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MIGRATION, BORDER CONTROL AND SOLIDARITY:

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EU DISCOURSE AND POLICIES IN THE

WAKE OF THE ARAB SPRING – WITH A CASE STUDY FROM LAMPEDUSA

IED Research Project: "Migration, borders control and solidarity: Schengen at stake?"

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Abstract: *In the wake of the revolutions of the "Arab Spring", the European Union has been proposing a renewed approach to migration management, aimed at modifying its security-oriented focus so to take more into account partner countries' interests and needs. This paper tries to assess the extent to which the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) adopted in 2011 has brought about a consistent shift in EU migration policies, as often claimed within the EU institutional discourse. The introduction discusses the relevance of issues such as the inter-institutional consistency/inconsistency of EU discourse on migration management and the notion of change/continuity in EU policy making. The first section accounts for the theoretical framework. Analytical concepts such as "securitisation" and "de-securitization" of EU policies and the understanding of the EU as a "normative power" are employed to understand the recent developments in the EU approach towards its Southern Neighbourhood. In the second section, a critical analysis of the EU post-Arab Spring migration policy is carried out, so as to assess the real extent of the shift from the traditional security-oriented approach to a more inclusive and comprehensive strategy. The third section deals with the case study. Focusing on the*

shipwreck that caused the death of 366 migrants along the shores of Lampedusa in October 2013, several statements issued by the Council of the European Union, the European *Commission and the European Parliament are analysed, so to assess whether the discourse of the institutions is coherent with the new migration strategy.*

The conclusion discusses the notion of "cognitive dissonance" in EU decision-making and introduces "normalcy" and times of "emergency" in the EU migration policies.

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Introduction

The events known as the Arab Spring changed the geo-political reality of the Mediterranean area and opened up the door for a new role for the European Union (EU) in the region. The fall of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya - and the following power vacuum – had the potential to revive EU's ambition to take the lead as a "normative force for good"[1] in the region.

In this light, the EU put forward a *renewed*[2] approach to migration, officially aimed at taking into more account its partner countries' interests, in order to facilitate the establishment of win-win relations.

The "Global Approach on Migration and Mobility" (GAAM), a communication issued by the European Commission (EC) in November 2011[3], promoted the institutional arrangements set to address the changing political context in the neighbourhood. The document had the innovative goal to closely embedding migration policies into the wide spectrum of the EU external policies[4]. Interestingly, the document acknowledged the link existing between internal security and development policies in the migrants 'countries of origin, thus addressing the so-called 'development-security nexus'[5].

Despite the institutional discursive shift towards a more comprehensive approach to migration management, the EU's real willingness to change its security-oriented policies is controversial[6]. Furthermore, doubts remain regarding the extent to which GAMM is likely to modify the power relations between the EU and its partners[7].

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[1] Esther BARBÉ and Elizabeth JOHANSSON-NOGUÉS," The EU as a Modest 'Force for Good': The European Neighbourhood Policy", *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, n. 1, 2008, p. 85

[2] Emphasis added by the author throughout the whole paper

[3] European Commission, *The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility*, COM (2011) 743 final, 18/11/2011, Brussels

[4] Ibid. p. 10

[5] Ninna NYBERG-SORENSE, Nicholas VAN HEAR and Paul PENGBERG-PEDERSEN, "The Migration-Development Nexus Evidence and Policy Options State-of-the-Art Overview", *International Migration*, n. 40, vol. 5, 2002, pp. 3-7

[6] Marie MARTIN, 'The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility: the state of play', *Statewatch Journal*, Vol. 22., n. 2-3, October 2012, p. 5

[7] Philippe FARGUES and Christine FANDRICH, *Migration After the Arab Spring*, MPC RR 2012/09, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 2012, p.8. Available at: http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPC%202012%20EN%2009.pdf (consulted on 09/03/2016)

I.   Research question

Two research questions are addressed by this paper:

1) To what extent did GAMM produce an actual shift towards a comprehensive strategy in EU migration policies, as claimed within the post-Arab Spring institutional discourse?

2) Which EU institutional actor(s) was responsible for the attempt to transform the EU in a normative leader in the Mediterranean region, and which one(s) did instead oppose a security-driven resistance?

II.   Hypotheses

For each research question, an hypothesis is set as preliminary answer:

1) The struggle between normative forces and security-driven actors produced an inconsistency between the institutional discourse and the decision-making outcome. Despite the alleged innovation in the EU's approach, the discursive shift was not matched by substantial change in the text of GAMM;

2) The clash between an EU institutional discourse geared towards inclusiveness and comprehensiveness and the enduring securitization in policy-making reflects the primacy of supranational institutions over the former, and intergovernmental institutions over the latter.

III.   Previous Research on the Topic

While a considerable degree of attention in academia has been awarded to the the 'securitization' of EU migration policy in general (e.g. Moscoe[8], Carrera & Hernandez I Sagrera[9], Pinyol-Jimenez[10]), fewer publications have analysed the creation of GAMM as a

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[8] Adam MOSCOE, "Not So Normative After All: The Securitization of Migration Since 9/11 and the Erosion of Normative Power in Europe", *Carleton Review of International Affairs*, vol. 2 Fall 2013, pp. 34-48

[9] Sergio CARRERA and Raul HERNANDEZ I SAGRERA, *The Externalisation of the EU's Labour Immigration Policy Towards Mobility or Insecurity Partnerships?*, Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS Working Document n. 321, October 2009. Available at: https://www.liu.se/utbildning/pabyggnad/F7MER/student/courses/733a51-contemporary-issues-in-international-governance/filarkiv-contemporary-issues-in-international-governance/2010/articles-peo-hansen/7-14/1.231431/8-CEPS-Externalization-EU-Migration.pdf (consulted on 09/03/2016)

[10] Gemma PINYOL-JIMENEZ, "The Migration-Security Nexus in short: Instruments and actions in the European Union", *Amsterdam Law Forum*, vol. 4, n. 1, pp. 36-57

tool to step up EU's normative actorness - according to Ian manner's understanding - in the Mediterranean region.

The interest of this research lies in assessing the outcome of two conflicting trends: on the one hand, the security concerns influencing the EU migration policy-shaping, due to the constructed perception of an Arab migrants' *invasion* of Europe[11]. On the other hand, the strategic effort carried out by some community institutions to overcome the former approach so as to establish the EU as a normative actor *for good*[12].

