



New Global Challenges
Revolutions, migration, world order

Paweł Olszewski
Artur Wróblewski
Daria Orzechowska

Instytut Studiów Politycznych
Polskiej Akademii Nauk
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**European Studies Department Institute of Political Studies Polish
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R e viewers
Marek Gałęzowski
Martin Dahl

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Introduction

Tn the face of global changes and new trends the approach towards the Middle East is in a bad need of re-conceptualization. Given the pivot shifting to the Far East as well as emerging new local powers and groupings of states (such as BRICs or MINTs) the West must work out its coordinated strategy which appear efficient, embracing but also will take into account some justifiable grievances of the international actors feeding on popular discontent. Though new globalism is shared by everybody the abiding sense of unfairness in division of global assets and profits persists. In Politics Aristotle pondered the distributive justice concerned primarily with the distribution of the political authority (politike arche) and, secondarily, with the distribution of wealth. 2300 years later the conundrum of “justice as fairness” is surprisingly still actual and still to be addressed in the process of creating a better world to live for everybody.

The world has clearly divided into the “west” and the “rest”, or - in other words – into the relatively well-to do swath of western countries (sharing the same values and comprising now also the east European states) and the ”rest” consisting of relatively stable governments (BRICs, MINTs) and the countries on the slide to anarchy (MENA states). The usual simplifying template applied by scientists renders this growing chasm by referring to terms: core and periphery.

In the complex situation of today the old-school recipes are lacking in nuance. In 1947 Kennan wrote "The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union, must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." To that end, he called for countering "Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world" through the "adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy."

After 70 years from Kennan's instructions the world evolved completely though the politics of the West still betray many of the features of old thinking which relied on exerting pressure at thorny points of the world without addressing the problems in a systemic way at the grassroots. What is needed now is resolving the issues on the ground with local stakeholders by fairer distribution of assets and wealth and by building a fairer economic foundations of new global order based on "participatory engagement." The current challenges like immigration, terrorism, organized crime and climate change feed not so much on what their patrons have to offer but on the conceptual vacuum from the global community.

As these global problems urgently need to be deconstructed intellectually and practically targeted the United States and the European Union has attained the historical point of having to reach out to the world with constructive solutions in place of provisional, half-way verbalizations. Since Krauthamer's "unipolar moment" has gone, it is time to act...

Arab revolutions – New scenarios

I. The Arab Spring

After almost four years of the crisis in Syria, which have begun in March 2011, the solution to the internal conflict is as far away as before. With all the twists which saw the semantic upgrading of the conflict from crisis to the civil war - and with subsequent other developments which saw the transformation of the Syrian National Council into the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces - the events on the ground did not produce any viable resolutions. To the contrary, by implicating more variables in the equation they have complicated further the situation moving the expected finale even further away.

On the whole, the Arab revolutions have not brought Arab societies to a better dénouement so far – Egyptian and Libyan cases are fitting examples. The words of Hannah Arendt about XVIII revolutions in Europe encapsulate well the current situation in the Middle East: In France the downfall of the monarchy did not change the relationship between rulers and ruled, between government and the nation, and no change of government seemed able to heal the rift between them. The trouble was that the chief difference between the nation and its representatives in all factions had very little to do with ‘virtue and genius’, as Robespierre and others had hoped... The inescapable fact was that liberation from tyranny spelled freedom only for the few and was hardly felt by the many who remained loaded down by the misery.

The proclaimed creation of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces during the meeting in Doha on November 12, 2012 did not help consolidate the opposition forces in

the face of Bashar el-Assad's resistance and laid bare fragmentation and lack of "a working concept" on the part of opponents-in-exile. No wonder that cyclical spectacles of wishful thinking in the West and the Gulf became an easy object of mockery in Damascus. The glib Information Minister in Syrian government Mr. Omran al-Zoabi once cynically dismissed the opposition gathering as "delusional ravings of people sitting in the lounges of five-star Gulf hotels." Mr. Omran al-Zoabi's wry comments were not completely unfounded. It is now crystal-clear that the opposition groups have not won popular support within Syrian society. The opposition leadership have always attracted the same set of names – only reconfigured differently under diverse labels – and led by individuals too disconnected from the people on the ground in the country (the arguments used often against Syrian National Council) or too ailing to be considered seriously in terms of effective leadership on the ground (like in case of Mr. Riad Seif).

Behind regime's minister cynicism lurked a well-founded irony about the awkward directions of the Syrian revolution, which in many respects copied the distorted features of the Egyptian, Libyan and Tunisian uprisings. It bore also, in some respects, the resemblance to the French Revolution - the mistakes of which it repeated. All of them had one thing in common – they all, as the saying goes, devoured its children, cost a lot in social and economic terms and turned clock back as measured against the scale of people's "pursuit of happiness."

Like the French Revolution the Arab Spring movements have its own teleological sense probably better comprehended as seen in the conceptual framework of Hegelian historical inevitability, in other words, as part of necessity of facts fixed and immutable.

Hegel feared the French revolution, detested its violent character, despised its protagonists and therefore tried somehow to rationalize the outbreak of irrational hatred to make sense out of the chaos. As a believer in the rational progression of history (and idealist determinist) he strove to convince himself against all odds that: ...world history exhibits nothing other than the plan of Providence.... In the pure light

of this divine Idea... the illusion that the world is a mad or foolish happening disappears... Spirit does not toss itself about it....

Applying Hegel's way of understanding the history let one to appreciate better the logic of events in the Arab countries that have spiraled out of control and made average people's life worse off - either through sudden impoverishment or the death of relatives. Hegel's conception is comforting since it allows to come to terms with the fatalism of the situation – when it assumes the necessity for the historical processes to realize themselves. Unfortunately, the fatalism/destiny is good for the history studied in academies (it allows it to realize itself) but not so much for an average individual.

It is worth reminding that in none of the Arab Spring countries, the (declared) progressive political goals of restoring the dignity to people, installing civil rights and liberties and making people happier were fully fulfilled. Are Arab revolutions a case of one merciless nepotism substituting another and a secular sham replacing religious exuberance? The Western media's coverage of the region show people cheated out of the victory and complaining – from the average businessman to the garbage collector. In order to identify what went wrong, for the sake of the research, analysis will comprise Egyptian and Syrian revolutionary experiences.

II. What went wrong in Egypt.

Something went wrong in the Middle East which affected by the spirit of change and escapes any attempt for easy explanation. Structurally, a body polity had been transformed by bringing in new concepts of governments; ideologically, the new ideas have arrived in the form of new phraseology about freedom and liberties. However, from axiological standpoint, the noble ideals seem to be more of a chimera than realities due to the simple fact that noble values did not followed the declaratory statements. These words on the French Revolution from Hannah Arendt's book "On Revolution" fit again the current condition of the Arab revolutions across the region: Thus the role of

revolution was no longer to liberate men from the oppression of their fellow men, let alone to found freedom, but to liberate the life process of society from the fetters of scarcity so that it could swell into a stream of abundance. Not freedom but abundance became now the aim of revolution. The Arab revolutions released huge destructive energy (life process of society) – like in the case of the French Revolution before. They were in need of guidance but instead what they encountered was abundance hiding spiritual vacuum, intellectual chaos and often propensity for deception from all kinds of career-seekers. The drama of Tunisian cart wheeler or the death of protestors on Tahriri Square served as a catalyst for change awaited by one group of people to take power from another; and as such, regrettable to say, their individual deaths were meaningless and their sacrifice expendable – expendable in the face of historical processes in the Middle East. They released energy that in turn was “hijacked” by – using Hegelian terms - the immutable laws of history which were, in this case, the dictate of the most voluble ideology. The first mayor controversy over the decree issued on November 22, 2012 by President Mohamed Morsi which had limited the powers of judicial authority revealed intentions of Egyptian President and his cohort. After months of turmoil, the decision could be interpreted as appropriating popular enthusiasm to its own purposes. To many antagonists it amounted symbolically to the loss of revolutionary innocence and the betrayal of Egyptian revolution as a popular revolution of values. This move increased fears that the proposed 234 Article of the constitution could open way for a theocracy by moving the country closer to Sharia law - prompting Mohamed El Baradei to comment wryly ...(Morsy) put to referendum a draft constitution that undermines basic freedoms & violates universal values. While the protestors on the street in late November were replacing placards against Mubarak with the ones playing on Morsy’s name: Morsy beaucoup (merci in French) the gloomy self-realisation was slowly making its way. But, it appears as legitimate to ask, who in the first place told El Baradei and, for example, Western observers that the implementation of “freedoms and universal rights” in Egypt will be

realized at all? The logic of the history had suggested something to the contrary and this is exactly what happened in Egypt. The aspirations of religious leaders in Egypt were known long in advance and went beyond gaining mere political influence - the ambitions of religious (but also non-religious) organizations is to win spiritual leverage. This is the spiritual power that infatuates followers and provides leaders with control over people's minds. Significantly, the French revolutionaries, in order to gain popular acceptance, quickly created artificial God of the revolution by establishing the "cult of the Supreme Being" (inspired by the last chapter of Rousseau's "Social Contract") and winning quickly the army of devotees overflowing with enthusiasm: ... The true priest of the Supreme Being is Nature; his temple, the universe; his worship, virtue; his festivals, the joy of a great people. The Bolshevik and Maoist revolutions followed suit procuring religion-like devotion to Leninism and Maoism with the bureaucratic apparatus fashioned after the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church. These tactics of are part of the "revolutionary marketing" regardless of changing times, places and actors. Given the above, it should not come therefore as a surprise that the group of 85 Egyptian members of parliament pushed through the legislative body their own project of the constitution and looked for ways to impose their own vision of Egyptian politics. At this stage of Egyptian experience it was as natural as, for example, the imposition by 56 white male (mostly lawyers) of the Republican Constitution on the United States in 1789 which defended the business interests of some oligarchs (like in Russia under Boris Jelcin 200 years later) and granted the rights to vote only to white property holding male - leaving disenfranchised everybody else in the society (women, poor white property-less male, black people and native Americans). In the American case, a narrowly conceived republicanism became a form of "religion" - controlled and manipulated by a vibrant group of business leaders with vested interests (majority of them were lawyers).

The triumph of Muslim Brotherhood's political arm "Freedom and Justice Party" in the legislative election and subsequent "highjacking" of Egyptian revolution, from historiozophical angle, was an inevitable

consequence - considering that the conservative Muslim, as the most vocal group, constituted “optical” majority by employing combination of such factors as skillful political PR plus aggressive and domineering approach. If we added to this combination the political immaturity of people (exposed before to prolonged time of oppression) the silent compliance of “non-optical” majority in the face of colossal challenges would not have surprised us.

Interestingly, the oppression of liberal revolutionaries by their conservative counterparts (Muslim Brotherhood under President Morsi) in Egypt was not unlike the Jacobin cleansing of real or imagined enemies of the French Revolution at the time of Great Terror. Ironically, the similar sentiments for the return of the old good times under ancien regime appeared across the region - repeating history of the French restoration under Louis XVIII.

The case of Egyptian revolution is a telling example of ancien regime coming back. The arrival to power of Marshal Fatah Al-Sisi after Islamic president Mohammed Morsi’s downfall - who in the first place had appointed Sisi in attempt to reclaim power from the army - and restoration of the old military elites signified the repetitive cycle of revolutions gone astray. What is interesting, Sisi came to power with support of several old prominent businessmen and the mainstream parties embodying the old order such as al-Dawa al-Salafiya (the Salafist Call), the Salafist Nour Party, the liberal Free Egyptians Party and the liberal New Wafd Party. The case of Tunisia is not dissimilar. After a three year spell of Islamic Ennahda (Renaissance) party in power the October 2014 elections brought back the old cohorts of deposed president Ben Ali, syndicalists and leftists – all united under the aegis of the new movement called Nidaa Tounes led by 87 year-old Beji Caid Essebsi, the former minister of Bourguiba. Similar narrative could be applied to the Libyan case where the dictatorship has been replaced by warlords and two acting governments.

Concluding, it seems that the excesses of the revolution are unavoidable until the thirst for bloodletting runs its course and the majority of population comes to their senses. So far the Egyptian

revolution has been impressive as extravaganza - of beautiful language, lofty declarations, important statements and words; words which do not come true easy in the Middle East. In a sense, it has been a “revolution completed” – in a semantic dimension - with antagonists ascribing their own meaning to the words, relativizing them and, in a way, depreciating their value.

