groups - *corrupt elites* and *the pure people* (2004, p. 543). Furthermore, given the focus on European climate policy and its potential to aggravate populist sentiments, the main concern will be right-wing populist parties (RWPPs), which in Europe are often associated with anti-environmentalism and euroscepticism (Huber et al, 2021).

There is wide consensus among researchers regarding the importance of economic conditions as key determinants of voting behaviour (Anderson, 2021; Di Matteo and Mariotti, 2020; van Leeuwen and Vega, 2021) Empirical evidence suggests that factors such as unemployment, economic prosperity, and the economic structure (especially the relative share of traditional manufacturing industries) significantly influence the populist vote (Rodrik, 2021; Rodrik, 2018). While such findings are extremely relevant for this analysis since they can serve as indicators for a region's potential inclination towards populist parties, a broader and more qualitative theoretical framework of the determinants of populism should be outlined, which can accommodate European climate policy as a source of likely friction between citizens and the EU.

The literature identifies two broad categories of explanations for populist support – structural/economic and cultural factors, with different researchers emphasizing one or the other as having explanatory primacy (Anderson, 2021, p. 7; van Leeuwen and Vega, 2021, p. 214). In Europe, the culture thesis mainly revolves around immigration issues, especially regarding Muslims, as can be exhibited by the rhetoric of France's National Rally, Germany's Alternative for Germany, Hungary's Fidesz, etc. Another feature of far-right populists is their pronounced social conservatism, which often devolves into traditionalism as is the case of Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) party. While the importance of cultural factors is unquestionable and well outlined in the literature (Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Margalit, 2019), Rodrik argues that such factors can be seen as intermediaries which amplify the political effects of economic shocks (2021, p. 135). The structural/economic thesis explains the increased demand for populism as the result of long-term structural shifts of the economy, mostly stemming from globalization. These economic shifts culminate in large economic shocks, such as the Great Recession of 2008, which in turn create a feeling of disillusionment and set forth the so-called 'populist wave'. Such an

interpretation directly relates to decarbonisation policy and the economic consequences which it will have, especially for regions which are dependent on coal-related activities. That is because a comprehensive and rapid coal-phase out has the potential to create an economic shock of similar magnitude for such regions.

A deeper look into the patterns of populist sentiment in Europe illuminates the crucial importance of the physical space in which this process is embedded. Anderson states that "populism is often very much about 'place' and that the territorial distribution of populist attitudes matters" (Anderson, 2021, p. 7). This notion is at the forefront of growing research which emphasizes economic and cultural contexts as spatially bound and qualitatively diverse, resulting in regional differentials in the demand for populism, which need to be taken into account (see Essletzbichler, Disslbacher and Moser, 2018; Essletzbichler *et al*, 2021; Rodriguez-Pose, 2018). By focusing on the regional as opposed to the individual level of voting patterns, this territorial perspective is capable of reconciling the economic/structural and cultural explanations in a coherent narrative, while also accounting for empirical findings which show populism spreading among relatively affluent voters. Rodriguez-Pose argues that populist sentiments resonate not with the 'people that don't matter' but with 'the places that don't matter' and that the people that are or used to be well-off in those communities are key consumers of the supply of populism (Rodriguez-Pose, 2018, p. 201). Furthermore, this holistic explanation also ties neatly with the fact that old industrial areas (OIAs) in Europe and the United States such as the Rust Belt in the US, the Ruhr area in Germany, the north-east of France, and industrial towns in England and Wales have exhibited significant shifts towards populism (Anderson, 2021, p. 1). Indeed, the notion that European climate policy and decarbonization in particular pose a significant risk of aggravating populist support in coal-dependent regions is underpinned by the fact that indirect coal-related employment is mainly concentrated in traditional manufacturing and especially the iron and steel industry (Mandras and Salotti, 2021, p. 2).