IV. Research Design and Methodology

The present research unfolds in three parts and a conclusion:

The first section accounts for the theoretical framework. Analytical concepts such as the 'securitisation' of migration policies and the understanding of the EU as a 'normative power' are discussed to understand the recent developments in the EU approach towards its Southern neighbourhood.

In the second section, a critical analysis of the EU main post-Arab Spring migration strategy - GAMM - is carried out, so as to assess the real extent of the shift from the traditional security-oriented approach to a more inclusive and comprehensive strategy.

In the third section, the study focuses on the shipwreck that caused the death of 366 migrants along the shores of Lampedusa in October 2013. Several statements issued by the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Parliament are analysed so to assess whether the discourse of the institutions is coherent with the new migration strategy.

The conclusion discusses the notion of 'cognitive dissonance' in EU decision-making, and makes a distinction between times of 'normalcy' and times of 'crisis' in EU policy making.

The methodological tool adopted for the present research is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which studies the spoken and written text and its internal structure. CDA

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[11] See the intervention of the EMP Matteo SALVINI at the demonstration "*Stop Invasione*!" in Milan on 18/10/2014. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BBpyG4o2iGA (consulted on 09/03/2016)
[12] Ian MANNERS, "Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 2, n. 40, 2002, pp. 235-258

relies on the use of concepts such as power, critique, discourse and ideology[13] to understand social phenomena, through the analysis of discourses within their social and historical contexts[14]. CDA draws on the Critical Theory studies carried out by the Frankfurt School, which asserts that the goal of social theory is to *change* society, in opposition to traditional theory mostly focused on understanding and *explaining* it[15].

With Foucault[16], discourse is more than the mere mirror of the world: it is socially *constitutive*. In other words, discourse plays a role in the construction of reality. The social actors constitute the link between the discourse and reality. The relation with the notion of power is therefore crucial, especially the social power of a group or an institution deriving from the privileged capital of knowledge, information or authority it has acquired and is able to profit from over a less-informed audience.

A) Selection of Speech Actors

Different speech actors have different motifs and defend different interests. Due to the limitations of space imposed by the format of the research, it is not possible to analyse the whole spectrum of European actors who had a say in the discourse and policy shaping of the EU response to the Arab Spring in terms of management of migration. Hence, a choice has been made to keep the research focus solely on the European institutional actors directly involved in the policy-making process. Communications from the European Commission (EC) and speeches from then-President José Barroso and then-Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström, as well as the conclusions of meetings of the Justice and Affairs Council and the European Council have been selected. Selected texts of the plenary sessions of the EU Parliament (EP) dealing with the events occurred in Lampedusa, as well as speeches of EP President Schultz, have been also included in this analysis.

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[13] Norman FAIRCLOUGH, *Critical Discourse Analysis. The Critical Study of Language*, Routledge, London, 2013, p. 25
[14] Deborah SCHIFFRIN, Deborah TANNEN and Heidi E. HAMILTON, *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, UK, 2001, pp. 352-3
[15] Max HORCKEIMER, "Traditional and Critical Theory", quoted in: Paul CONNERTON (ed.), *Critical Sociology: Selected Readings*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1976, p. 213
[16] [16] Michel FOUCAULT, *L'Ordre du Discours*, Gallimard, Paris, 1971, p. 34

As a consequence of the strategic selection of texts, a number of actors quite relevant in the process of securitization or liberalization of the discourse - such as European security agencies like Europol and the European Maritime Safety Agency, or migrant-friendly organisations like the European NGO Platform for Asylum and Migration - have been left out of the analysis. The choice to leave the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex) out of the study has proved particularly difficult to make. It is unquestionable, in fact, that Frontex' role in the EU migration management activities has took centre stage in European debate on the topic.

However, the increasing role played by agencies within EU governance cannot void the basic distinction between full-fledge institutions and technical agencies. While the first ones draft and agree on policies, the latter essentially follow directives and orders. That is the case for Frontex, which according to its general guidelines, pursues the goal to "reinforce and streamline *cooperation* between national border authorities"[17], thus not taking active part to the EU policy-making process itself.

B) Selection of Documents

The body of texts for this research is composed of the 2011 EU Commission communication putting forward GAMM - the key document for the EU post-Arab Spring new migration strategy - and 20 official texts issued by the European institutions on the tragedy happened across Lampedusa shores in the fall 2013. The time span chosen for the selection of texts on the Lampedusa shipwreck is one year, from the immediate reactions to the tragedy occurred in Lampedusa on October 3rd, to the Council's keynote on the priorities in the area of Security and Justice, on October 14th 2014. Such a choice allows to grasp the evolution of the EU discourse on the issue: from the emotional, humanitarian shock in the wake of the tragedy; through the return of the security-oriented narrative at a later stage; to the final commemoration of the shipwreck's victims in the first anniversary of the Lampedusa events.

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[17]Frontex, *Mission and Tasks*, Frontex website. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-and-tasks/ (consulted on 15/04/16)

C) Selection of 'Keywords'

CDA will be conducted, for each text analysed, in two parts.

In the first part, the research will focus on the conceptual nucleuses of the texts. The association between the main ideas expressed in the documents will be discussed and the ambiguity of certain expressions and concepts, which are strategically employed by the speech actors to appease different audiences and stakeholders, will be highlighted.

In the second part, 4 keywords will be set so as to extract essential information from the textual analysis. The recurrence of these keywords in the texts is expected to account, on the one hand, for the evolution of the EU migration strategy and, on the other hand, for the institutional discourse about the Lampedusa events.

The keywords *border* and *pressure* reflect the traditional, security-oriented approach to migration management. The choice seems convenient because the two words evoke the perceived urgency to protect European countries over the mass arrival of unwanted migrants who are allegedly stressing European integration capacities.

On the other side, the keywords *responsibility* and *mobility* account for the recent efforts undertaken by the EU in order to liberalise its narrative in the field of migration. The concept of responsibility moves the focus of the discourse from the EU's self-defence to the protection of endangered migrants' lives. The reference to mobility builds on the core pillar of the recently developed GAMM, which establishes Mobility Partnerships as the designed strategic tool to bring about a more inclusive and comprehensive dialogue on migration with neighbouring countries.

D) Selection of the Case Study

In the night between the 3rd and 4th October 2013, a makeshift boat coming from Misrata (Libya) with 550 migrants on-board, sunk near to the Italian island Lampedusa's coasts. With 366 documented victims, most Eritrean and Somali asylum-seekers according to the UN[18], the tragic shipwreck proved to be the most tragic event happened until then in the Mediterranean Sea since the World War II[19].