III. What is with Syria?

The Syrian problem is another good case study - being part of a more complex problem inherent in the region. As a focal point for analysis it can be extrapolated and universalized as an experience not unique to one location and one people. The Egyptian revolution, to some extent, is a finished entity, at least, at its first stage of development while the Syrian revolution is still an experience in *statu nascendi* – therefore more interesting from epistemological standpoint as a subject of analysis. With all this fatalistic determinism in the Middle East is Syria doomed to the recurring cycles of endless violence and bloodbath? It is a very probable scenario given the synergy of two overlapping negative factors – the persistent problems and catastrophic impact of the external players. It can be examined by using sociological methods and foreign policy theorem.

1. Analyzing internal factors

A. What Syria needs is not a stash of arms but a kind of moral revolution and a secular canon of ethical standards. As to the intrinsic nature of the thing the inability of Syrians to find ways in order to reach compromise was striking. As eyewitness to Syrian national „reconciliation“ I was awed by the amount of anger and distrust on the part of people involved in the political process. The politicking in Syria from the beginning took the form of a spectacle of emotions running high where buck-passing and name calling became more important than any meritorical argument. Temperamentally

extremists, the Syrian were unable to overcome differences. The hot temperament so enticing for tourists when quarreling with the marchants at the Damascus shouk turned out to be a critical factor preventing from any compromise at the round table. It transpired also that the idea of Syria as one nation unraveled fast. Temperamental aspects aside the major factor inhibiting chances for national reconciliation seems to be overpowering mistrust inherent in the Middle Eastern behavioral pattern. The negative legacy of distorted politics and business spawned the culture where taking advantage of one another, inflating stories or telling half-truths became commonplace. Becoming involved in the meetings arranged to discuss new vectors of reforms in Syrian politics in May, 2012 I was struck how lightly people were appropriating statements only to depart from them minutes later. Not mentioning that the most outspoken participants defected soonafter making the whole reform initiative a laughing stock. Though it might be politically incorrect to admit it openly however the erratic behavioral pattern is a main inhibitor paralysing the political processes in Syria and beyond. On the one hand, it is one of the charming indiosyncrasies making the region so intriguing but, on the other hand, hindering political processes. Anybody making business or politics in the Middle East know how tough the environment can be. What is interesting, no part of the region is immune to it, including the Israelis. Politically counted into the Western zone of democratic tradition, where dishonesty in politics is expected to be punished by the voters at the ballot boxes, Israel is following the Middle Eastern pattern of lie. Israeli politics being plagued by corruption in recent years, yet the Israeli politicians know well that they are not going to be held accountable for excesses. To some extent, being well versed in political tradition of Morgenthau style, they are adapting to the circumstances of the region - otherwise they would not have survived so long in such unfriendly environment. Manipulation is innate in the fabric of the societies in the Middle East – it is like a contagious disease. Analyzing the anatomy of problem the question arises what could be done to build trust among people. The solution for the region

could arrive from an unexpected source. It could take the form of, to paraphrase famous sociologist Max Weber's words –“Islamic ethics and the spirit of modernity.“ Weber's one hundred year old studies on bureaucracy, Protestantism, capitalism and disenchantment of the world demonstrated how important in Judeo-Christian traditions of the West was the liberation of significant areas of human activity from religious oppression. It was like a „Copernican revolution“ in thinking and perception of the world. It was a point of emancipating Western Europeans from the feudal shackles intellectually, from religious infatuation and it was a point of encouraging open debate and creative thinking in neo-platonic sense. To some extent, it was a culmination of the secularisation process which had began in medieval times.

It was the ideas sewn from the time of Thomas Aquinas who separated the secular from the religious thus broadening epistemological horizons and breaking intellectual straitjacket of St. Augustine stiff tradition. The French Revolution, Enlightenment and industrial revolutions only strengthened the secular tendencies in the West. And, what is interesting, the overcoming of religion did not happen outside or against the Judeo-Christian faith as Dr. Richard L. Rubenstein noticed duly in his book „The Cunning of History“ : „It must be not forgotten that the Protestant insistence upon the radical transcendence of a supramundane God, which was the indispensable theological precondition of both the secularization process and disenchantment of the world, was biblical in origin“. The emancipation of mind in the Judeo-Christian tradition allowed the creation of universal ethics understood as a secular set of values and principles valid universally and internalized by majority of people. This in turn became the avenue to mutual understanding and social harmony in euroatlantic geographical space. The Arab world will have to face similar revolution in thinking about the doctrinal concept of the state and society. The discussion is not new one and has been accompanied from the beginning the public discourse with writings and preachings of such intellectuals as Sayid Qutb, Al-Banna or Abul Maududi where it was pointed that overzealous devotion to the one-sided (and distorted) politicized interpretation of Quran/religion was a trap. At

issue was, for example, the prominent slogan popular among conservatives that guided the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood: `al-islam dinun was dawlatun` (Islam is a religion and a state). The closer study revealed that the sentence was mentioned neither in a verse of the Quran nor was it quoted from a hadith. It was simply a 19th century invention appropriated by the Salafi movement that emerged to stop the Western influence in Egypt. The damage to interpretation had been done yet by inseminating peoples' minds with wrong concept.. Characteristically, around the same time when Weber was pondering on the separation of the earthly economic pursuits from religious endeavors the Arabic ideologues of Islamic state developed doctrine of the state (daula islamijja, hukuma islamijja) which went in the opposite direction to the tendency which Weber demonstrated. For them (Rashid Rida) the political renaissance (nahda) signified the merger between politics and religion under the rule of the pious caliph. The Middle East (and the Arab world) in the process of undergoing renaissance, now like never before, needs dignifying ethos and everyday ethics which would constitute the moral reference and set a criterion for judgements. It could solidify the backbone of societies and offer platform for resolving differences. The Syrian case of quarelling leaders unable to overcome prejudices might be symptomatic of a bigger problem of the Middle Eastern reflecting deficiency in the ethical standards relating to politics and business. Lack of which undermine the fabric of trust indispensable in the process of modern state-building where decisions are made more through consensus than prevalence. The inability of constructing a modern polity, in this case, is a result of temperament and distrust.

What Syria needs is not a stash of arms but a moral revolution and secular canon of ethical standards internalized and implemented in social sphere. Syria needs, to remind Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski's words, mathanoi (a change of heart) and katechon (spiritual might). On the other hand, religion could play a very positive role in times of social changes. Kolakowski, professor of Oxford and committed secularist, wrote an interesting essay in 1980th in which this religious sceptic emphasized the role of religion (any

religion but christianity in this case) as the moral cornerstone for civilizational progress. The religion for him represented the point of reference in the chaotic world guaranting the organized progression of peoples and societies through history and maintaining the ability to distinguish good from bad while preserving the superiority of natural law prescribing moral behaviour. By removing the natural law as a point of reference – the law externally anchored - we expose ourselves to the dangers of totalitarian whimses and relativization of moral categories. The instrumentalization of religion by extremist forces in the Arab countries complicated the situation and made harder to discover any moral common denominator.

B. The Polish case - Solidarity revolution scenario revisited

The Polish Solidarity revolution was one of the most successful methamorphosis which contributed to change radically the geopolitics of Eastern Europe. At the same time it was a bloodless spectacle bearing resemblance to a civil disobedience in India or in the United States respectively. Studying this chapter of European history one can notice that all change was preceded by a moral transformation more than political or economic developments. Growing incrementally the evolutionary process lasted for 10 years before it brought the expected fruits. The victory was also preceded by colossal mobilization of intellectual forces in Poland – from the left and right side of political scene - with huge role of the Catholic Church under the spiritual leadership of Polish Pope Karol Wojtyła. After years of political debating the Polish revolution, instead of generating recommendations for armed uprising, produced something unique under conditions of escalating national hostility of the beginning of 1980th – it was almost intangible and took a form of a book of ethics by philosopher Jozef Tischner “The Ethics of Solidarity“ which promoted moral consiouness, individual embetterment and propagated ethical dimensions in national transformation. Interestingly, though being a catholic priest and theologian, Tischner drafted a code of ethical standards – secular and religion-neutral in its spirit - serving collective

objective of national reconciliation and preparing fertile ground for the political revolution. The short quote from Tischner's book carries a potent message of universal value - timeless in its actuality despite time elapsed. Preserving what is quintessential about humans it could be applied to any revolution (including the Syrian one): We are living in an extraordinary moment right now. People are casting aside their masks, they are coming out of their undergrounds, they are showing their true faces. Out from under the dust and out of the oblivion their consciences are coming to light. Today we are such as we really are. Believers are believers, the doubtful are doubtful and non-believers are non-believers. It makes no sense to play someone else's role. Everyone wants to be called by his own name. What we are experiencing is not only a social or economic event, but, above all, an ethical one. The matter impinges on human dignity. The dignity of man is founded on his conscience. The deepest solidarity is the solidarity of consciences. The moral revolution accompanying the social, political and economic grievances in Poland allowed for creation of elites magnanimously capable of transgressing negative emotions of retribution and inclined to compromise. Despite General Jaruzelski's repressions and martial law, after only eight years, Poland was ready for the round table – which was a triumph of common sense and moderation over passions and cries for revenge. Without the self-consciousness raised to higher level and accompanied by the spirit of respect the peaceful transition of Eastern Europe from socialism to capitalism would not have been so smooth. It seemed that only when the moral reflection made deep inroads on all sides of the barricades of the conflict (the communists and the opposition) progress was possible. It is worth noting that similar intellectual undertones and moral sensitivity were reflected in other equally successful transition countries of the region. For instance, the writings of the playwright Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia and the collection of essays *The Power of the Powerless* where he described citizens forced to live under lie in communist regime are point in question. The phenomenal achievements in Eastern Europe attempted for practical realization of the theory of justice projected by John Rawls in

his famous book on ethics and politics - Theory of Justice in which the author envisioned theoretical state-building scenario . It was an imaginary situation in which social/state institutions received the legitimacy through application of common principles formulated in the "original position" behind the "curtain of ignorance" and approved by the majority of rational citizens. Who knows if it were not for moral consciousness that the chances for conflict resolution would have been bigger and the grounds for, to use Karl Popper's nomenclature, open society more fertile . The intelligentsia, as a leading class and a vocal participant in public life as well as a natural avanguard of political and social processes in the society, could help heal wounds. Deprived of more active debate the Syrians got stupefied hustling around everyday business. The poor quality of education in social sciences worsens the problem by diminishing ability of balancing the information inflow and sharpening the critical judgment. The Syrians suffer from the serious symptom identified by Hannah Arendt as – antipolitics. They remain blinded to what is real politics being exposed to, to use Arendt's words, „antipolitics informed by totalitarian tradition“ marked by culture of corruption, foul play and cronyism. It happens whenever there is no chance to work out, under conditions of free discourse, the critical thinking ability - so „worshiped“ by Immanuel Kant in his writings - understood as ability to posit itself among the plurality of judgments and critically confronting it against all odds. It is also worth reminding Kant's timeless observation on the paradoxical nature of democracy which - unlike the Western tradition often holds it - may not yet necessarily be the best of political systems. It might also not be deemed the best fitted option for the Middle East. Kant's reservation about democracy found expression in his support for the mixed form of government and in sober warnings against excesses of democratic governing: ...democracy is, properly speaking, necessarily a despotism, because it establishes an executive power in which 'all' decide for or even against one who does not agree; that is, 'all,' who are not quite all, decide, and this is a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom. To some extent, the West fixed the problem highlighted by Kant by

resolving the paradox of democratic deficit - present also in Rousseau's idea of *élan general* as a force subjugating the minorities. The western invention of representative and later participatory democracy with the extended system of legal guarantees for minorities created an acceptable version of democratic order over sighted by such institutions as for example European Court of Human Rights in Europe. The oversensitivity and revulsion for honest soul-searching is another inhibitor of change in the Middle East. The suggestion about ethical inward inquiry should not be regarded as impingement on dignity. Unless the majority depart from the conviction that the systematic study of human society and behaviour is not un-religious menace - the diagnosis will not be possible and right solutions for modern challenges will never be found – neither in Syria nor somewhere else.