Transition towards carbon net-neutrality in the EU, if not properly managed, can set forth a massive negative shock for the European economy, with some model estimates amounting to roughly 350,000 jobs lost as a result of the coal, peat, and oil shale phase-out (Mandras and Salotti, 2021, p. 8). These developments will disproportionately affect some regions' economies more than others and potentially create an environment where populist ideas can thrive. Particularly right-wing populism is likely to challenge ambitious climate policy by framing the issue as an attempt of the elites to assault the economic and cultural life of 'ordinary people' (Huber et al, 2021, p. 1002). Such a narrative can discredit EU's legitimacy and

greatly imperil its supranational role in coordinating and implementing the European Green Deal. Nevertheless, an analysis by Adelphi on the parties in the European Parliament found that only seven out of 21 RWPPs strongly oppose ambitious climate policy, while 11 of them are either disengaged or take ambiguous action on the issue. However, the authors still express strong concern that many of the disengaged populist parties are likely to enter the debate once the issue becomes more pronounced on the political agenda. Furthermore, they anticipate that centrist parties can shift towards a more reactionary position and start to cater towards climate-sceptic positions (Schaller and Carius, 2019). Therefore, it should be the EU's utmost priority to ensure that the Just Transition Mechanism delivers on its targets, given that it is not only the regional economies of coal-dependent regions that are at stake, but rather the overall credibility and governance capacity of the EU.

Europe's coal, peat, and oil shale industry

While coal's importance as an energy source has steadily decreased in recent decades, it still accounted for about 15% of the EU's electricity production in 2020, controlling for the decrease in demand due to the COVID-19 pandemic (Redl et al, 2021). Direct employment in the coal industry is mainly concentrated in Poland, Germany, Spain, Czech Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria and is estimated at roughly 200,000 jobs, with 75% of them in the mining sector and the rest in coal-fired power plants (Mandras and Salotti, 2021, p. 2). Moreover, the coal value chain employs further 150,000 workers with some estimates going as high as 215,000 (Alves Dias et al, 2018, p. 2). Naturally, most of those indirect jobs are not randomly dispersed in space, rather they are concentrated in or around the coal regions. Peat and oil shale are also threatened by phase-out related to ECP and are included in the analysis, although their relative importance is much lower. Currently, six EU Member states use peat, namely Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Sweden. Among them, Ireland and Finland have made clear commitments towards either full or partial phase-out. Oil shale is used only in Estonia. Figure 1 presents an estimate of direct and intraregional indirect jobs in the coal, peat and oil shale industry. Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic each have at least one NUTS 2 region which employs more than 10,000 people either directly or indirectly related to coal. Most notably, the Śląskie region in Poland employs 80,000 people in coal production and a further 20,000 which are indirectly related to the coal industry. Overall, there is 23 NUTS 2 regions with more than 3,000 people employed in the relevant sectors. Another 16 regions with between 1,000 and 3,000 potential jobs at risk can also exhibit significant economic damage from the phase-out. Note, that indirect interregional jobs, which are also under threat, are not considered here.

Figure 1 – Total domestic jobs in coal, peat and oil shale industry (NUTS 2)[1]

Examining the number of jobs at risk or the energy production capacities of different regions is not enough to gauge the economic vulnerability of a region and how quickly it could adapt to the new circumstances. In other words, regions which have large coal operations can still experience a smoother transition away from coal in comparison to regions which have a smaller relative share of coal-related activities, but a more rigid labor market and economy as a whole. While it is hard to estimate how sensitively a regional economy would react to the shock of coal phase-out, it is crucial for EU policy makers and national authorities to channel JTM funds to those regions which will be most susceptible to that shock. As already discussed, populist sentiments would not necessarily fester in the places which took the biggest economic hit, but in those regions which experience the largest decrease of well-being in relative terms, namely where the feeling of being 'left behind' is strongest. It is important to note that the EU has already been going through a gradual coal

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[1] Coal-related employment data from Alves Dias et al, 2018; Peat- and oil shale-related employment data from Mandras and Salotti, 2021

phase-out, caused by stricter regulation on emissions and market forces, namely retreat of investment and technological innovation in renewable energy (Galgóczi, 2019, p. 14). This implies that regional economies, which historically depended on coal and had to reduce their operations, have already started adjusting to the new economic reality. Consequently, the EU's role in facilitating the just transition away from fossil fuels should strive to support the market-driven adjustment process, which has already taken place.