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[18] The BBC, *Italy Boat Sinking: Hundreds Feared Dead Off Lampedusa*, 03/10/13. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24380247 (consulted on 09/04/16)
[19] Matthew CHANCE, *Lampedusa Boat Sinking: Survivors Recall Awful Ordeal*, The CNN, 10/09/13. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/08/world/europe/italy-lampedusa-boat-sinking/ (consulted on 10/04/16)

The exceptionally high amount of dead migrants triggered differed reactions from political and civil society actors all around Europe.

Many voices called for an increased humanitarian engagement of the European Union in stopping the deaths in the see, which marked 21,429 from 1988 to May 2015, with 8.902 migrants losing their lives in the Strait of Sicily only, according to the "Observatory of Victims of Illegal Migration"[20]. Migrants-friendly actors drew parallels between Lampedusa and Homer's Ithaca, picturing the island - with its death tribute of 4,000 victims between 2,000 and 2014[21] - as the symbolic destination of the modern-age odyssey undertaken by desperate migrants.

On the other side, security actors and populist politicians, as well as conservative media read the high number of dead in the October shipwreck in connection with the overall figure of 14,753 migrants arrived in 2013 on the island only, thus finding alleged evidence for an invasion of African 'clandestine' migrants to Europe[22].

Therefore, the tragically iconic Lampedusa shipwreck seems to make the perfect case for assessing the outcome of the conflicting trends between the liberalization of the discourse on migration management, on the one side, and the conservative focus on internal security, on the other.

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. From Security to Securitization of EU Migration Policy

The notion of securitization, developed by School of Copenhagen scholars such as Barry Buzan and Ole Waever in the early '90s, refers to the way social agents construct *threats*[23]. Assuming an increasing detachment between objective reality and inter-subjective understandings of it, the Copenhagen scholars define the contemporary focus on

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[20] Gabriele DEL GRANDE, *La Fortezza*, Fortress Europe. Available at: http://fortresseurope.blogspot.it/p/la-fortezza.html (consulted on 09/04/16)

[21] Data published by the Migrants Files Project and collected through Puls, a project run by the University of Helsinki and commissioned by the Joint Research Center of the European Commission. Available at: https://www.detective.io/detective/the-migrants-files/ (consulted on 09/04/2016)

[22] Nadia FANCALACCI, *Immigrazione: nel 2013 Sbarchi Triplicati (e Costi Record)*, Panorama, 03/01/14. Available at: http://www.panorama.it/news/marco-ventura-profeta-di-ventura/immigrati-clandestini-lampedusa/ (consulted on 09/04/16).

[23] Barry BUZAN, Ole WAEVER and Jaap DE WILDE, *Security: a New Framework for Analysis,* Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1998, p.35

security as a self-referential practice[24]. Indeed, when a securitizing actor affirms that a referent object is threatened in its existence, he is in fact claiming "a right to *extraordinary* measures to ensure the referent object's survival"[25]. Therefore, securitization is a linguistic action led by a specific rhetoric, usually associated to the *emergency* to react. In this understanding, an issue is a security problem "when the elite declares it to be so"[26]. Security practices are designed and implemented not because of the existence of immediate dangers, but rather because legitimised institutional actors turn some aspects of reality into perceived *risks*, whose prevention justifies the use of urgent action[27].

In case the agents enouncing specific claims enjoy sufficient legitimacy and authority, discourses articulated within specific policy frameworks – like the management of migration inflows – may turn into institutionalised narratives.

When the Schengen Agreement entered into force in 1995, abolishing border controls between the European Union's Member States, the *fight* against irregular immigration from non-EU countries became a priority clearly listed in the Union's political agenda. The loss of national control over internal borders led to the introduction of restrictive measures aimed at limiting the mobility of third countries nationals into the EU[28], so as to balance the increased risk of irregular arrivals into the EU. The Schengen area contributed to redefine the link between security and territory by conceptualizing security in terms of the *defence of a common space*[29].

The new system produced indeed a historical modification of the notion of human mobility within Europe. The newly established free movement of people was to apply to the Schengen club's nationals only, thus turning Europe into "a laboratory not to open borders, but to strengthen them"[30].

The 'Schengenisation' of migration policies was made possible by the securitization

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[24] *Ibid.*, p. 24

[25] *Ibidem*

[26] Ole WAEVER, "Securitization and Desecuritization", in: Ronnie LIPSCHUTZ, *On Security*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, p. 6

[27] Paula FALCI, *Securitization of Migration Policies in Italy*, University of Vienna's Master Thesis, 2011, p. 26. Available at: http://othes.univie.ac.at/17004/ (consulted on 22/03/2016)

[28] Christina BOSWELL, "The 'External Dimension' of the EU Immigration and Asylum Policy", *International Affairs*, vol. 79, 200*3*, p. 622

[29]William WALTER and Jens H. HAAR, "In/Secure Community: Governing Schengenland" in: William WALTER and Jens H. HAAR (eds.), Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration, Routledge, London, 2004, p.107

[30] Virginie GUIRAUDON, "Les effets de l'européanisation des politiques d'immigration et d'asile", *Politique européenne*, n. 31, 2010, p.13 (translation by the author)

of the discourse carried out by the Ministers of Interior and Justice[31]. Migration inflows have been being increasingly linked to the emergence of threats such as the organised crime, terrorism and, sometimes, Islamic extremism[32]. The security-oriented discourse of the EU reached its peak after the attacks of the 9/11, when the institutional speech actors quickly adjusted to the American narrative depicting a Western civilization under attack[33], as the conclusions of the European Councils held in Laeken and Seville attest[34].

The securitisation of migration policy had an impact on both the external and internal dimension of European security. On the one side, fighting terrorism became a general argument used in the policy debate to justify stricter migration controls and admission policies at the national level. On the other side, the EU relied more and more on agreements with third countries foreseeing the mandatory return of their nationals, with the goal to curb arrivals of third country nationals onto the EU territories.

The EU focus on curbing migration inflows led to the practice of outsourcing control[35] to third parties, including transit countries and EU agencies such as Europol and Frontex, whose legal mandate and specific tasks are not made clear to the European public opinion or the EP[36].