2. External factors – Syria let down twice by the West.

The distrust toward the West prevailed in Syria – even among the Christians. The West was perceived as the cynical egoistic player with reputation mortgaged by the colonial past and its unequivocal ties to Israel. The United States' position being even worse given its strategic relationship with Israel – it is a reputation of being the imperialist minus colonial past. It is worth noting that one of the main features of the Syrian mental makeup has been programmatic hatred of Israel propagated from early school days. The successful propaganda took its toll on Syrians sometimes in the form of grotesque where the legitimate historical fact mixed with pure nonsense. Characteristically, the anti-Israelism and anti-imperialism is one of the few things capable of releasing emotions – verging on religious elevation escaping rational explanation. It is a result of exposure to prolonged subliminal conditioning of mind - illustrating detrimental effect when extreme emotions affect political judgment. No wonder, from ideological point of view, anti-Israelism (called anti-Zionism) played a very useful role of a scarecrow solidifying a sense of national unity across the sectors of society – the fear being one of very

few things – except for food – which multi-sectarian Syria have shared in common. Given Syrians’ negative connotations about the West for the majority of their history the Western world was often stereotyped more as a promised land for gestarbaiteurs than any conceptual model of political arrangement to be mimicked. The brief overview of historical data illustrates the troubled relations. From a distant past, the territory of present Syria was a battleground for the crusaders and Muslims. The monument of Saladin on the horse towering over the Old Town in Damascus testifies to the glories of the victory over Christian conquerors. In more recent history, the Syrians were left alone and betrayed unceremoniously by the West at least twice in the 20th century. For the first time it was after the fall of the Ottoman Empire - when the new world order was emerging in the wake of the First War; the second setback came with the current crisis. Unlike in case of the Central European peoples such like Poles and Czechs, President Woodrow Wilson was less responsive to the calls for independence in the Middle East. Wilson abandoned Syrian aspirations to the logic of treacherous Sykes-Picot agreement between the British and the French which partitioned the Levant into the zones of influence in red and blue shades on the map. What worse the West violated the terms of Husayn–MacMahon correspondence in which the British High commissioner promised recognition of the independent Arab kingdom under Sharif Husayn’s Hashemite dynasty in exchange for the Arabs fighting assistance against the Turks (allied at the time with Germans). The Syrians helped to fight the Turks but promises were broken. The treaties signed over Syrians’ heads during the war, such as aforementioned Sykes-Picot Agreement and Balfour Declaration, were quite unequivocal about the future of this area leaving Syrian nationalists in the cold. Ironically, though Syrians defended their rights smartly using President Wilson’s own idealistic slogans from “The Fourteen Points” about “new age of open diplomacy with open covenants of peace proceeded frankly and in the public view” their dramatic cries were left unanswered. The quote from the statement of the Syrian Congress gives a sample of frustrations: “The fundamental principles laid down by President

Wilson in condemnation of secret treaties impel us to protest most emphatically against any treaty that stipulates the partition of our Syrian country and against any private engagement aiming at the establishment of Zionism in the Southern part of Syria; therefore we ask for the complete annulment of these conventions and agreements.” For Syrians it marked the culmination of disappointment and a good lesson of realpolitik while for Americans it meant the loss of face as a reliable potential partner – reputation that they will never quite recover. Years later, in 1945, the Americans will repeat exactly the same mistake in Vietnam turning deaf ear to the nationalist Ho Chi Min’s borrowing of Jefferson’s words from the American Declaration of Independence and proclaiming a Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the presence of American delegation: We hold these truths to be self-evident. That all men are created equal . Ho Chi Min, who originally looked for support from the US in the anti-colonial nationalist struggle against the French in Southern Asia, eventually, turned against them affiliating with the Communists and becoming a major source of woes for the American diplomacy. The “Syrian scenario of 1919” will be repeated later with Fidel Castro after revolutionary Cuba had looked in vain for US backing. As to the French in the Middle East after WW I they persisted in ignoring further Syrian national demands which took the form of declaration of independence presented officially by the Syrian Central Congress in March of 1920. The declaration was based on the resolution delivered to the King-Crane Commission - which was set up by the Americans and whose recommendations supported Syrian efforts. The French refused also to recognize Sharif Husayn’s son, Amir Faysal, as the king of Greater Syria encompassing territories of Palestine and Lebanon. The final distribution of the Arab provinces took place in April of 1920 at the conference of San Remo with the British annexing Iraq and Palestine and the French grasping Lebanon and Syria. The famous battle of Khan Maysalun of July 1920 in the mountain pass between Damascus and Beirut in which a few Syrian nationalists - evoking the specter of heroic Greeks at Marathon - fought a lost battle for self-determination against the prevailing French

cohorts. This gloomy moment in Syrian history turned into a day which sealed the fate and relegated the province to the servile status of the colony. The Syrians felt let down by some of the allied victors of the Great War and, before the Second World War, Damascus saw twice its recurring struggle for freedom finishing in bloodbath – it was bombarded twice by the French forces with a significant loss of life on Syrian side. The colonial historical experience conditioned the perception of the West by subsequent generations of Syrians. It fueled the mistrust though civilizationally the elites cultivated the cultural heritage of former colonial exploiters - what has manifested itself in education and many snobish habits. The Syrians were navigating choppy waters of the Middle East politics after the Second World War looking for new allies and new opportunities. The flirt with pan-Arabism resulting in confederation project with colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser's Egypt was short-lived; but the Russian option - as an alternative to the American - seemed attractive. The Syrians did not like American intimate bond with Israel and resented the interference in the region's politics manifested by Mossadeq affair - followed by the control of Iran till 1979 (interestingly, the Russians had grabbed a chunk of Iran long before during the Russo-Iranian wars of 1804-1813 and later in 1826-1828; in this way they acquired the Persian province of Azerbaijan which became eventually a republic of the Soviet Union.)

B. The West betraying moderates in Syria

After missed chances of currying favors with Syrians at the Paris Peace Conference after the First World War it seems that the second major blunder arrived eighty years later - at the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011. The West made a mistake by hurrying too quickly into taking sides in the conflict. Instead of giving itself more time to consider all viewpoints and weigh possible scenarios it pinned its hopes on only one antagonist - the opposition thus undermining instruments of diplomatic maneuvering. Unfortunately, the Syrian opposition turned out to be less reliable as the partner - than it was

originally predicated - bogging down country in a prolonged crisis which devastated the country and pauperised society. At the same time West's whole long legacy of weaving delicate network of relations with Hafez Assad and with the current government in power was lost irreversibly. The United States and the European Union rushed into creating the vision of the future based on the wrong assumptions. For the French diplomacy it took quite long to realize the errors of judgment and, most importantly, admit it explicitly. It is worth quoting at this point a comment from an interview of one anonymous functionary from Quai d'Orsay which appeared in „Le Figaro“: “La diplomatie française a sous estimé le régime syrien parce qu'on a bien voulu le sous estimer. On ne devait pas être surpris par sa capacité de résistance... Le Conseil national syrien (CNS) est en perte de vitesse sur le terrain. Nous avons soutenu un cheval perdant.”

By brandishing enunciations of support for one side of conflict while unceremoniously condemning another the tools at the disposal of diplomacy were relegated to the backburners only petrifying the hostile camps. At the same time the Western policymakers' serious error seemed to be to ignore the the most important protagonist in the crisis – the „silent majority“ of average Syrians comprising roughly 60% of the society. It is a significant segment of the population embracing the middle class of businessman, shopkeepers, farmers, religious minorities, women and children. In other word, this is apolitical and non-sectarian group bonded by a commonsensical interest and, at the same time, encompassing the most vulnerable elements of society. They were neither supportive of the regime nor negative about the opposition – like in every war and armed conflict they were just casual bystanders caring only about surviving. And like in every war and every conflict it was this people who were affected the most and who bore the biggest burden of violence. What is most important, the cross section of this group unveiled its universalist profile extending beyond simple religious and ethnic affiliation. The western world should have reached across the ethnic barriers and tried to make the „silent majority“ an addressee of its policies - as the moderate and prevalent segment of Syrian society.

Instead, the recognition was hastily extended to the Syrian National Council (SNC), the representation based outside of the country and dominated by a group with clear religious tag of Muslim Brotherhood - reinforcing only the perception of the sectarian character of the crisis. In this way the West squandered the occasion to win potential loyal ally and lost most valuable future asset installed inside Syria. The Western/American belief in controlling Muslim Brotherhood and moderating more radical Salafis was delusional. The choice for attributing to them so much authority was startling remembering that there existed at least six distinct ideological camps in Syria which allowed room for maneuver and alternatives. Picking up the ally from each camp and creating a conglomerate of forces swearing allegiance to progressive ideas of secular state was a better option. It would have prepared groups for adoption of ideas of fair governance and political pluralism – conditions for assistance from the West. Instead, the recognition was thrown behind the group dominated in two-thirds by Muslim Brotherhood. The refurbishment of the Syrian National Council in November of 2012 and renaming it into Syrian National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces did not change situation substantially. The New National Coalition's 27 of 65 seats still were controlled by Muslim Brotherhood and the new organ was headed by Ahmed Mouaz al-Khatib, former Imam of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, known for his anti-Semitic and anti-Western remarks. He is also quoted as an admirer of the Qatar-based Muslim Brotherhood preacher Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi and remains ideologically attached to Islamism of the Brotherhood's Damascene branch - associated with Issam al-Attar, a former spiritual guide of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. It is worth mentioning that the National Syrian Coalition includes also other Islamists, domineering thus the opposition body slated by the West as the representation of the reform forces of future Syria. By supporting the organ identified with one option the West squandered occasion to create truly pluralist representation composed of the moderates without religious affiliations – at least at the head of the organization. With all due respect to the figure of Damascus Imam the question

arose why, having so many alternatives from amongst the secular silent majority, the West put its trust in the religious cleric from Damascus Mosque affiliated with Islamic movement? Appointing the imam as head and spokesperson of the revolution would have been like placing the priest at helm of the Polish solidarity revolution, in which the Catholic Church was heavily involved. If it happened it would have probably affected the credibility of the movement. The activities of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt provoked the question about organization's "hidden agenda" and real intentions.

Another big blunder of the West was channeling arms to groups dominated by Islamists – some of them very shadowy. Upon closer inspection it seemed that their main source of legitimacy qualifying for the cache flows was manifesting open opposition to the Assad government. Though the Free Syrian Army was nominally anti-sectarian and proclaiming to fight in the name of freedom, in fact, it was backed by Islamic forces. The new joint military council formed by the fighters in Antalya at the end of 2012, which led the battle for Syria, reflected exactly the same logic of lopsided composition as the Syrian National Council in the past and Syrian National Coalition nowadays. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic forces account for two-thirds of 263-member military body oversighted by US and Turkish advisers and financed with Saudis and Qatari money. Though the frontman for the military council was reputed to be a moderate - his deputies, Abdel-basset Tawil of Idleb and Abdel-Qader Saleh of Aleppo governate - were linked to the Salafi movement. Another major deficiency in the Western strategy towards the Syrian opposition was the absence of clear set of conditions under which the aid could be transferred – at least such terms were not revealed to the public. The Syrian opposition as beneficiary of the patronage benefits should have presented in unambiguous words the contour of future political social and economic arrangement. Taking their public statements about freedom at face value was a naïveté – the history of former allies turning their weapons against former sponsors should have served as a warning. A formal document - something like a "memorandum of understanding" - should have been outlined as a

road map plan for Syria. Any help should be conditioned on the honest reporting as the situation develops, on delivering on the promises and implementing all terms of such agreement. The opposition - whether its civilian government or the military arm – should be morally and politically obligated to respect the preliminary arrangements and only upon acceptance of the strings attached, the world should sponsor the fighters inside the country and their representation abroad as government-in-exile. The current system of security guarantees for “after the crisis” is vague and the clandestine deals between the Western intelligence organizations and all sorts of locally operating groups within Syria may bring further destabilization into the region. The channels of communication remain shadowed from the public and provoke legitimate questions about the future security implications. Keeping in mind that the opposition is led by Islamists – regardless of their specific affiliation – one may wonder what will be the end effect of such approach. Exactly such clumsy strategy and absence of strong security and control mechanisms contributed to the loophole which conceptually trapped Americans in Afghanistan and helped to create a breeding ground for emergence of the Taliban forces. In this case, the American intelligence services, in the most expensive covert operation in the history of CIA called “Cyclone”, channeled weapons and money with the assistance of Pakistan only to wake up in the face of the “beast”, well armed and with honed military skills, which turned the weapons against its former patron after elimination of short-term Russian obstacle. The famous photo of the CIA chief William Casey passing Stinger missiles to the mujahidins on the Afghan-Palestinian border via Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence took later a symbolic meaning – after their former protégés had facilitated successful terrorist operations against US interests around the world and... set in motion events that led to 9/11. The transparency issue is becoming an urgent matter especially now in the critical moment of Islamic terrorists regrouping and rebranding activities. The lack of thereof may result in the sinister entrapment to be regretted for many years to come. The current trend among jihad groups point to the tendency of giving up on unique