Data

In order to explore fossil dependency of regional economies across Europe, a dataset of NUTS 2 regions for 24 EU Member states is constructed, containing estimations on direct and indirect intraregional employment in the coal, peat and oil shale industry for 2018-2020. Estimates of total jobs in the sector are computed by combining data from the *JRC Science for Policy Report: EU coal regions: opportunities and challenges ahead (2018)* for coal-related employment and the *JRC Technical Report: Indirect jobs in activities related to coal, peat and oil shale: A RHOMOLO-IO analysis on the EU regions (2021)* for peat and oil shale related employment. Data on the number of coal mines and coal-fired power-plants as well as their capacities in MW at the NUTS 2 level from the same JRC reports are also considered.

For the structural characteristics of European regional economies, data on median population age and unemployment rate for 2021 at the NUTS 2 level is sourced from Eurostat. Additionally, a four-level classification of regional economic resilience (resistant, coping, fighting, and sensitive) which captures regional resilience to economic crisis at the NUTS 2 level is included, following Markowska's *A measure for regional resilience to economic crisis (2015)*. This index is based on a complex measure of GDP, employment, economic structure and other economic indicators and their dynamic behavior before and after the 2008 financial crisis. A value of 'fighting' or 'sensitive' indicates a region's higher sensitivity towards negative economic shocks, with the latter indicating the worst performance in relative terms.

In order to compare populist support across regions, the regional deviation of the populist vote share against the country average is computed by using election data from the 2019 EP election sourced from the European NUTS-level election database (Schraff, Vergioglou and Demirci, 2022). Ireland, Malta, and Portugal are excluded from the analysis either due to lack of data, or because no RWPPs took part in the 2019 EP election. A full list of political parties which are considered as RWPPs for the purposes of this analysis can be seen in the Appendix.

Findings

The aim of this study is to examine which European regions have, on the one hand, a large stake in terms of employment in the coal, peat and oil shale industry, and on the other hand, exhibit the structural characteristics which are associated with higher support for RWPP. Moreover, those coal regions will be distinguished, which already had a positive deviation of populist support against the country average in the 2019 EP election, assuming that a large negative shock of their regional economies originating from the coal phase-out can further aggravate anti-democratic and anti-environmentalist sentiments. In other words, the aim is to create a typology of European regions which can be considered as more risky for the green transition, because of a potential increase in populist support stemming from worsening socio-economic conditions.


Figure 2 – Deviation of RWPP share of votes from national average[2]

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[2] 2019 European Parliament election results from Schraff, Vergioglou and Demirci, 2022; Definition of populist parties adapted from Rooduijn *et al*, 2020

Figure 2 presents the deviation in populist support against the national average for NUTS 2 regions. When comparing this map with the one in Figure 1, it is notable that while some overlap between higher populist support and a region's employment in the coal, peat, and oil shale industry does exist, there is no notable spatial distribution pattern to be observed. Nevertheless, this analysis is relevant not only for those regions which are exhibiting higher RWPP support on average, but more importantly, those which possess the structural environment associated with RWPP electoral success.

In Figure 3, EU regions are presented according to the number of total jobs in the coal, peat and oil shale industry, showcasing those regions which have an unemployment rate deviation greater than 2% from the national average and/or a deviation from the national median age greater than 2 years and/or a deviation in the share of people with an education attainment level of 'lower secondary' or lower greater than 5% from the national average. The structural indicators were chosen following the academic literature on the key determinants of populist support.

Multiple empirical studies have concluded the significant positive relationship between unemployment and populist support such as Anderson (1996) and Algan et al (2017). What is more, Guriev argues that high regional unemployment tends to increase support for populist parties not only among those who have lost their job, but among everyone who witnesses deteriorating economic opportunities in the region (2020, p. 1). In terms of demography, age and education indicators have been consistently identified as statistically significant determinants of electoral performance of RWPPs (Inglehart and Norris, 2016, p. 4). On average, older people and the less educated tend to support populist parties more than young and/or educated people. Furthermore, a higher median age of a region compared to the national average indicates either high outward migration of young people or lower fertility, both of which suggest worse socio-economic conditions relative to the national average. In terms of education, there is no exclusive theoretical interpretation of the underlying reason why lower educational attainment positively affects support for populist parties. Inglehart and Norris suggest it can either be the role of education as a prerequisite of socio-economic status and job security, where the latter directly affect support for populist parties, or that formal education in general instills progressive values and social tolerance among pupils (2016, p. 4).