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[31] Dominique VAN DIJCK, *Is the EU Policy on Illegal Immigration Securitized? Yes of Ccourse! A Study into the Dynamics of the Institutionalized Securitization*, Paper presented to the 3rd Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Istanbul, 2006, p. 4. Available at: http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-istanbul/virtualpaperroom/054.pdf (consulted on 10/04/16)

[32] John P. LEPERS, *Qui a peur de l'Islam?*, France 4 documentary, 10 mars 2012. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1p_VLMpH6dA (consulted on 10/04/16)

[33] European Council, "The Union's action following the attacks in the USA on 11 September", SN 300/1/01, Laeken, 14-15/12/01, pp. 4-5

[34] European Council, "Presidency Conclusions", 13463/02, Sevilla, 21-22/06/02

[35] Thomas G. GAMMELROFT-HANSEN, *Outsourcing Migration Management: EU, Power, and the External Dimension of Asylum and Immigration Policy*, Danish Institute for International Studies, Working Paper n. 2006/1, p. 2

[36] Aoife SPENGEMAN, *Upholding the Legitimacy of Frontex: European Parliamentary Oversight*, European Security Review, March 2013, p. 4. Available at: http://isis-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/ESR_65.pdf (consulted on 10/04/16)

1.2. The EU Emerging Normative Actorness in the Mediterranean as a Drive Towards De-securitization

Since its creation, the EU has sought to play a role on the international stage not only in the direct shaping of the international political agenda, but also by bringing about change through the diffusion of its system of values[37].

Ian Manners' concept of "Normative Power Europe" describes the effort to promote change in a different way from traditional, hard power-based Cold War approaches[38]. In Manners' understanding, the transformational power of the EU rests upon the universal character of the principles inscribed in its founding treaties, which it promotes in its relations with non-members[39]. The catalogue of norms includes core precepts such as the safeguard of peace, freedom, democratic government, rule of law, human rights, non-discrimination, sustainability and good governance[40].

The respect of these values is now included in the agreements negotiated with third countries in the shape of conditionality clauses and is regarded as an essential element for the delivery of financial and technical aid[41].

Since the launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995, all bilateral association agreements between the EU and its Mediterranean partners have included a human rights clause[42].

In reality, for many years the deepening of economic and political ties has not been made conditional upon progress in human rights by the governments of Southern neighbours. Restrictive migration deals have indeed been closed between EU countries and the authoritarian regimes of then-presidents Ben Alì and Mubarak, marking a clear preference for security over the defence of EU norms.

The Arab Spring subverted the regional geo-politics and forced the EU to modify its approach towards the countries in transformation. The EU found itself short of strategic influence in the region. At the same time, the power vacuum ensuing the deposition of long-

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[37] Dimitris BOURIS, "The Limits of Normative Power Europe: Evaluating the Third Pillar of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", *Political Perspectives*, vol. 5, n. 2, 2011, p. 83

[38] Ian MANNERS, "Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 13, n. 2, 2006, pp. 182-99

[39] Ian MANNERS, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms", p. 241

[40] *Ibid*. p. 242

[41] Richard YOUNGS, *The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy: Europe's Mediterranean and Asian Policies,* Oxford University Press, New York, 2001,.p. 53.

[42] Dimitris BOURIS, *op. cit.*, p. 85

standing authoritarian regimes provided the EU with an interesting opportunity to take up the regional leadership and present itself as a consistent normative actor[43].

The 2011 renewed version of the European Neighbourhood Policy enabled the Union to react relatively quickly to the developing events in the Mediterranean region[44]. The document promised an unambiguous support to the ongoing democratic transitions in the Arab countries. The establishing of 'deep democracy', a concept taken from a comprehensive interpretation of European *core* values, would constitute the guide for the EU's supportive action in the Mediterranean.

2. THE EU MIGRATION POLICY AFTER THE ARAB SPRING

The evolution of the EU migration policy in the wake of the Arab Spring constitutes a valuable example of the EU dialectic between a security-oriented response to a perceived crisis and the opposite push produced by normative liberal political ambitions.

The uprisings of the Arab Spring created a highly insecure environment for individuals in the North African region and triggered significant cross-border movements in the Spring and Summer of 2011, as people fled violent street clashes, arrests, political turbulence and, in the case of Libya, heavy military ground fighting.

While it is true that the EU, and especially Italy and Malta, saw a rising inflow of migrants during the first half of 2011, overall figures show that migration flows to Europe represented only a fraction of the total amount of displaced people in the Southern Mediterranean. Between 1st January and 31st July 2011, in fact, Italy received approximately 48,000 irregular migrants[45], while Malta received just over 1,500 individuals during the spring and summer of 2011[46].

Nevertheless, the EU's immediate reaction was driven by high security concerns, as the toughening of control and containment of migrants - including asylum-seekers –

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[43] Martin BECK, *The Comeback of the EU as a "Civilian Power" Through the Arab Spring?*, The GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Working Paper n.2, 2013. Available at: http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/gf_international_1302.pdf (consulted on 10/04/16)
[44] European Commission, *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood*, COM(2011) 303 final, Brussels, 25/05/11
[45] Bruno NASCIMBENE and Alessia DI PASCALE, "The 'Arab Spring' and the Extraordinary Influx of People who Arrived from North Africa", *European Journal of Migration and Law*, vol. 13, n. 4, p. 343
[46] International Office of Migration (IOM), *Response to the Libyan Crisis*, External Situation Report, 31/10/11. Available at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/external_sit_rep_31st_october.pdf (consulted on 10/04/16)

showed. EU's actions in response to human movements were broadly divided into three types of measures: 1) intensification of border control and surveillance by Frontex; 2) pressure on post-Arab Spring newly elected governments to cooperate in curbing irregular migration and 3) introduction of legislative proposals suspending mobility. In the most notorious case, France and Italy sent a request to the EC aimed at amending the Schengen rules. The Schengen Governance Package, adopted in September 2011, explicitly states that "the crossing of the external border of a large number of third country nationals might, in exceptional circumstances, justify the immediate reintroduction of some internal border controls"[47].

2.1. The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility

The EU itself acknowledged the security-oriented nature of its immediate response to migration inflows from Arab Spring countries, justifying its restrictive measures as short-term emergency measures, as the May2011 EC Communication on Migration stated[48].

A more comprehensive and balanced strategy was needed to address the changing geopolitical reality in the region in the middle and the long term.

This new approach was formalized with the adoption of the EU renewed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) in November 2011[49]. The document, which was built on the existing Global Approach to Migration, put stronger emphasis on legal migration, development promotion and the migrants' rights. GAMM was to be implemented through Migration and Mobility Dialogues, which identified policy tools known as Mobility Partnerships as the principal instruments for inclusive cooperation. Therefore, Dialogues on Migration, Mobility and Security (DMMS) were launched with Tunisia and Morocco in the autumn 2011, with similar initiatives foreseen with other ENP Mediterranean countries such as Egypt, Jordan and, in the longer run, Libya.