name (such as for example Al Qaeda) and unified command and adopting, increasingly, different names in different geographical locations. The old world of unipolar jihadism is being thus replaced by the fragmented multipolar jihadosphere composed of many separate groups but unified by the same ideology. What connect all those organizations is the same Arabic name *ansar al Sharia* (supporter of Islamic law) and unbridled enthusiasm for the adopted cause (*dawa*) of manifesting missionary zeal and imposing “happiness” on people in the form of religious regime. The trend started in Yemen, when al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the al Qaeda’s branch, set up the front group Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen in April 2011 and continued with the emergence of sister organizations around the Middle East and in Africa (in Libya, in Tunisia, in Morocco and Egypt). The additional boost to this process came in the form of special “blessing” from famous jihadi ideologue Shaykh Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti. Unfortunately, the terrorist groups linked to Al Qaeda have penetrated into Syria making the transfer of weapons to this country possible. The group Jabhat al-Nusra, presented as the most fearsome Syrian rebel fighting force, is the prime driver behind coordinating jihadist actions there and sends a warning signal about the directions the West-sponsored revolution might be taking if not properly supervised. It is symptomatic of a major potential problem awaiting Syria after the crisis. The reply of one of its leaders to the question about designating the organization as terrorist by Obama’s government should be heeded with attention: “It’s not a problem... We know the West and its oppressive ways. We know the oppression of the [U.N.] Security Council, the lies of the international community. It’s not news. This means nothing to us.” Keeping in mind the assumed long-term strategy of al-Qaeda and its local affiliates, and assuming those activities are coordinated between different groups, the presence of this terrorist group in Syria is ominous. The developments in northern Mali as of January 2013 - being a consequence of successful entrenchment of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb which copied *modus operandi* of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi - should

serve as a lesson. Jabhat al-Nusra followed in the footsteps emerging as one another nightmare of the West.

The absence of the balanced approach and creative on the ground was reflected in the West's wishful thinking and futile speculations based on oversimplifications. The text which appeared in 2013 on the website of American think tank "Council on Foreign Relations" and on the opinion pages of the "New York Time" disclosed such tendency. It was a tangible evidence of (well-intentioned) strategic thinking based on old axioms of the American diplomacy (being part of the imperial mindset) and archaic perception of the world rooted in the past experience – completely unglued from the realities on the ground (scenario repeated despite Vietnam, Iraqi and Afghanistan experience which turned out to be the longest US conflict in history - 15 year-long.)

C. Foreign nations' proxy war in Syria

The foreign involvement in Syrian crisis is the most dramatic dimension of the conflict. The conflict deteriorated fast in 2011 not so much out of its own internal impetus as because of the outside interference . Everything started with precocious side-taking when American ambassador – Robert Ford and the French ambassador - Chevalier openly condemned the government in Damascus. The articulated support for opposition forces and its military branch of the Free Syrian Army, no doubt, have contributed to the escalation of conflict informed by the proxy war logic. On one side aligned the United States, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar while on the other the Shiite-ruled neighbours of Iran and Iraq meddled in the fray sending Hezbollah fighters and Iraqi militiamen to Assad's rescue. It was a critical point when the situation worsened adding the strong religious undertones to the political rivalry. Syria became the playground for the old regional rivalry between Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia – pivotal states in the struggle for regional hegemony.

The command headquarters for the operation were established in Istanbul under the guidance of Qatari operative embedded in border town of Adana who previously armed rebels in Libya (and toppled Gaddafi). At the beginning things looked easy for the opposition and the financing of rebel fighters in Syria went smoothly. But calculations were misplaced and the popular support for Assad in Damascus allowed him to survive. This was the moment when the unity in Western coalition camp have frayed. The Saudis and Turks started to finance muslim fighters of all colours – officially they were moderate and more effective – although money ended up in radical muslims' stash arms as it turned out. Situation spiraled out of control making United States force Saudi Arabia to replace Prince Bandar bin Sultan as the head of Saudi intelligence with more transparent Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef. But the damage already has been done. The conflict escalated and the weapons proliferated. In this way, the western coalition unconsciously helped to create favorable conditions for Islamic State. The Turks undertook even the oil trade with the IS allowing intermediaries to transport cheap oil trucks over border – everything with intention to finance fighters in Syria. At the same time the Turkish priorities slightly changed from fighting Assad's government to destroying Kurdish resistance on the Syrian-Turkish border. The unwelcome spill-over effect, like in the case of Afghanistan in the past, was once again a result of strategic intentions disengaged from a thorough intellectual analysis.

D. The Russian factor – the sources of Russian conduct towards Syria.

The Russian strategy towards Syria, which stands in stark contrast to the Western policy, does not come as a surprise. Its approach is another disclosure of the old instinctive distrust of the West manifested so many times before in the history. George Kennan, when posted in Moscow as a diplomat, capsulated well this psychological streak in Russian thinking about the world outside when writing his famous "Long Telegram." Turned later into analytical essay The Sources of the Soviet Conduct and published in "Foreign Affairs" in

1947 Kennan wrote: At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, it was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people.

The fear of nomadic threat embraced such purges as the Mongol invasions while the fear of the West was manifested after the Polish occupation of Moscow in the wake of successful battle of Kłuszyn of 1610 where the Russian czar Vasil Shujski was unable to stop systemic deterioration of Russian principedom.

Psychologically, the Russians do not think about Syria in terms of freedom, human rights and political pluralism which were now openly declared by insurgents (those looking for Western backing) as the goal of uprising and promoted in the Western mass media as justification for the support for them. Those values are irrelevant for Russians and historically foreign to their canon of values. The Russians think in traditional geopolitical way seeing in the Western engagement a plan to impose the control on insubordinate country, which from the beginning of Assad family's rule, gravitated to the Russian-controlled sphere of interest. In other words, the Russians do not conceptualise crisis in terms of the „humanitarian intervention doctrine“ (R2P – responsibility to protect) which is a Western invention, but perceive the region in the spirit of „Sykes-Picot agreement“ which almost one hundred years ago saw the West secretly divided the region into zones of interest betraying Arab indigenous aspirations. What more, the Russians believe that the West is implementing this clandestine stratagem to extend influence into Syria exactly to vitiate the Russians influence in the area traditionally bonded to them. Measuring up against the actions of others by their principles of realpolitik they view world politics - to quote from Hans Morgenthau's "Politics among Nations" - as the realization of "national interests perceived in terms

of power.“ This comes natural to Russians whose code of norms in foreign policy is not embedded in any system of values (liberalism, individualism and “enlightened altruistic interest“) but based on the terms of zero-sum game. The other reasons behind Russian indiosyncrasies are economic and strategic. The monopol on relations with ostracized Syria is simply a very good economic business, given the violations of sanctions, and create promising business perspectives for the future trade relations - after Syria will enter the stage of post-war reconstruction and development. Sentiments apart, the war is always a good business for sanctions breakers hence the intense contacts between Moscow and Damascus in military, trade and financial domains. It is reported that Damascus is sending its staple products such as vegetables and fruits abroad through Russian operated port of Tartus and buying wheat from them. Some sources suggest the illicit trade is also going in sanctioned oil and other products. In addition, the Russian banks such as VTB, Vneshekonombank, and Gazprombank are actively bankrolling the Assad government despite the Western financial institutions cutting ties with the government in Damascus. The filling in of vaccum by Russians and Iranians‘ helping hands in forlorn Syria is documented by some circumstantial evidence and provides, to some extent, an explanation behind Assad regime’s long stay in power despite foreign and domestic pressures. The military contracts form a significant chunk of the Syrian cake to be grabbed. According to the analytical reports from „Oxford Analytica“ the Russian military transactions in 2010 accounted for 6% of total Russian arms exports and 5 percent of Russia’s global arms sales in 2011 while the outstanding accounts show about 4 bln worth of contracts for future military deliveries - as for 2012. Though the numbers are not mind-boggling the statistics speak for themselves and reavel hard facts behind Russian calculations. In addition, given Russian savings in military spendings in certain areas and tightening arms trade market due to growing international competition the Syrian crisis becomes a golden opportunity to cash quick maney from pinched Syrians and secure employment and smooth operation for its industrial-military complex.

The Russian also make up for the losses incurred in wake of the Western sponsored sanctions against Iran and Libya which were reputed to cost Russia respectively about 13 bln and 4,5 bln dollars in lost arm deals contracts. In addition to lucrative arms deals, Russian companies also invested roughly 20 bln dollars in various projects including energy sector investments - comprising gas production facility and pipelines. More important for Russia's involvement in the crisis are strategic motives. After the disintegration of the Soviet zone of influence during the decade of Yeltzin at the helms of the state and arrival - according to Charles Krauthammer - of so-called "unipolar moment" in the history , the Russians under Putin regime undertook an elaborate task of rebuilding old strategic outposts in the world. One of the lost assets was influence in the Middle East region. They still think of old grandness, cherish old imperialist sentimentalism and will not let pass any occasion to restore old outposts – ethically questionable means are welcome. Since Russia has never judged political decisions by ethical standards (and wholly alien was to them the concept of "ethical foreign policy" introduced to diplomatic lexicon by British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook in 1997 – and nicknamed quickly "Cook's ethical bombshell" by broadsheet newspapers) the opportunity to support Damascus is viewed by them merely in strategic terms. Practically, the port of Tartus does not represent any impressive prize for the Russian Navy consisting only of a few floating mooring, warehouses and decrepit barracks (similarly to the port of Latakia). What really counts is a symbolism of bringing "boots" to the coast of the Mediterranean Sea which have been a coveted prize for them since times immemorial (efforts to obtain control over Bosphorus and Dardanelle date back to 19th century.)

The Russian new military and security doctrine - outlined by Russian decisionmakers in recent years – only facilitate institutional conditions for recreations of a system of client states in, to use Kennan's words, "geographically shifting points" in order to reposition itself while building new international security system and exert pressure on the West. The new 2010 military doctrine ("Military Doctrine of The Russian Federation Until 2020"), which replaced the one from year

2000, designated NATO as a source of potential military danger and redefined terms of nuclear deterrence (by not ruling out the option of preventive nuclear strikes in situations vital to Russian national security, even in small-scale, local wars like that in Georgia in 2008.) This is exactly the approach George Kennan had in mind seventy years earlier when dissecting Russian mentality. To this purpose serve various international and regional arrangements under Russian auspices such as Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian Union which form a geopolitical net of concentrated circles on the map – all this to reestablish the Soviet style sphere of influence.

D. “Syrian experience“ - was George Kennan wrong or right - is “Kremlin’s neurotic view“ of the West justified?

Putting the tradition of Russian foreign policy in a sharp focus one can conclude that many features fueling neurotic suspicions of the West were not totally unfounded. The aforementioned “Sykes-Picot agreement“ is one of the examples of power politics where the pursuit of strategic gain replaced the moral considerations of Western policymakers. In this case the aspirations of Arab peoples were sacrificed at the altar of big politics inevitability. The Bolshevik government, not out of magnanimity but driven by the desire to affect the image of Tsarist government, revealed the evil nature of secret arrangements (such as the Sykes-Picot document) in order to disclose the Western politicians’ duplicity. Another act of the play was the “Yalta agreement“ - whereby the allies in Eastern Europe were “sold out“ - following Stalin’s “divide and rule“ logic in which the Western powers acquiesced. The event petrified a great powers pattern of behaviour sealing the fate of subjugated peoples for the whole Cold War period. With the expiration of the Soviet Union in December of 1991, the old world habits in the international politics did not disappear but were replaced by other more subtle ways of gaining influence. The new trend took the appearance of dignified moralisation under the cloak of various concepts such as “unilateral interventionism“,

„doctrine of human rights“, “humanitarian intervention“ or the most in vogue now – “responsibility to protect (R2P)”.