≥ **1,000** total jobs in coal, peat, and oil shale industry	≥ **3,000** total jobs in coal, peat, and oil shale industry	≥ **10,000** total jobs in coal, peat, and oil shale industry
≥ **+2% deviation from national unemployment average**		
Puglia (ITF4)* Andalucía (ES61)*	**Dytiki Makedonia (EL53)*** **Észak-Magyarország (HU31)***	**Sud-Vest Oltenia (RO41)**
≥ **+2 years deviation from national median age**		
Saarland (DEC0) Sachsen-Anhalt (DEE0) Peloponnisus (EL65)* **Principado de Asturias (ES12)***	**Brandenburg (DE40)** **Dresden (DED2)** **Dytiki Makedonia (EL53)*** Castilla y León (ES41)*	**Sud-Vest Oltenia (RO41)**
≥ **+5% deviation from national share of population with less than primary, primary, or lower secondary educational attainment**		
Peloponnisus (EL65)* Puglia (ITF4)* Andalucía (ES61)*	**Észak-Magyarország (HU31)***	**Severozápad (CZ04)** Yugoiztochen (BG34)
≥ **+2% deviation from national RWPP share of valid of votes in 2019 EP election**		
Leipzig (DED5) Sachsen-Anhalt (DEE0)	**Brandenburg (DE40)** **Dresden (DED2)** **Észak-Magyarország (HU31)*** Malopolskie (PL21)	**Severozápad (CZ04)** Moravskoslezsko (CZ08)

* Regional economic resilience indicator is either *fighting* or *sensitive*.
Regions that appear more than once are in **bold**

Figure 3 – EU regions by total number of jobs in the coal, peat, and oil shale industry and select structural indicators
Source: own elaboration

Regions which have a high unemployment rate and/or median age deviation from the national average, as well as a lower educational attainment level, suggest that they potentially have the structural characteristics that cultivate increasing populist support. Given the upcoming shock to those regional economies from the coal phase-out populist sentiments in those places could be amplified. This process will be largely predetermined by how well the regional economies can absorb the shock and adjust accordingly. This implies that regions which have historically showcased a lack of flexibility to fend off economic downturns pose an even greater risk. This effect is captured by the economic resilience indicator. For example, Dytiki

Makedonia (EL53), having roughly 7,300 total jobs in the coal industry, has both a higher unemployment rate and a higher median age than Greece's average, and is categorized as 'fighting' in terms of its regional economic resilience. Therefore, a further deterioration of the structural economic environment there, driven by the coal phase-out, can increase support for RWPP in the region relative to the national average, *ceteris paribus*. In general, the more to the right-hand side a region is in Figure 3 and the worse its structural indicators are, the higher the risk of stronger RWPP sentiments taking root. Naturally, this interpretation holds if we assume that a successful *just transition* from coal did not take place and the structural environment was net negatively affected from the phase-out.

Figure 4 presents a three-level typology of regions according to the risk of increasing populist support, following the structural indicators presented in Figure 3. The categorization is based on a nine-point system, where each structural indicator is worth one point (unemployment, median age, education, economic resilience, and previous populist support), whereas the number of people employed in the coal, peat, and oil shale industry is worth either one ($\geq$ 1,000 jobs), two ($\geq$ 3,000 jobs), or four ($\geq$ 10,000 jobs) points. Regions, who score 6-9 points are considered as 'high risk', 4-5 points as 'moderate risk', and 1-3 points as 'low risk'.