The purpose of the DMMS was to identify those countries deemed suitable to sign Mobility Partnerships with the EU. On the other hand, neighbouring states considered unready or unwilling to join the new framework of cooperation would be offered a Common

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[47] Preamble of the *Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances*, COM(2011) 560 final, Brussels, 16/09/2011, p. 6
[48] European Commission, *Communication on Migration*, COM(2011) 248 final, Brussels, 04/05/11, p. 3
[49] European Commission, *The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility*, COM(2011) 743 final, Brussels, 18/11/11

Agenda for Migration and Mobility - a less ambitious format for cooperation in the shape of common recommendations, targets, information exchange and capacity-building measures[50].

Mobility Partnerships have been labelled "the most innovative and sophisticated tool to date of the Global Approach to Migration"[51]. They constitute non-legally binding joint declarations negotiated between the Commission and a third country. In the wake of the Arab Spring, the Commission has signed Mobility Partnerships with three Mediterranean countries: Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan[52].

On behalf of the signatory Member States, the EC offers a range of benefits - from visa facilitation schemes to regular channels for temporary migration - in exchange for a commitment to the management of irregular migration, notably readmission, return and border control/surveillance policies[53].

2.2. Critical Discourse Analysis of GAMM

The text of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility mirrors the EU's efforts to prompt a renewed approach to the Southern Neighbours into existence. The focus on internal security and political stability, which had characterised the former relations between the EU and its Southern partners, is replaced by a more marked attention to the external dimension of security.

An analysis of the use of the security-oriented keywords – which characterised EU's early response to migration flows from Arab Spring countries – proves the departure from the old path marked by GAMM.

The word 'border' is only used 5 times, and only in 1 occasion it is associated with the idea of 'control', while reference to 'irregular migrants' is made 7 times. The document never mentions emergency-minded expressions such as 'pressure', 'fight', or the importance

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[50] Sergio CARRERA, Leonhard DEN HERTOG and Joanna PARKIN, *EU Migration Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring - What prospects for EU-Southern Mediterranean Relations?,* MEDPRO Technical Report n. 15, August 2012 p. 10. Available at: http://www.medpro-foresight.eu/system/files/MEDPRO%20TR%20No%2015%20WP9%20Carrera.pdf (consulted on 10/04/16)

[51] European Commission, *Mobility Partnerships as a Tool of the Global Approach to Migration*, SEC(2009) 1240, Brussels, 18/09/09, p. 4

[52] The only EU countries to participate to all the three Mobility Partnerships with the Mediterranean Neighbours are Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Germany and Sweden. Interestingly, Mediterranean Member States such as Greece and Cyprus only participate to one Partnership each, while Malta and Croatia to none

[53] Sergio CARRERA, Leonhard DEN HERTOG and Joanna PARKIN, *op. cit*. p.11

of the patrolling activities by Fronte*x*. Rather, strong attention is reserved to the maximization of the 'migration-development' (11 times) nexus, which positively links the development of third countries' economies to the reduction of migration outflows[54].

A clear attempt to liberalise the discourse on migrations becomes even more evident if the focus is put on the words accounting for an inclusive understanding of migration management. 'Legal avenues' for migrations are mentioned 9 times, often in association with 'strategic' (11 times) actions designed to implement them. To this extent, the words 'dialogue' and 'mobility' are used, respectively, 48 and 49 times. Dialogue with third countries is deemed key to address 'challenges' (5 times), 'manage' (6 times) flows, and, more generally, enhance multi-level 'cooperation' (27 times).

The concept of 'mobility' is often used in association with the ideas of 'opportunities' (5 times) and 'integration' (5 times), so as to suggest a link between the arrivals of migrants and their accession to the European 'labour market' (8 times).

However, this rather 'economic' (5 times) understanding of migrants does not come without ambiguities. The complete absence of references to 'responsibility' (0 times) of the EU towards migrants in distress at sea, in fact, reflects a strong neo-liberal bias in the institutional discourse which collides with EU's normative efforts.

The discursive overlap between the words mobility and migration constitutes yet another evidence for the ambiguity of GAMM.

Despite mobility is said to constitute a "much *broader* concept than migration"[55], the shift from the use of the concept of migration entails a quite restrictive frame of human movements. When compared to migration, in fact, mobility appears as a more temporarily and discretionary idea[56]. The selective basis of choice of the individuals deemed suitable to take part to mobility schemes is indeed made clear by the EC itself, which states that mobility (together with its benefits) "applies to a wide range of people, e.g. short-term visitors, tourists, students, researchers, business people or visiting family members"[57]. In spite of the many liberal elements introduced in the discourse on migration since its early

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[54] Alejandro PORTES, "Migration and Development: A Conceptual Review of the Evidence", in: Stephen CASTLESs and Raúl D. WISE (eds), *Migration Development: and Perspectives from the South*, International Organization for Migration Publications, Geneva, 2007, pp. 17-43
[55] European Commission, *The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility*, p. 3.
[56] Sergio CARRERA, Leonhard DEN HERTOG and Joanna PARKIN, *op. cit.*, p.13
[57] European Commission, *The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility*, p.3.

response, the EU still seems to prioritise the skilled or relatively wealthy individuals as targets of its so-called comprehensive migration management strategy.

The textual analysis of the document provides valuable answers to the first research question addressed by this paper, regarding the extent to which GAMM brought about change towards a comprehensive strategy in EU migration policies. The preliminary hypothesis, that anticipated an inconsistency between the institutional 'liberalised' discourse and the text of GAMM, has proved mostly false.

The document does take indeed a step away from the security-oriented measures that had characterised EU's early response to the migrations inflows generated by the Arab Spring. The focus on the concept of (temporary) mobility over migration, however, questions the inclusiveness of new policy vis-à-vis the many people that chose to lose post-Arab Spring instable countries to seek shelter and better lives in Europe.

3. THE CASE OF LAMPEDUSA

3.1. The EU's institutional reactions to the Lampedusa shipwreck

3.1.1. *The Council of Justice and Home Affairs (7 texts)*[58]

Although under the policy co-legislative rules Member States share central powers and responsibilities with the supranational institutions of the EU, the Council of the European Union, in its Council of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) formation, still retains strong competences.

The fact that the components of the JHA Council are national Ministries of Defence and Internal Affairs has certainly a strong impact on its views on migration policies, the latter being regarded as important tools to guarantee the internal security of European countries through the control of arrivals.