The NATO’s armed intervention against Serbia in 1999, over loud protests from the Russians and the Chinese and without UN Security Council resolution (so in violation of existing regime of international law laid out by article VI and VII of the UN Charter), fueled the theory of West’s ulterior motivation. The support for Kosovars’ secession alerted Russia and was interpreted not as humanitarian solution, but as part of encircling ploy to undermine their influence in the Balkans (the accidental bombing of Chinese embassy did not help to ease fears.) Also, the recent examples of blatantly broad interpretation of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council in case of Iraq and Libya crisis and their subsequent direct violations (according to Russian and French position) only hardened the Russian neurotic perception of Western intentions. For them that Western phraseology amounted to creative devices to justify “postmodern expansionism” behind the veil of altruism. Judging by its own foreign policy standards, it did not matter much whether interventionism was interpreted in terms of “right to intervene, “responsibility to protect” or “peace enforcement & building”. Strictly, from the the legal (not moral) point of view, their arguments were not baseless. This was the case, for instance, of famous resolution 1441 adopted unanimously in November 2002 . The vague language of resolution 1441 - calling for "serious consequences" in case of Iraqi non-compliance with disarmament obligations - by the Russians, Chinese and French was treated with suspicion from the beginning. It was viewed as purposefully ambiguous to offer pretext for launching military intervention. As it turned out later, the distrust turned out justified after the Americans alongside with the British, despite prior vehement denials of existence of any “hidden automatic triggers” inside the text, had employed skillful exegesis (exceeding the commonplace interpretation of language) to warrant open attack (based on the sexed-up evidence about WMD in the first instance.)

Similar misgivings on the part of the Russians (the Russians and Chinese abstained) accompanied the vote in the UN Security Council

on resolution 1973 adopted in March 2011 in the context of the Libyan crisis . The resolution allowed merely for establishing a “no-fly zone” and for the use of “all means necessary short of foreign occupation to protect civilians.” Again, also in this case, the broad exegesis of the “innocent language” of the resolution went beyond understanding of some agreeing parties (or abstaining parties like Russians). The special forces from Great Britain, France Italy and other allied countries intervened on the ground raising Russian objections as to the legality of the operation and a possible breach of the resolutions’ spirit. From Russian perspective, all this verbal sophistication was redundant since it merely hid ulterior motives of traditional power politics disguised in the idealist verbalization of humanitarianism. The overbroad interpretation of the legal documents set also dangerous precedent for relativizing international law - as a result the Russians mimicked the West’s behavior intervening in Georgia’s provinces of Northern Ossetia and Abkhazia. The critical look on the above-mentioned resolutions in the context of the Syrian conflict allows to contextualize slightly differently the Russian international perspective on the crisis and, to some extent, understand the obstinacy of Moscow on Syria during the votes in the UN Security Council. Given the Russian tradition of foreign policy-making - based on tenets of realistic paradigm and in the absence of any even remote idealist background - along with the ambiguous record of the Western powers’ “unprincipled“ behaviour outlined above one should not expect any radical faceabout in Kremlin’s declared strategy in near future.

IV. Conclusion

The above analysis leads to several conclusions:

1. The „pact on Syria“ with the opposition should be first signed

The assistance offered to the Syrian opposition should not be unconditional. Any help should have been preceded by the “sworn promise“ to implement the system of governance based on universally

tested, secular principles which lay groundwork for the future government. Those non-negotiable “technical“ principles include: the rule of law not of men, judicial review, separation of powers and (considering multiethnic character of the Syrian state with Kurdish factor) federalism.

Those are ideas have been already tested around the world and fit best the multiethnic and multisectarian societies. There is no other political solution which can make people confident beyond those commonsensical and practical arrangements. Past experiments with building states on religious or non-religious ideologies of different kinds did not work appearing oppressive and very costly either in socialist societies or theocratic regimes. Only under such terms true “majority of Syrians“, including the “silent majority“, will back up efforts for reform and a real change in the war-torn country.

Whether one calls this set of operational principles: liberal democracy, islamic democracy Syrian style or Syrian democracy does not matter - what matters is the substance of the politico-economic model pursued. In the case of Israel, for example, the political scientists commonly associate the term “ethnic democracy“ to describe existing political regime. Being a political system with many imperfections and deficiencies, it is still rooted in the Western tradition guaranteeing basic rights to people and allowing the peaceful rotation of political groups at the helms of the government through free elections. Israel is held responsible for oppressing the Palestinians but, at the same time, it provides the administrative framework for fair judicial litigation (domestic and abroad), for allowing political representation in the parliament and for religious freedom. It creates thus a hope for eventual peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Any other model of the governance would not permit such favourable conditions. Although it is, like the Arab countries, facing the problem of religious fundamentalism (with the Haredi Jews questioning even the basic right of the state of Israel to exist) the existing system of universally recognized principles is allowing Israel to function smoothly as the only democracy (or “ethnic democracy“) in the Middle East capable of providing the majority of people with

economic well-being and political instrumentality.

The West should support only those forces which openly favor political model of, like in the case of Poland, “friendly separation between the state and the church“ (the French developed the system of so-called “strict separation between the state and the church“) Any attempt of blending religion into the institutions of the state should be nixed in the bud as sectarian aberration placing Syria on the path of assured conflict which eventually, to recall Norman Podhoretz’s slogan, would guide the state to “religio-fascism“ - that would backfire in the future in a way Munchen appeasement did before WWII.

2. Moral revolution should be encouraged

The successful transformation in Syria and other Arab countries is an uncertain outcome. Like in the case of Polish solidarity revolution, which preceded the economic and political transformation in Poland, without ethical katharsis the propensity for corruption and lack of transparency would not be eradicated. Only self-cleansing and rising ethical awareness might help in building civil society. The improvements in international ranking on the corruption and transparency in Poland are the crowning argument on behalf of efforts aimed at moral embetterment as a condition sine qua non accompanying construction of well functioning state.

Without ethical changeover in Syrian mentality (and in other Arab spring countries) the overthrow of President Assad government will only see the replacement of one corrupted group by another.

3. Assad regime should be engaged

Ostracism of Assad government and explicit support lavished on the opposition was an error. The Assad government should have been engaged and pushed for the reform from the beginning. The General Jaruzelski’s regime was also obstinate and repressive but changed over time. Helping the unprepared and disintegrated opposition resulted in the bloodbath and senselessly multiplied civil victims exposed

to the military revenges. Encouragement for the uprising in Syria (which provoked the situation of putting civilians against tanks and planes. Ironically support came from the former colonial power of France which persecuted Syrians only eighty years ago and from Turkey which was always in constant dispute with Syria over territorial delimitation and water. It only legitimized the violence which eventually spiraled out of control. Applying the scenario in Syria to Polish revolution one might wonder what would have happened if the West had armed Polish opposition for the armed confrontation.

There is no doubt that the response of General Jaruzalski's regime would be a violent retaliation (assisted with potential Soviet intervention) and the country would get stuck in the protracted bloody civil war - considering Polish character and martyrological proclivities. The events in Budapest in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 laid bare the resilient and ruthless nature of the dictatorships which have no scruples to mercilessly decimate enemies of the system. The Western world protested (it even encouraged freedom fighters in Budapest through the broadcasts on waves of the Radio Free Europe) but did nothing, or almost nothing, to practically help prolong the hopeless upheaval as if suspecting tragic consequences of this act. This attitude saved the civilian lives allowing the majority of Hungarians to live relatively peaceful lives (for forty five years) under communist oppression waiting patiently for the political solution to appear at the right historical moment (Hegel's idea comes again to mind).

In the Polish case, the introduction of the martial law in december 1981 resulted in very few victims (still over one hundred people died) only because there was no national rebellion led by irresponsible anticommunists. In places where the resistance took place (like the protests at the mine of "Wujek") the regime fired back at people. The peaceful transition through the martial law period was a result of self-limitation by opposition, European political tradition, moral self-reflection, influence of the church authorities (which called for moral crusading and not for the armed revenges). Also well developed

political consciousness, respect for the human life embedded in the tradition and the mitigating approach of the Western countries played a role.

Unfortunately, the Syrian crisis has proceeded according to completely different scenario. Though one has to take into account the changed geopolitical circumstances, in comparison to situation in Poland thirty years ago under conditions of Cold War bipolarity, still the Western approach surprises with its inordinate proclivity to arm Syrians. The cornered regime fights back well aware that, in the culture of the Middle Eastern region, one cannot count on mercy if defeated. The West, knowing this mentality, and still sending arms, to some extent, is contributing to more violence for civilians trapped in the conflict.

Given the poor record of human rights and little respect for the value of human life in the Middle East tradition, in comparison to the Western world, the conditions created in Syria by the world could not be more unwelcome. The reports circulated in the Western media calling for referral of the Syrian crisis to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and bringing President Assad before justice - prepared for him allegedly in the Hague - only throw more wood into the fire.

The existing situation provokes several questions. If the justice be always done, like the human rights activist see it in Western world, why General Jaruzelski was spared in the Hague and engaged as reliable partner for the West instead? He also maintained the corrupted regime propped up by force, jailed the opposition leaders while regime condoned the killing of several activists in Poland. He agreed to reforms only after the complete economic bankruptcy of Poland when longer staying in power would have created only more problems than benefits (this is also the case of the Soviet Union)

Also, why Werhner von Braun - Hitler's henchman, member of Allgemeine SS and creator of rocket technology V2 which killed thousands of civilians in London - was never put on trial? Instead he was rewarded with many privileges and employed by the United States's government after the war to supervise moon exploration program (developed Saturn 5 booster rocket).

The Syrian crisis is a collective failure of the Syrian leaders and

international community. The demolition of Syria was chosen by big powers over diplomatic resolution of the conflict and national reconciliation. It happened so because the conflict is taking place in the Middle East, in other words, in the part of the world considered inferior by Western decision-makers. This situation revealed the double-standards to the extent that the West would have never armed and encouraged fighting of the Flanders against the Wallons or the Basque against the French (similarly to not sending weapons to Poles against Russians in 1981, and to Hungarians against the Soviets in 1956) fearing the resultant disruptive consequences for the Euroatlantic zone.

In this aspect, the current approach of the Western world towards Syria, with total disregard for human life in the Levant, can be considered racist, discriminatory and irresponsible.

CHAPTER 2

Transatlantic alliance towards new changes in the world – constructing global order