High Risk	Moderate Risk	Low Risk
Severozápad (CZ04)	Moravskoslezsko (CZ08)	Saarland (DEC0)
Észak-Magyarország (HU31)	Brandenburg (DE40)	Leipzig (DED5)
	Dresden (DED2)	Principado de Asturias (ES12)
	Peloponnisus (EL65)	Sachsen-Anhalt (DEE0)
	Castilla y León (ES41)	Malopolskie (PL21)
	Andalucía (ES61)	
	Puglia (ITF4)	
	Yugoiztochen (BG34)	
	Dytiki Makedonia (EL53)	

Figure 4 – NUTS 2 regions by risk of increase for RWPP due to potentially worsening socio-economic environment from the coal phase-out
Source: own elaboration

This typology is by no means exhaustive or precise. It merely serves as an explorative tool to gauge the structural conditions of regional economies under threat of coal phase-out and extrapolate the potential danger of RWPP messages resonating with the local electorate, given those conditions. Moreover, its cardinal aim is to advocate for more targeted policy making on the EU and national level, advocating for place-sensitive approaches to structural and economic challenges. The just transition can

only be successful if the accompanying policy measures consider both the relative weaknesses and the relative strengths of the respective regional economies. In other words, the successful transition away from coal and other fossil fuels requires either the reinforcement of already existing regional comparative advantages, or the fostering of new ones, through proactive industrial policy and multisectoral stakeholder engagement.

Conclusion

Regional economic downturns have the potential to improve the electoral performance of RWPPs. In the EU, this mechanism could unfold during the green transition, especially in regions which specialize in coal, peat, and oil shale production. However, a subsequent economic recovery can revert the process and deem populist parties less attractive (Anderson, 2021, p. 15). Therefore, successful just transition policies would not only ease the socio-economic deterioration of fossil-dependent regions, but also improve trust in the EU's governance capacity.

Just transition policy needs to be proactive and place specific. The resource constraint of the JTM and the short time frame in which the coal phase-out must take place requires regional just transition plans to utilize policy synergies to the biggest extent possible. In other words, EU-funded policy prescriptions ought to tackle more than one objective wherever possible. Therefore, this analysis argues that just transition funding could be distributed among regions in a way, such that it also addresses structural economic challenges which affect wider economic and social processes. The regional economic adjustment after the transition is a matter which also falls under other EU policy areas as well, and should receive funding from a wider pool of sources, e.g., the Cohesion Fund. In other words, the ultimate success of the just transition should not merely be an objective of the JTM, rather it ought to be embedded in every EU and national strategy related to economic policy, industrial policy, economic convergence, etc.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Industrial Policy

The most important conclusion which this analysis underscores is the fundamental need for the EU's and national just transition strategies to have a targeted and tailored approach towards regional economies, taking into account their various contextual differences and utilizing the already existing market signals. Traditionally, policy action which aims to boost regional economic growth and competitiveness has revolved around growth-pole strategies relying on large investment projects (Anderson, 2021, p. 5). However, if the JTM is to minimize the number of regions which could be considered as 'transition losers', policy makers ought to make use not only of already existing comparative advantages, but also seek to develop new ones by means of proactive industrial policy. Indeed, most case studies of successful transitions away from coal suggest there is a need for active government involvement in steering regional economies towards new industrial sectors, and especially green industries (Gambhir, Green and Pearson, 2018, p. 11). The EU partly addresses this with its *Coal Regions in Transition Initiative,* which promotes good practices by connecting public and private stakeholders in coal-dependent regions, provides tailored technical assistance, and informs relevant stakeholders on EU funds availability. Apart from financial sources related to the JTM, other European funds are also, in part, channeled towards transition-related initiatives, such as Cohesion Fund investment towards developing regional 'smart specialization'. While the rationale behind those policies is correct, it is difficult to say whether they would manage to create new employment opportunities in time to match regional labor supply. Therefore, we support an even more ambitious and holistic industrial policy approach, rather than traditional horizontal measures.

A key hindrance of a successful regional just transition is the general lack of industrial diversification capacity in many coal-dependent regional economies (Pollin, Wicks-Lim and Chakraborty, 2020, p.88). This is where the role of the state ought to take a more active role, by providing and facilitating investment and other forms of incentives in new industrial sectors, mainly green energy production. The current energy crisis in Europe has vastly improved the competitiveness of renewable energy production, which poses a great opportunity to follow the already existing market signals and transform coal regions in green energy hubs. Consequently, territorial just transitions plans should be drafted in accordance with the rapidly changing economic environment, especially in the energy sector, as well

as flexible enough to accommodate more changes to come, especially given recent concerns of an upcoming recession.