Despite some attempts to balance the focus on border surveillance and patrol operations with a call for action to address the development-migration nexus in the

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[58] 3 texts containing the Conclusions of meetings of the Justice and Home Affairs Council; 1 text containing the statement of the Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs Vytas Leškevičius to the EP in the wake of the shipwreck; 1 text containing the statement of the European Council's President Hermann Van Rompuy to the EP in the wake of the first European Council meeting after the tragedy; 1 text containing the Conclusions of the first European Council meeting focusing on Defence since the entry in force of the Lisbon Treaty, which included migration management into key security priorities; 1 text containing the Memorandum of the Presidency of the European Council on the main orientations in the area of the Union of Freedom, Security and Justice as for October 2014.

migrants' countries of origin, the JHA Council appears more interested in short-term national gains provided by reducing the arrivals of migrants to Europe than in the implementation of new instruments such as legal venues for migrants, more coherent with the mobility-based approached developed by GAMM.

Filtering the texts with keywords shows similar patterns. The word *border* recurs 27 times in the 7 documents taken into account, mostly in association with security oriented concepts such as *surveillance* (8 times), *reinforce* (15 times), *smugglers* (5 times) and *control* (2 *times*). The word *pressure*, which directly refers to unease of those Member States confronted with high inflows of migrants, recurs 16 times. Pressure is always associated to *migration* (16 times), sometimes to *risks* (4 times) and to the urge to take measures to counter the phenomenon, as it is highlighted by the recurrence of the concept of *solidarity* among European states (6 times) and *response* (3 times).

Interestingly, references to *solidarity* among Member States do not go together with Member States' *responsibility* (only 2 times) towards endangered migrants and asylum seekers.

This finding is only partially surprising. Many authors have in fact highlighted that while *solidarity* amongst Member States is a *principle* enrooted in EU law, *responsibility* towards other countries and their nationals is only a *moral commitment* which may, only in some case, turns into *practice*[59].

Therefore, while the Council appears keen to enhance *cooperation* amongst EU states (6 times), the same commitment does not seem to apply to the safeguard of *rights,* a word used in the texts.

Finally, the word *mobility* – which plays such an important role in the text of GAMM - only recurs 3 times in the JHA texts, in 2 occasions in association to the concept of *partnership*, as a strategic tool to promote strategic agreements with third country partners. The idea of introducing *mobility* as a *value* itself does not rank as a top priority for the JHA Council, as the concepts are associated only one time in the texts.

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[59] See for example Javier DE CENDRA DE LARRAGAN, "Liability of Member States and the EU in view of the international climate change framework: Between solidarity and responsibility", in: Michael FAURE (ed.), *Climate Change Liability*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2011, 304 p.

3.1.2.   *The European Commission (8 texts)*[60]

The European Commission has long been the EU most vocal body in advocating the adoption of a European migration policy. Although the article 79 of the TFEU sets the establishment of a common framework as a precise objective for the EU, so far no comprehensive regulation on the admission of third-country nationals has been drafted, with the exception of the Directives on family unification[61] and the admission of highly qualified workers[62]. Most of cooperation has been focusing towards the creation of a common visa policy[63] and the guidelines for return *illegal* migrants found on the territory of Member States[64].

The EC's discourse on the Lampedusa shipwreck reflects the peculiar composition of this institutional body – made of Member States' officials who are supposed to act in the interest of the whole Union, but who often seek reappointment by appeasing their country of origin's public opinion.

The textual analysis of the documents reveals an overall approach which is quite consistent with the attempt to bring about a comprehensive understanding of the migration phenomenon. The word *borders* is mentioned 9 times, but when it is, that happens in association with security-oriented concepts such as *surveillance* (2 times), *control* (1 time) and *reinforce* (1 time). Interestingly enough, statements by President Barroso and his vice Šefčovič produce together 6 out of these 9 references to *border*s, while the Commissioner Malmström never uses this word in the 2 speeches analysed.

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[60] 3 texts containing the statements of the EC President José Barroso, both in the immediate wake of the disaster in Lampedusa and on the occasion of the inception of the Italian Presidency of the European Council on June 2014; 3 texts containing the statements of EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström, in the wake of the tragedy, on the occasion of end of the Stockholm Programme in the area of Justice, Freedom and Security in March 2014 and on the first anniversary of the shipwreck on October 2014; 1 text containing the Communication from the EC to the EP and Council on the work of the Task Force Mediterranean, on December 4th, 2013; 1 text containing the statement of the vice-President of the EC Maroš Šefčovič on the preparations for the European Council meeting on December 20th 2013.

[61] Council of the European Union, "Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2013 on the right to family reunification", *Official Journal of the EC*, L 251, Luxembourg, 03/10/03

[62] Council of the European Union, "Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly   qualified employment", *Official Journal of the EC*, L 155, Luxembourg, 18/06/09, (17-29pp)

[63] European Parliament and Council of the European Union, "Regulation (EC) No 810/ of 13 July 2009 on establishing a Community Code on Visa", *Official Journal of the EC*, L 243, Luxembourg, 15/09/09

[64] European Parliament and Council of the European Union, "Directive 2008/115/EC of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals", *Official Journal of the EC*, L 348, Luxembourg, 24/12/08

Similarly, the keyword *pressure* only recurs 5 times, always in connection with the idea of *migration inflows*. In 4 cases it comes in association with the idea of *solidarity* with Member States or *burden sharing*. It appears that the idea of *solidarity* is at the core of the Commission's discourse, since the word recurs 10 times. The two similar concepts of *cooperation* (10 times) and *assistance* (3 times) are often mentioned in association with *intra-European* solidarity. Yet, *cooperation*, together with *dialogue* (3 times), is also the word most used (6 times) to refer to the relations that the EU should entertain with the migrants' countries of origin.

When it comes to *responsibility* towards the migrants themselves, the Commission appears more reluctant to openly declare its commitment. Although the keyword recurs 6 times (compared to the only 2 mentions in the Council's discourse), it is mostly used in reference to the obligation to *share* (4 times) the *burden* (2 times) amongst the Member States, rather than as a value to uphold in order to guarantee the protection of human *rights* (4 times).

Lastly, the concept of *mobility* is mentioned 6 times, the double compared to the Council's texts, and comes in pair with the strong reference to the need for opening new *legal* channels for migration (9 times). These evidences support the above-mentioned findings that the European Commission's reaction to the Lampedusa shipwreck proved to be quite more liberal that the Council's.