3.1. Introduction

The modern world has no uniform structure of international relations, there are no dominant powers, there are also no prevailing patterns, which scholars of international relations often look for and attempt to see in them a certain stability and potential to create a new international order. Nearly twenty-four years after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Cold War, a new or renewed international order has yet to be formed. . The previous balance of power, where there were two main poles, did not find a successor, and it is currently most convenient to write about a system of multipolar governance, or a multipolar order with one dominant party - in this case, the United States- or a system of governance that is still in the process of being created – *in statu nascendi*. But the question arises however, whether we are actually witnessing the shaping of the international order, or perhaps we are now in a stage of chaos and disorder on the international stage, with the more important countries looking for their place on the world stage, or simply being thrown into a the mix and being forced to play the role of main players, even if they are not or do not want to play such a role - at least in political terms, and perhaps also in military terms. I am not writing here about their potential power or importance to the world in the same way as Mackinder, Mahan, Nicolas Spykman, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and others, but are rather describing a reluctance of the main actors to play the role of stabilizer of international relations, the famous "policeman of the world", or the wizard of international relations. They are not particularly interested in the power and influence of international organizations, which have been hailed by idealists as being the main drivers of world politics, and their significance, discounted at the beginning, is now seen by some as having a great significance for the

of architecture of international relations, when in fact, their significance is marginal. Rather, these countries simply act in the name of, and on the basis of, "realpolitik", looking to pursue their own national interests. Generally speaking, because of the difficulties in international relations, none of the current organizations have enough strength, capability, real influence or full compliance of their members to really play the role of a wizard in global politics. In addition, marginalized or forgotten players have re-entered the game, ones who have either already had the roles of main actors - Russian Federation, or are completely new actors in terms of their strategy, tactics, and expectations - Turkey, Brazil, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia. Each of these states has their own weaknesses and approaches to world politics, and take a completely new approach to the international scene as well as their role and importance in its framework. These returns of old players or rise of new ones was both inevitable and a sudden surprise to many researchers, politicians, analysts, and the general public. This surprise, however, was due largely to the underestimation of the societies of these countries, a lack of geopolitical imagination, or perhaps caused by a laziness in maintaining generally accepted analysis and not looking outside of the commonly accepted terms and formulas: - multipolar order - United States - NATO - European Union - and the rest of the world. Those who show that the world may in fact look different, are stigmatized by the wise men, and their claims are claimed to be ridiculous and incorrect. It is for these reasons that mistaken assertions continue to be repeated, and that pundits continue to be surprised the revolutions in North Africa and their results, assigning to these revolutions values of democratization which for obvious reasons are completely useless unsuitable given the reality of what is actually happening there. The current events in Egypt and other countries are not provoking neither Western countries, nor the European Union, nor NATO to rethink their assumptions that "democracy" is the cure for all evils of this world, and that it is the only available and possible solution. The events do not provoke reflections as to why Western countries consider the revolutions in North Africa as being of a democratic

nature, but at the same time similar upheavals in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are considered to be destabilizing and necessitate armed suppression. Most researchers and politicians will say that of course the situations are different, that the causative factors and conditions are different, the groups conducting said “democratization” are different, – but were the "revolutionary" activities, inspired in Egypt by the Muslim Brotherhood, or other activities in Libya and other countries in the Black Sea region, were they different as well? This pattern of cognitive dissonance appears not only in the abovementioned case, but also during the process of recognizing the sovereignty of newly-formed states. Did the recognition of Kosovo's independence not happen to be, by chance, an inflammatory component for subsequent secessionist aspirations in South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, or did it not contribute to the destabilization of Ukraine, the secession of Crimea, and will it not contribute to similar events in the future, which are already well underway, in Scotland, in the Basque country, or even in Bavaria? Most Western countries, lawyers in the United States, will probably say no. After all, there were again different factors, conditions, specificities involved in the other cases. Moreover, in the it was widely described how the case for the independence of Albania legally legitimate, how Albanians living there deserve independence, and today we have requests from Albanians who not only have their own state, who not only recognize that they are Kosovars, but also claim that they are ancient Irili (ancient Greeks), and should as result have part of Macedonia removed and incorporated into their state. Nobody notices this however, as nobody noticed how Albanians caused a civil war in 2001, based on unreasonable expectations placed on a country in which they are already constitutionally protected, and enjoy some widest privileges of any national minority. But who among Western states can notice such things? When NATO and the European Union continue to operate in the conviction of their enormous, if not the most significant role in shaping the international order and the world, which they see through the prism of Western-centric, Europe-centric terms, which in actuality stand in complete conflict with demographic

realities, military and economic realities - I am thinking here in particular about factors affecting the economic development of countries – i.e. industrialization. How then, in light of all the above, is the influence of the United States and the European Union on the global order being shaped? Are we dealing with governance, or perhaps the lack of governance? Are the United States and the European Union major players in the international arena, as before the fall of the Soviet Union, or have they lost their influence? Is it not true that, unlike what some researchers write, we are not currently approaching another Cold War but rather something that - in between rivalry, multipolarity, the balance of power, and unilateralism - is actually closer to, in both theoretical and practical terms, the concepts voiced by N. Ferguson published in 2004?¹ This concept is quite frightening, but perhaps absurd, taking into consideration, in particular, that it does not only look for a new model of international relations, but also asks the question who, other than the United States can or wants to be a regulator of international relations – either positive or negative, but still significant and dominant? I ask these questions quite ironically, in spite of many different publications, researchers and analysts - but is it not the goal of science to keep asking questions and get off the beaten track? Yes that is in fact the goal. That is why I try to find answers to these questions, which either confirm or deny my hypotheses, and may reveal a completely different course for observing and analyzing global governance and the place and role of the United States and the European Union in the world.

3.2. Transatlantic relations and the new architecture of world order

Transatlantic relations possess three specific characteristics, triple specificity, first they are distinguished two main institutional actors, to which we include the European Union and NATO, second, they are distinguished by state actors and, thirdly, they are characterized by activities and issues regarding transatlantic policy implemented by the North Atlantic Council and joint projects. In that regard we must first

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More: N. Ferguson, *A World Without Power*, "Foreign Policy", July/August 2004.

analyse the activity of two of the abovementioned institutions, which are designed not only to provide security in its different dimensions, but also wish to play a significant role in shaping the international order, although they differ significantly in terms of their capacity and operational capabilities. Both institutions, since 1991, have undergone transformations and have made numerous changes to their policies, strategies, and structures - both internally and externally. The European Union in this respect is different than NATO, because unlike NATO it is a political and economic organization, and has no permanent military structures that could support its foreign policy. Therefore, in military terms the EU's participation in the development of international relations is actually nonexistent. Observing, however, the potential and capabilities of the European Union, we can say that it can influence international economic relations, which allows it to play a certain political role on the global stage. The European Union pursues outdated strategies, such as the Black Sea Synergy², the EU Strategy for Central Asia³, EU Arctic policy⁴, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership⁵, the European Economic Area, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership. All of the above mentioned initiatives are carried out by the European Union and have different impacts on its role and place in world politics, and present its position differently relative to the often diverse national policies of its member states. They also interact with variable force, and create a varied and inefficient mechanism for influencing the world and the shape of global economic and political governance. However, one can find among them elements which form the basis of European Union activity in the world and contribute to the formation of its global role, especially bearing in mind that most of them centre around the European Neighbourhood Policy, which is clearly the most

2 Black Sea Synergy – A new regional cooperation initiative, Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament, (COM 2007, 160 final), Brussels 11.04.2007

3 The EU Central Asia: Strategy for New Partnership, The Permanent Representatives Committee, Brussels 31.05.2007

4 European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on the EU strategy for the Arctic

5 More: <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/euro-mediterranean-partnership/>

important policy used to the creation of globally defined objectives, which makes use in large part of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, as well as the European Development Fund. These instruments are coupled with the EU Security Strategy, which is outdated and incompatible with the current international situation. In addition, there are assumptions regarding internal security strategy, international operations in the field of development and humanitarian aid, as well as other tools of exercising influence, i.e. sanctions.

In 2003, the European Union adopted a security strategy called "A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy"⁶. The document was prepared in conjunction with the increasing need to not only shape but also enlarge the EU's security zone both internally and externally, to include countries that entered the EU after the 2004 enlargement, , and the adjacent communities. It focussed attention on the problem of having to continuously deal with threats and challenges, , making note that the European Union must be ready to "take responsibility for global security and common build a better world."⁷ The authors set out to define and describe the external environment in which they distinguished global challenges and major risks. According to them, "the post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked (...) and they have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields (...) in many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict. "⁸. In view of all this, the authors conclude that "security is a precondition of development" "⁹. At the same time they created a catalogue of the most immediate threats to the EU, which included: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, the disintegration of the state and organized crime.

⁶ "A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, Brussels 12.12.2003

⁷ "A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, Brussels 12.12.2003

⁸ "A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, Brussels 12.12.2003

⁹ "A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, Brussels 12.12.2003

The implementation of one of the European Union's principles, or "soft power", was also taken up. At the same time, the authors believed that "the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order"¹⁰. It was found, however, that "contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further reinforce. A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens."¹¹ One can therefore consider the above statements as constituting instruments for the European Union's influence beyond its borders, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, which is associated largely with what the authors call the development of a "strategic culture"¹².

In 2010, a draft for the internal security strategy of the European Union, entitled "Towards a European Security Model", was created. One of the main themes of this document, mentioned already in the introduction, was that of 'unity in diversity'¹³, which was to be the basis for all activities aimed at building a uniform concept of security. However, for the purposes of properly classifying threats, as well as introducing appropriate instruments and mechanisms for establishing and systematizing this security, the authors adopted a unique definition of security upon which other ideas and assumptions in the document were developed. . The authors wrote that, "the concept of internal security must be understood as a wide and comprehensive concept which straddles multiple sectors in order to address these major threats and others which have a direct impact on the lives,

¹⁰ "A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, Brussels 12.12.2003

¹¹ "A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, Brussels 12.12.2003

¹² "A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, Brussels 12.12.2003

¹³ "Internal Security Strategy for the European Union. Towards a European Security Model", http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC3010313ENC.pdf, Brussels 2010

safety and well-being of citizens, including natural and man-made disasters such as forest fires, earthquakes, floods and storms." Hazards mentioned in this definition were enumerated as follows: "the main crime-related risks and threats facing Europe today, such as terrorism, serious and organised crime, drug trafficking, cybercrime, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of minors and child pornography, economic crime and corruption, trafficking in arms and cross-border crime, adapt extremely quickly to changes in science and technology in their attempt to exploit illegally and undermine the values and prosperity of our open societies. "14

The document also adopted a number of instruments to facilitate cooperation between member states when it comes to predicting and combating threats. These included, among other things: "Analysis of future situations and scenarios: threat anticipation", "Adequate response: planning, programming and handling the consequences". "Effectiveness in the field: the work of agencies, institutions and bodies" (i.e. Europol, Eurojust, Frontex), as well as "Tools based on mutual recognition, for information sharing and to facilitate joint investigations and operations", ."15 An even more significant aspect of this strategy proposal is the model of security which it introduces. This model consists of a number of important elements, such as law enforcement, judicial cooperation, border management and civil protection, all put on the same level regarding their impact on security. The authors also list principles for action within this model, these principles include: " justice, freedom and security policies which are mutually reinforcing (...), the protection of all citizens (...),transparency and accountability in security policies (...) dialogue as the means of resolving differences in accordance with the principles of tolerance, respect and freedom of expression; (...), integration, social inclusion and the fight against discrimination as key elements

14 "Internal Security Strategy for the European Union. Towards a European Security Model", http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC3010313ENC.pdf, Brussels 2010

15 "Internal Security Strategy for the European Union. Towards a European Security Model", http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC3010313ENC.pdf, Brussels 2010

for EU internal security (...), solidarity between Member States in the face of challenges which cannot be met by Member States acting alone or where concerted action is to the benefit of the EU as a whole (...), mutual trust as a key principle for successful cooperation."¹⁶ In reference to the above policies and assumptions, the authors proposed “Strategic Guidelines for Action”, which included, among other things: a wide and comprehensive approach to internal security, both vertically and horizontally ; ensuring the effective democratic and judicial supervision of security activities; prevention and anticipation: a proactive, intelligence-led approach; development of a comprehensive model for information exchange; judicial cooperation in criminal matters; ; integrated border management,; a commitment to innovation and training; ; external dimension of internal security/cooperation with third countries; flexibility to adapt to future challenges.¹⁷ These guidelines cover selected aspects of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), in particular with regard to the transposition of the rule of law, institutional cooperation, and rules governing the functioning of individual institutions. The ENP is also an element of exerting influence on countries such as Ukraine, and is also an element of energy security and market expansion, which are critical for European stability. On the other hand, it is also a tool for limiting the influence of the Russian Federation, carried out in the spirit of the European strategy of using *soft power*. Countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy voluntarily participate in it, adopting its principles and individual projects. It is, in a sense, a political choice of these countries to make themselves open to the possibilities for increased cooperation, and the fostering of institutional integration. The European Neighbourhood Policy in this respect is a bridge between integration and its absence, it aims to bring countries that are a part of it closer together, and allows the EU to

¹⁶ “Internal Security Strategy for the European Union. Towards a European Security Model”, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC3010313ENC.pdf, Brussels 2010

¹⁷ “Internal Security Strategy for the European Union. Towards a European Security Model”, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC3010313ENC.pdf, Brussels 2010

maintain a zone of influence over neighbouring nations without having to establish close institutional ties with them. . It also enables and encourages neighbouring countries to carry out broad institutional and legal reforms aimed at the democratization of political, economic and social structures, giving them a pro-development character intended to foster peaceful coexistence. In carrying out its plans through the European Neighbourhood Policy, the European Union exports ideas, financial assistance, counselling, organizational and technology assistance, as well as plans for the involvement in common missions to settle international disputes and conflicts. Such activities include missions in Transnistria and along the Arab-Israeli line. The above is in a sense part of the 'unity in diversity' theme, and thus is also part of the search for common elements between European Union and neighbouring countries. The European Community must simultaneously control, predict and prevent new threats, which, through their dynamic nature, force it to frequently react and take action in the areas of law, humanitarianism, ideology, and mediation. It is because of that that, through mechanisms and instruments associated with the European Neighbourhood Policy, the European Union attempts to influence states that are characterized by good governance, neutrality, and the minimization of conflicts and social dysfunction. These activities are not confined solely to the interior of the European Union, but also include countries outside of its borders.