Labor Market Policy

A key policy measure in the JTM is the reskilling of affected workers. Such measures have shown ambiguous results regarding their effectiveness. Several empirical studies, which examine the effect of vocational training programs on unemployment, have shown no statistically significant results (e.g., Lechner, 2000; Hujer and Zeiss, 2003). Furthermore, Hujer and Zeiss correctly argue that when there is an issue of low labor demand, measures which aim to change the structure of the labor supply cannot be expected to fix issues on the demand side (2003, p. 12). Therefore, we conclude that less emphasis should be put on retraining programs, while more attention is given for long- and medium-term solutions, such as investment in education and R&D. The short-term objectives of retraining programs can instead be addressed by alternative active labor market programs such as early retirement schemes, job-search assistance, public sector work placements, etc.

Social Policy

The regional economic re-adjustment, which will be spurred by the transition away from coal and other fossil fuels, will be a slow process. Consequently, while industrial and economic policies ought to be oriented towards the long-term, welfare policy needs to address the grievances of local populations from the start and throughout the whole process. Broad-ranging redistributive measures serve to address not only the social well-being of citizens in the most affected regions, but also counteract the notion that the transition will inevitably produce winners and losers. Indeed, RWPP narratives target those feeling left-behind. To counteract such an interpretation of the state of regional economies in Europe, national and EU governance needs to foster what Martin Sandbu calls "new economics of belonging" (2020).

Since the Western order is under threat from the erosion of one of its pillars—an economy to which everyone belongs—rebuilding that pillar in a way fit for today's social and technological conditions holds the promise of restoring support for the Western model as a whole. What we need, in short, is a new economics of belonging.

-**Martin Sandbu**, *The Economics of Belonging. A Radical Plan to Win Back the Left Behind and Achieve Prosperity for All,* 2020

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ANNEXES

List of RWPPs / Eurosceptic Parties in Europe, 2019 EP elections

Adapted from The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe, Rooduijn et al, 2020.

Original name (romanised)	English name
Austria	
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)	Freedom Party in Austria
Belgium	
Parti Populaire (PP)	People's Party
Vlaams Belang (VB)	Flemish Interest
Bulgaria	
Ataka	Attack
VMRO - Balgarsko Natsionalno Dvizhenie (VMRO)	IMRO – Bulgarian National Movement
Natsionalen front za spasenie na Bŭlgariya (NFSB)	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria
Croatia	
Most nezavisnih lista	Bridge of Independent Lists
Živi zid	Human Shield
Cyprus	
Ethniko Laiko Metopo (ELAM)	National Popular Front
Czech Republic	
Svoboda a přímá demokracie (SPD)	Freedom and Direct Democracy
Denmark	
Dansk Folkeparti (DF)	Danish People's Party
Estonia	
Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond	Conservative People's Party of Estonia
Finland	
Perussuomalaiset	Finns Party
France	
Rassemblement National (RN)	National Rally
Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans (CNIP)	National Centre of Independents and Peasants
Germany	
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)	Alternative for Germany
Greece	
Elliniki Lisi	Greek Solution
Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós	Popular Orthodox Rally
Laïkós Sýndesmos – Chrysí Avgí	Golden Dawn
Hungary	
Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség	Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance
Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom	Jobbik - Movement for a Better Hungary
Italy	
Lega (Nord)	(Northern) League
Fratelli d'Italia – Centrodestra Nazionale	Brothers of Italy
Latvia	

Kam pieder valsts?	Who owns the state?
Lithuania	
Lietuvos Centro Partija (LCP)	Lithuanian Centre Party
Tvarka ir teisingumas (TT)	Order and Justice
Luxembourg	
Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei (ADR)	Alternative Democratic Reform Party
Netherlands	
Forum voor Democratie (FD)	Forum for Democracy
Partij voor de Vrijheid (PD)	Party for Freedom
Poland	
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)	Law and Justice
Kukiz'15	Kukiz'15
Romania	
Partidul România Mare (PRM)	Greater Romania Party
Slovakia	
Slovenská národná strana (SNS)	Slovak National Party
Slovenia	
Slovenska Demokratska Stranka (SDS)	Slovenian Democratic Party
Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka (SNS)	Slovenian National Party
Spain	
Vox	Voice
Sweden	
Sverigedemokraterna (SD)	Sweden Democrats