3.1.3. The European Parliament (5 texts)[65]

With the gradual introduction of the co-decision procedure in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice the European Parliament has become a legislative actor of equal standing as the Justice and Home Affairs Council. With the Lisbon Treaty in force, in fact, the EP has now a voice on all legally binding agreements with third countries, which in the

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[65] 3 texts containing EP resolutions: 1 of them is the earliest *ad hoc* resolution in the wake to the Lampedusa events dealing with inflows of refugees; 1 text containing the EP's position on the state of the respect of Fundamental Rights in the EU; 1 text containing a review of the Stockholm Programme with regards to the area of Justice, Freedom and Security.
2 texts containing President Schultz's statements on the tragedy: 1 speech is delivered in the wake of the Parliament's resolution on October 24th 2013; 1 speech is a reflexion on the role of the EU in the management of migrations on the first anniversary of the Lampedusa events.

case of the Global Approach to Migration and Migration means mainly readmission agreements[66]. On all other issues the EP is informed or consulted.

The involvement of the UN High Commissioner for the Refugees as a well-regarded interlocutor in the field of migration policy affects the Parliament's discourse concerning migration inflows and, therefore, its frame of the Lampedusa shipwreck. The analysis of the texts reveals remarkable attention to the migrants' human rights and a strong advocacy for an enhanced commitment of the European Union as a social actor for protection.

Although some differences can be highlighted between the statements by the Plenary Assembly's and President Schulz's – with the last one being more exposed to the security concern from EU Member States – it appears quite evident that the EP endorses the implementation of the comprehensive approach to migrations outlined in GAMM.

The textual analysis carried out through keywords further highlights these findings. The word *border*, which recurs 33 times, is mainly used in a descriptive – rather than prescriptive – manner. This is why the concepts of *surveillance* (6 times) and *control* (4 times) are only rarely associated to the idea of borders while the *human* (or *humanitarian*) *rights* are associated to borders 13 times. Besides the link to borders, the texts refer to the *human* (or *humanitarian*) *rights* 59 times overall, a statistics that confirms the Parliament's proactive advocacy for the *protection* (18 times) of migrants.

Similarly, the word *pressure* is only mentioned 5 times, almost always in association with strategies to *reduce* it, such as Frontex's operational office (1 time), a common mechanism to *resettle* migrants (1 times), or the humanitarian, financial and economic *assistance* (1 time) to be provided to the migrants' countries of origins. As it can be noted, therefore, even a rather security-oriented concept like the idea of migrants' pressure can assume a different meaning when put into a different interpretative framework.

The word *responsibility* is mentioned 20 times, very often in association with *solidarity* (19 times overall). The quasi-perfect balance between the two concepts is very telling of the EP's inclusive approach to the phenomenon of migrations, and of the great difference with the Council's and – to some extent – the Commission's stance on the issue. Yet, it is the word *protection*, mentioned 19 times time in the whole text, which makes the

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[66] Art. 218 TFEU. For a discussion on the role of the Parliament after the Lisbon Treaty see Jean-Pierre CASSARINO, *Readmission Policy in the European Union*, Study commissioned by the DG For Internal Policy, 2010, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2010/425632/IPOL-LIBE_ET%282010%29425632_EN.pdf (consulted on 10/04/16)

idea of the *normative* approach of the EU institution. Protection, in fact, has a more precise connotation than responsibility, and refers to the idea of taking concrete steps to avoid the loss of human lives and the abuse of the migrants' rights.

Finally, the keyword *mobility* is only mentioned 5 times. This statistics could seem rather surprising, considered the Parliament's overall bias for the comprehensive approach to migration. However, it must be noted that the Mobility Partnerships are a quite technical tool negotiated between the European Commission and the third countries, with the Parliament (and the European Court of Justice) having no formal say in the discussions[67]. In order to keep some ownership over the policy making, it is understandable why the Parliament prefers to talk about the creation of *legal avenues* or r*outes* (7 times) for migrants into the EU, rather than making specific reference to Mobility Partnerships.

3.2. Analysis of the findings and comparison with the text of GAMM

Some analytic elements extracted from the comparison of the texts on the EU discourse and GAMM allows for the discussion of the second research question set for its paper.

This studies inquired the EU institutional actor responsible for the attempt to transform the EU in a normative leader in the Mediterranean region and those opposing a security-driven resistance. The preliminary hypothesis suggested that the supranational institutions (EP and EC in particular) would advocate for normativity, while the intergovernmental bodies (the JHA Council and European Council) would reflect national interests in the protection of internal security.

The findings of the empirical textual analysis partially confirm the hypothesis. First of all, it appears that the EU suffers from a clear cognitive dissonance when it comes to migration management. The failure to articulate a coherent strategy to address migration inflows can be largely attributed to the different composition and ideology of the speech actors who shape the EU institutional discourse. As it has been seen, the Council of Justice and Home Affairs has a much more stricter stance on migration inflows than both the European Parliament – which tends to value a normative narrative of inclusiveness and

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[67] Natasja RESLOW, *Partnering for mobility? Three-level games in EU external migration policy*. University Pers Maastricht, Maastricht, 2013, p. 143

respect of human rights – and the Commission – which tries to foster a pragmatic understanding of migrants as an added value for the European labour market.

However, blaming institutional divisions alone for EU's inconsistency in the field of migration policy would be too simplistic. The multi-level decision-making process is a characterising feature of the whole EU system, and divisions exist in all policy areas without the outcome-delivery being compromised for this reason only.

Rather, it would seem convenient to apply to the EU the model developed by Sidney Hook to explain how states of emergency modify the choices taken political leaderships[68]. States of normalcy, says Hook, are suitable for administrators, while great political leaders fit better exceptional circumstances[69]. The technocratic, consensus-oriented political system of the EU makes it appropriate to deliver significant policy outcomes in times of normalcy. Yet, crisis management proves to represent a harder challenge for the EU, due to its complex system of check-and-balances that fragments and slows down the decision-making.

Furthermore, situations of political turmoil such as the Arab Spring affect not only politicians' perceptions, but also public's expectations towards their leaders' response. In the scope of the analysis carried out in this paper, it seems fair to affirm that media claims of a potential migrants' invasion happening as a result of the displacement of people from Northern Africa deeply influenced the political agenda in Brussels.

The above-mentioned findings take on empirical significance when the wording of a text designed to address times of normalcy – the long-term Global Approach to Migration and Mobility – is compared to the responses to political crisis such as the tragedy of migrants in Lampedusa.