In this respect, the European Neighbourhood Policy - with its main objectives: prosperity, security and stability – aims to benefit the European Community, either directly or indirectly, by creating conditions in the countries that are part of the ENP which will allow for the achievement of results that the European Union expects. .

Incidentally, when referring to geopolitical theory, it is worth looking at it as the intertwining of geopolitical space with political actors . An important element of this is the question of state power, the factors which strengthen and lessen it, as well as the sources of power and its limits. Rudolf Kjellén, in turn, sees geopolitics, as the science of the state, which is a geographic or spatial phenomenon. Karl Haushofer thinks of this in a similar way, presenting political geography as the

study of the state from a spacial point of view, and geopolitics as the study of space from the point of view of the state. Pierre Marie Gallois describes geopolitics as the study of the relations between power at the international level and the geographical framework in which it is formed. Certain theories in this regard seem particularly interesting, such as John Halford Mackinder's "heartland theory", Yves Lacoste's analysis of geopolitics as competition associated with space, and Zbigniew Brzezinski idea of "the game", a concept he developed in the publication "The Great Chessboard – American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives". Geostrategy and geoeconomy are also two significant concepts associated with geopolitics. Geostrategy, according to V. Kaminski, is a field that focuses on the rivalry of forces for the control of territories, while Alexander Del Valle presents it as the focus on rivalry for control over territories, which in turn means having control over the people and resources within those territories. Geoeconomics on the other hand looks at the relationship between the economy and space. Both geostrategy and geoeconomy constitute an integral and inseparable chain of components of geopolitics, but are not its only parts. These approaches and perceptions of geopolitics from the abovementioned scholars, including Kjellen who coined the term, allow the author of this article to answer, if it is of course possible, the question posed in the introduction. They allow one to reflect on the roles played in the global balance of power, and particularly in the development of cooperation in the functional, sectoral and pro-development dimension, with particular emphasis on the space within which the European Union conducts its activities. That space is essential, as its formation shapes the scope of coverage, , as well as the design of concepts and methods. Indeed the dimensions brought about by the extent of territorial scope lead to the conclusion that geopolitics really does exist. However, in this case scope is not what is most important, though it is significant, Rather, it constitutes the specificity of the framework of European Union policies. The fact is that it involves not only a diverse culture, politics, social and economic structures, as well as different local and regional realities, but also that the starting point

for the action is a common European ideology, culture of peace, liberal approach to social issues and general economic and democratization. European ideology, built on the most simple yet the most accurate definition of "unity in diversity", which was created for the needs of internal relations, can be successfully transposed external relations. A culture of peace, in which one can observe actions and approaches characterized by *soft power* everywhere in the European Union - is constituted by the rule of law, resolution of disputes and conflicts through mediation, negotiation, conciliation and unambiguous search for consensus. A liberal approach to social and economic affairs, expands freedom of the individual and social groups, yet is often confused and poorly utilized especially by people in the so-called young democracies as well as free, and unfettered by excessive regulation markets, where the state only has a function of the proverbial "night watchman". Universal democratization covers all aspects of the functioning of the state, its institutions and citizens. These different aspects, which are defined within the zone of influence, must be in the beginning presented and standardized clearly. Therefore, it has a certain geopolitical implications, which include: the European Union's commitment to local and regional conflicts, involvement in conflicts outside of this sphere in areas such as the economy, as well as social and ideological areas. It conducts missions, such as EULEX in Kosovo (except ENP), EUBAM on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border. It also participates, although recently a very limited extent, in the process of resolving conflicts along the Israel – Palestine line, and engages very actively in the resolution of the conflict between Georgia and Russian Federation. Furthermore, the individual Action Plans for selected countries contain references to the resolution of local conflicts. At the same time, in the case of Kosovo (which is not included in the ENP) although the European Union has left the issue of recognizing its individual member states, it has committed, as a community, material assistance and advisors, and is now exerting increasing pressure on Serbia to resolve this issue. The European Union is also active in resolving disputes, conflicts and situations threatening the security in many regions of the world,

including in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Its participation in NATO missions and in the activities of other organizations is also not without significance. The European Union is increasingly involved in the task of promoting democracy, post-conflict reconstruction and giving financial aid - provided on the principle of conditionality. The European Neighbourhood Instrument and the European Development Fund issue financial support for a wide range of goals, projects and tasks. For the abovementioned activities one can include, among other things, programs such as TAIEX, SIGMA, TACIS. Moreover, agreements such as the "Stabilisation and Association Agreements", "Agreements on Partnership and Cooperation", "Association Agreements", as well as agreements on preferential trade terms, also fit well and support the abovementioned activities and programs. They also fit into the aforementioned dichotomy, which the author of this article describes as Europe's "split personality", because on the one hand these elements lead to closer relationships and cooperation, yet on the other hand, there are still significant barriers formed by the European Union's strict approach to securing its external borders. The issue of borders is not just a matter of liberalizing the movement of people, goods and services, but is rather a more complex set of issues involving widening range attempts of the European Union to influence other countries, even those referred to as "the neighbours of our neighbours," whose political, economic, and social problems become a real issue that needs to be dealt with in the policies of the EU. In respect to this there is an element leading to the intensification of interactions with other countries. This does not, however, arise only along the "EU-other countries" axis, or even in the "EU-countries covered by the ENP and their neighbours" axis, but also occurs at the "EU-other international organizations" level. This is caused by the intersection of different interests of individual state entities. The main interactions take place between the European Union and the Arab states, the European Union and the United States, and the European Union and the Russian Federation. The interactions include all aspects of the functioning of the state, except that they expose themselves differently depending on the situation. Certain aspects among them

also differ, where, for example, in transatlantic relations there is mostly an intersection of interests rather than a correlation of interests, although in recent years, actions have been taken to minimize such situations. Formed while many theses and hypotheses concerning interdependencies, who is subordinate to whom, who competes with whom and what is the result and consequences of the taken actions. The above is also created by the often divergent conceptions of the Member States of the European Union and their different strategic objectives which are not always part of an EU-wide trend.

The Security Strategy of the United States that is most useful as a base for analyzing the differences and interrelationships with the strategy of the EU in the transatlantic relations relating to the current international situation, is undoubtedly the Security Strategy of the United States from the year 2010¹⁸. It was created after the presidential election, won by Barack Obama, and so became the foundation for the implementation of a change advocated by Obama in various US policies, including foreign policy and security and defence policy. A new level of quality, which was then occurred, manifested itself in the first verses of the strategy, which indicated the need to focus on the involvement of the United States in the process of strengthening international institutions and cooperation within the framework of collective action to be taken, for the benefit of mutual interests, including primarily the fight against extremism, as well as fighting the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the stabilization of the economic situation and increasing economic development, as well as the elaboration of common approaches to climate change, armed conflicts and the spread of infectious diseases, including the prevention of pandemics. The beginning of joint activities carried out on the basis of actions taken collectively, would be the involvement of countries interested in the proposed solutions. A milestone in the development of the structure of these relationships was a commitment, as defined in the strategy, by closest friends, which included Europe, Asia, America and the Middle East. The common element that was

¹⁸ National Security Strategy 2010, President of the United States, Washington D.C. 2010.

noticed in mutual co-operation, was the common interests and shared values which formed the basis of security and prosperity in the world. In order to achieve the objectives it was decided to build a deep and effective partnership, based on the relationship of the main centers of influence such as China, India, Russia, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa, focused on the objectives lie in the range of interest in bilateral and multilateral as mentioned above states¹⁹. But the most important premise and thesis of this part of the US strategic approach to international relations is that in a globalized world, with mutually inter-penetrating factors, the concept of the use of force as a zero sum game no applied²⁰, and therefore it seems necessary to develop, broaden and deepen relationships with countries and peoples of developing countries, in particular when they are represented by a model transformation and the building of regional stability from America to Africa, to South-East Asia. This approach enables you to develop and strengthen the concept of an international order based on rights and obligations to act at the same time engaging international organizations, which must acquire the ability to adapt to the new reality of the twenty-first century, and on the basis of this modernization demonstrate a significant increase in the efficiency of responding and acting on the global level. That modernization of institutions, strengthening international standards and supporting the implementation of the principles of international law is not merely the task of the United States, they are also not as a state obligation to do so, and it is clearly a challenge for the countries that share identical values and having identical or at least very close to each other purposes. United States, in accordance with the strategy, can only take on the chairmanship of such a group, inter alia, of maintaining the main idea guiding the activities of the United States in the world,

19 More: S.W. Bodman, J.D. Wolfensohn, J.E. Sweig, *Global Brazil and U.S. – Brazil relations*, Independent Task Force Report No. 66, Council on Foreign Relations, New York 2011; R.D. Blackwill, N. Chandra, Ch. Clary, *The United States and India. A shared strategic future*, Joint Study Group Report, Council on Foreign Relations, Aspen Institute India, New York 2011; T. Graham, *U.S. – Russia relations. Facing reality pragmatically*, Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, Washington D.C., Paris 2008.

20 More: J.D. Meernik, *Political use of military force in U.S. foreign policy*, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004.

namely the promotion and implementation of national self-interest. What's more, the Americans simply express the conviction of the rightness of the strategy ideology action and demonstrate unwavering belief in the support for their own interests at the global level, the support that is granted by other states, recognizing in such line of thinking and acting, the possibility of achieving their own aims²¹. The strategy clearly states that the US government has no more important objective than the safety of Americans, which is undoubtedly related to the maintenance of hard power strategies and activities on the basis of legitimation of social support and acceptance of Americans, not international law, to respect the decisions of international bodies, or needs other actors on the global scene, which certainly contradicts the previously described assumptions about the impact of the strengthening of international organizations and international law on the mode of action of each player on the global stage and the methods used by them. It is also part of the collision between the European concept of soft power and American action ideology.²² At the same time, in order to implement plans for stabilizing and building safety guarantee system, the main tasks included comprehensive prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the expansion of nuclear security agenda based on rights and responsibilities of nations (countries). The strategy raises the issue of strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, reducing their nuclear resources, and the interaction in the international arena in order to control, raise the level of predictability and the fulfilment of the rules of international law, by countries like Iran and North Korea. At the same time, it was decided to further continue the fight against al-Qaeda, especially heavily on so-called advanced. the front line, so in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The above-mentioned activities are largely carried out by strengthening the defence capability of the partners of the United

21 More: D.M. Malone, Y. Foong Khong, *Unilateralism and U.S. foreign policy. International perspective*, Center on International Cooperation Studies in Multilateralism, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., London 2003.

22 J.S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power and European – American Affairs*, [w:] T.L. Ilgen, *Soft power and the future of transatlantic relations*, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006, s. 25–39.

States, particularly in terms of constant war against terrorists. Unfortunately, Afghanistan, yet untamed by any country in the world, still cannot be covered even partially stabilized and unlikely to happen to her or the presence of international forces, or after their withdrawal. In order to maintain stability and peace the United States, as part of the strategy, set up to take any action in order to build a stable relationship between Israel and its neighbours. The strategy defines it "as a guarantee of peace for Israel"²³ and "legitimize the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians to have their own state."²⁴

Finally, the strategy includes a list of challenges connected to the development of the international order, whose main idea is to promote justice and peace to facilitate the achievement of the objectives and deal with the issues of the day. Such action and the development of standards described is only possible with the failure of existing differences and disputes, and stimulate these elements to allow a community of interests. For some of them were included in the strategy to combat climate change, which should be carried out on the basis of national and international policy based on the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions, mitigate its effects, as well as the policy of conflict prevention and peacekeeping. Americans, setting priorities for the further development of its participation in the process of creation of a new international order, confirmed the stability of their interests, including among them:

- the safety of US citizens, US allies and partners;
- a strong, innovative and growing US economy and job creation in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
- respect for universal values at home and around the world;
- shaping international order based on US leadership in support of peace, security and the possibility of meeting global challenges jointly.