Applying the 4 keywords selected for the case study to the text of GAMM reveals interesting elements. The word *border*, which appears 99 times in the texts from the Lampedusa shipwreck, is only mentioned 5 times in the document from 2011. Similarly, the idea of migrants' *pressure* on the European Union' frontiers, which recurs 26 times in the texts post-Lampedusa, is completely *absent* in the Global Approach.

Unsurprisingly, the opposite happens with the keyword *mobility*. While GAMM mentions the term 49 times – making mobility the pillar around which EU's comprehensive

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[68] Sidney HOOK, *The Hero in History. A Study in Limitation and Possibility*, Beacon Press, Boston, p. 274
[69] *Ibid.*, p. 158

migration policy is built – it only recurs 14 times in the texts post-Lampedusa. Once again, the EU's malaise at living up to its liberal commitments in times of crisis appears evident. Finally, the recurrence of the word *responsibility* constitutes the most thought-provoking element of the comparative textual analysis. Although the keyword was set as an indicator for the EU's *normative* narrative, it is *never* mentioned in GAMM, the document that allegedly establishes the guidelines for the EU's *comprehensive* approach.

This evidence, that may seem contradicting the line of reasoning defended by the de-securitization theory exposed in the theoretical framework, assumes a different meaning when it is put into the perspective of GAMM's overall goal. The 2011 text, in fact, is a EC document that mirrors the pragmatic approach to the phenomenon of migrations defended by that institution. Therefore, the very normative concept of responsibility, which entails a focus on values and human rights, is not quite suitable for the purposes of the EC, which sought to establish with GAMM new legal venues for the arrival of *economic* migrants through labour-related mobility schemes. Asylum-seekers, who are the main beneficiaries of the theoretical duty of responsibility, are not GAMM's main target. Similarly, the texts from the Lampedusa tragedy reveal that the European Commission used the term *responsibility* 6 times, only 4 times more than the security-oriented JHA Council, whose political line is dictated by Member States. , Instead, it is the EP the speech-actor that most attempts at enhancing EU Normative Power with its 20 references to *responsibility*.

The preference accorded to the concept of mobility over responsibility in the text of GAMM, as well as in the EC's response to the tragic events occurred in Lampedusa, is yet another evidence that EU's migration management strategy is rather designed for times of normalcy than for periods of crisis. Indeed, it is also very telling of the difficulties encountered in implementing the so-called comprehensive approach to migration, that would allow the EU to claim a real role as normative actor for good in the Mediterranean region.

Conclusion

Recognizing that the complex system of exclusive and shared competences the field of migration policy requires a modest approach, this research has focused on the dialectics between EU's hard interests such as security and stability and normative precepts such as responsibility and inclusiveness.

In order to assess the outcome of the two conflicting trends towards securitization and de-securitization of migration management, the paper has focused on two main elements: 1) the so-called long-term strategy set up by the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility; 2) the reactions by EU's main institutions to a major political shock such as the death of 366 migrants along the coast of Lampedusa in October 2013.

The Critical Discourse Analysis of the texts has only partially confirmed the hypotheses of answer for the two research questions set at the beginning of the study: 1) GAMM does constitute indeed a step away from the security-oriented measures that had characterised EU's early response to the migrations inflows generated by the Arab Spring. The focus on the concept of (temporary) mobility over migration, however, questions the inclusiveness of a new policy vis-à-vis the many people that chose to leave post-Arab Spring instable countries to seek shelter and better lives in Europe; 2) the contradiction between the EC's liberal commitment to an inclusive approach to migration, the EP's concerns for the human rights of the migrants and the JHA Council's pragmatic implementation of restrictive policies, mirrors the cognitive dissonance experienced within the EU.

As for the future developments of a EU common policy framework on migration management, the prospects are not quite encouraging. The new tragedy occurred in the Strait of Sicily on April 18th 2015, causing more than 700 deaths among migrants heading towards Italy[70], shows that the EU has not firmly undertook the path of change. The 10-point strategy issued by the Commission two days after the disaster[71], as well as the European Council convened right after, showed again a restrictive understanding of migration management, mainly focused on the destruction of the human smugglers' boats before they could leave the country of departure[72].

Everything is lost, then, for the proponents of a more inclusive EU's approach tomigrations? Some elements may induce to a more balanced assessment.

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[70] Patrick KINGSLEY, *700 migrants feared dead in Mediterranean shipwreck*, The Guardian 19/04/15. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/19/700-migrants-feared-dead-mediterranean-shipwreck-worst-yet (consulted on 01/05/16)
[71] European Commission, *Joint Foreign and Home Affairs Council: Ten point action plan on migration, Luxembourg*, 20 April 2015, press release, Luxembourg, 20/04/15. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4813_en.htm (consulted on 01/05/16)
[72] the BBC, *Mediterranean migrants crisis: EU triples funding*, 24/04/15. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32435230 (consulted on 01/05/16)

First, both the EC President Claude Juncker and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini acknowledged, a week after the new tragedy occurred, that restrictive measures to contain immigration are not Europe's way forward. Mogherini spoke of a "special responsibility" to protect the lives of those who look at the Union as a land of hope and safety, thus putting forward again a normative understanding of the EU's role on the international arena[73]. On the same day, Junker angered his own centre-right party colleagues in the European Parliament when he made the following comment: "We must work on legal immigration. If we close the doors, migrants will break in through the windows"[74].

Second, an important Member States' chief of government such as the German chancellor Angela Merkel issued a declaration clearly stating that deaths at sea are "incompatible with European values"[75]. Indeed, winning Member States' diffidence at prioritising common principles over individual interests may constitute the first step to build a truly European migration policy.

"Stop Fortress Europe!" was written on the placards held by the survivors of the 2013 Lampedusa shipwreck at the commemoration ceremony for their fallen fellow migrants. It is now time for the European Union to show its real willingness to turn moral commitments into concrete political actions.

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[73] EU Business, *EU has 'responsibility' to face migrant crisis: Mogherini*, 29/04/15. Available on http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/europe-migrants-us.10yg/ (consulted on 01/05/16)
[74] EU Business, *Juncker calls for legal immigration to curb tragedies*, 29/04/15. Available at: http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/europe-migrants.10yl/ (consulted on 01/05/16)
[75] Deutsche Welle, *Merkel: Mediterranean deaths 'incompatible with EU values'*, 22/04/15. Available at: http://www.dw.de/merkel-mediterranean-deaths-incompatible-with-eu-values/a-18400041 (consulted on 01/05/16)

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