At the same time, Americans realize the dependence of their internal

²³ National Security Strategy 2010, President of the United States, Washington D.C. 2010.

²⁴ National Security Strategy 2010, President of the United States, Washington D.C. 2010.

and external security on the international environment. This awareness leads to a great deal of involvement and activeness on the global level, but this is only one part of the activities conducted. The American strategy emphasizes the dynamics of international relations and the increased activity of the different actors of the global scene. It is noted that the activities of the European Union, leading to a stronger internal integration, strengthening the role of the Russian Federation and its impact on the changes, activity in China and India, which increasingly use their talents and influence in the world, dynamically increasing its involvement in current events. It also stresses the activity of the Latin American and Africa, and Middle Eastern countries, as well as various international organizations, both intergovernmental and non-governmental, whose role in the process of peaceful coexistence is greatly increased. Also noted the increasing importance of corporations, which have an increasing impact on the international community. Americans, while keeping in mind all of the above factors, want to not only have a real impact on the international scene, but primarily wish to verify their position and strengthen the role of the United States as the creator of mutual international interests, primarily by strengthening US trade and investment, which today forms ties between countries, makes the global economy more dynamic, as well as contributes to the formation of a stable and peaceful political and economic environment.

The United States, recognizing the joint efforts of the majority of international actors which lead to the stabilization of the situation in the world, decided to develop a comprehensive model of commitment to international cooperation and the formation of a model of a completely new character and dimension, involving stakeholders broken down by sector-task activity. Developing guidelines and rules of conduct is not only easy, but also depends on the attitude of states, nations and international organizations, some of which is specialized in the field of sectoral activity. However, the United Nations, which in theory is the largest and most influential intergovernmental organization has proven to be insufficient, and rather too complex and subject to numerous national interests, which is manifested at the level

of decision-making and implementation of simple tasks. In this way, it became paralyzed, and its ability to exercise collective security, which has taken years to work out, became marginalized due to individual interests. This approach, in particular, present at the meetings of the UN Security Council resulted in dispersal of the realities of contemporary international relations in relation to the conduct of individual members of the Security Council. Lack of capacity to move to the supranational level stands in complete opposition to the transnational reality which created a global stage on which requires far transnational perceptions, decisions and actions. Americans are seeing this contradiction, and, together with other countries, the need for transferring the forms action level much higher than selfishness and self-centeredness state, undertook to try to shape a new form of business in the international arena, comprised in the concept of transition to task cooperation of stakeholders, and thus de facto regime to develop new multipolar order. This project takes into account not only the relationship with the existing members of the Security Council, but most of all take into account the newly emerging powers that increasingly affect international relations and want to participate in shaping the international order. The strategy shall, consequently, a significant attention to the need for these countries not only more active international role, but also their commitment to assume far greater responsibility for creating reality, and for action to tackle global challenges. In this regard, the significant role of the BRICS countries ought to be highlighted, which the European Union did not recognize until 2012, when it published a report about these nations Saryusz-Wolski²⁵. At the same time, attempts are made to find shared interests between them and the United States, as well as attempts to promote shared norms that will be respected by all. It is also important to highlight the role of states that are not in the BRICS group, and at the same time have a significant impact on the real security system in the world. In this regard, the state can be replaced even if the Middle East, Argentina, South Korea, as well as countries that destabilize the

25 J. Saryusz-Wolski, *European Parliament Resolution on the EU foreign policy towards the BRICS and other emerging powers: objectives and strategies*, European Parliament 2012.

international situation and cannot be due to its impact on world peace omitted. These may include North Korea, Iran, or Chile. The strategy was indicated the need for modernization of institutions such as the G-8 and G-20 in order to reflect the realities of the current international situation. Cooperation with other institutions and countries that enter into their composition will lead to the improvement of international capacity for conflict prevention, stimulate economic growth, improve the overall security of the country, to strengthen efforts to combat and prevent climate change and to create appropriate targets for the challenges arising from the activities of weak states and failing. At the same time it is necessary to strengthen the norms of international law, compliance and enforcement, as in the American strategy seems to be a very interesting piece, which, however, is not reflected in the general American concepts of "hard power" and implementation of strategic objectives, including through disregard of international regulations and standards (eg .: intervention in Kosovo, intervention in the Persian Gulf, the attack on Iraq). Americans point out, however, that the international order which is the result of many variables is essentially unstable and dynamic matter that is subject to a number of diverse influences, resulting in a time of need to be revised or stabilized by confrontation.

"In October, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, published an article titled 'America's Pacific Century', which announced a shift in US foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. The change was confirmed during a visit by President Barack Obama to Australia, where he stated the the US will be engaged in the pacific region for the long term."²⁶ A number of different assumptions were prepared in light of the above, and these were divided into different subject areas: defense, diplomacy, economy, development and internal security. This division, although in theory seems to be the realization of textbook theory, is however is complemented by a horizontal perception of the international order and expands the meaning of the terms used to form a new perception and approach. In their defense

26 J. Saryusz-Wolski, *European Parliament Resolution on the EU foreign policy towards the BRICS and other emerging powers: objectives and strategies*, European Parliament 2012.

they include mainly prevention and containment of threats, taking into account typical security risks and those asymmetric, which include even a threat to the environment; the need for strict correlation measures, institutions and bodies to ensure the safety of the civilian and military, including those of a voluntary nature, or even volunteer as civilian organizations, and even civic groups; strengthen innovation, adaptability and resilience to economic fluctuations domestic enterprises and raise the level of help and support for soldiers, veterans and their families. With the implementation of these changes it was also decided to strengthen diplomatic action and American diplomats, which were considered to be fundamental to national security. Their importance is increasing especially against plans to connect and mobilize for joint action to ensure the safety of other state and non-state partners, and thus increase the ability of American diplomacy to develop consensus and increase its adaptability and creative use of both soft and hard power. In the economic emphasized the need to maintain and guarantee access to scarce resources, maximize actions involving cooperation with developed countries and primarily with developing countries, which in a globalized world can in the long run to become major players in the global arena. The above strategy is part of taking care of the construction of stable conditions for development, which is a strategic element not only maintain the power of the United States and its impact in the world, but also *condicio sine qua non* for the maintenance of international security. It has been recognized not only as an end in itself and economic condition, but also a moral obligation. In pursuing this objective is to help the development of the cooperation and support of developing countries, appropriate risk management, and strengthening of democratic institutions supporting social and economic development. To this end, actions were taken to the proportional allocation of resources to enable equal opportunities and minimizing regional differences, and consequently the effective containment of conflict, combating international crime and popularization of human rights. It was considered necessary also to ensure internal security and adaptation methods and instruments for

his depends to contemporary threats, including strengthening the capacity of the intelligence and counter-intelligence in consultation with global partners. Strengthening communication between partners is necessary for implementing the above objectives, which allows them to maintain clear and undisturbed relations between countries and organizations and will be based on the clear transmission of ideas, and not random guessing and speculation. As part of the strategy, four permanent national interests of the United States are identified, which include security of the state, its citizens, allies and partners; shaping prosperity through innovation and economic growth; respect for universal values both at home and abroad and maintain international order reinforced by the leadership of the United States. These interests have to contribute to meeting global challenges. It is primarily the responsibility of the United States to maintain a commitment made to the allies and fulfil global assumptions about the leading role of the United States. To do this, set the terms and conditions of the use of force as a necessary condition to meet the objectives and apply it only in the context of the need for action rather than a standard. This means that the security of US defense commitments under the action tailored to the needs of the international situation, using diplomacy and deterrence methods, but also to ensure the development of the US military retaining the necessary capacities in all domains-earth, air, sea, space and cyberspace and to support partners and allies in the process of building a regional and global stability. If you need to force the Americans declare their willingness to act within the framework of international organizations such as NATO, the UN and in accordance with the provisions of the Security Council, but this is not always possible due to its composition and the nature of the decisions. Therefore, the strategy claimed the ability and the right to act unilaterally, but only if you are unable to take any other action or against threats directly affecting American society. United States under President Barack Obama's definitely shifted the burden of their interests in Western Europe towards the countries of the Middle and Far East, taking this to a new job and preparing new guidelines and strategic objectives.

Relations between the United States and the Middle East are built based on the vested interests in ensuring peace in the region, shaping favourable conditions for the development of economic cooperation, and to ensure access to raw materials, thereby strengthening the energy security of the United States and other countries of the world. Universal democratization is also important, however, due to the nature of the region may, and in spite of the so-called "Arab Revolution", this idea remains a slogan, and is unrealistic. The United States, within the framework of the strategic assumptions, reinforces its cooperation and friendship with Israel, which was confirmed in November 2012, during the recent conflict between Israel and Hamas. In addition, the strategy confirmed the validity of the aspirations for the establishment of a Palestinian state, however, can be rather considered as part of the political game than the word realistic expectations of the US side. Emphasized the necessity of transformation of Iranian policy and a permanent and effective transformation of domestic policy in Iraq. These objectives Americans want to pursue through the implementation of three basic elements, which include: the transformation of security in the region, to support the civil and diplomatic engagement. Transformation of safety is to take place on the basis of transition to a so-called full safety which is not defined in the documents specifying the strategic action of the United States, but may be understood in terms of a theoretical two-dimensional implementation of safety, and thus both the "to" and the "from ", which is shaping security and pro-development conditions of giving sense of safety. Unfortunately, no real clarification of meaning in the context of official documents of the foregoing, constitute only a guess and easily contestable interpretation. Civil support that Americans understand as civil deepening involvement in the internal interests of the countries of the Middle East, refers to the widening and deepening of the democratic process, in particular through the development of democratic institutions and strengthen their non-political, non-religious and functioning. Diplomatic engagement in the region is primarily to strengthen the impact of the US through the implementation of the concept of soft power on the making process of

peaceful coexistence and the promotion of sustainable development, which will undoubtedly contribute to the stabilization of the situation in individual countries of the region. In this spirit, the strategy also applies to countries located in the Western Balkans and the Caucasus.

Americans are definitely broadening their engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, where they see only growing economic and political potential, but also the core of global economic relations, in comparison to which Europe or the European Union is moving more to the periphery. Alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand are considered by the USA as the basis of security in the Asia-Pacific region, specifying Japan and South Korea as leaders in addressing regional and global problems, and partners in the promotion and realization of democratic values. The United States considers that these countries are the guarantee of the US presence in the region, but at the same time they do not neglect the need to build, as they call this strategy "comprehensive and constructive" relationship with China and Indonesia, whose role in American politics is growing. Against this background, relationships with the Russian Federation, Argentina, South Africa, Brazil and European partners are also significant, however, they seem to be a marginal element in contemporary American politics, despite determine their strategy as the "cornerstone" of the entire structure of American involvement in World as well as the catalyst for their actions. Despite such high-sounding phrases, Americans emphasize the importance of the European Union but not bilateral cooperation with European partners in terms of referring comprehensive security guarantees to the tradition and the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty, presenting it as a major element in shaping collective defence capabilities and risk prevention. Emphasize the universality of the Covenant and its ability to carry out all types of tasks, in particular with the newly adopted strategy of NATO. The European Union appears in this field only as a supporting partner trace transformation processes in the countries of Eastern Europe and strengthening democracy in the region. In 2012, it was published in the United States as a document entitled "Sustaining

U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the twenty-first century"²⁷, which presents the assumptions and objectives defensive confirming those adopted in the overall security strategy.

3.3. Conclusion

When evaluating the place and role of the transatlantic system and its participants in shaping global governance, one cannot use a singular method or instrument of analysis, especially when considering the differing and divergent factors characterizing each of transatlantic system's components. The European Union and the United States can together create a strong entity with the potential to exert economic influence, while each of the individual EU Member States, in cooperation with the United States, can play a greater or lesser role in creating and exerting military or political influence. This divergence is most clearly visible on the level of ideology about how to conduct international activities, indicators of military strength, military spending, as well as economic cooperation in the burgeoning free trade zone that is being newly formed. These discrepancies also indicate that the transatlantic system is clearly the sum of many diverse components, of which some may be compatible on the level of the two main organizations in the system – the European Union and NATO – and some on the level of the various countries involved. Unfortunately, within the framework of this system there are many separate and irreconcilable issues, particularly in the philosophical approach regarding the perception of international relations and how to act on the global stage, along with a genuine differences in commitment both internally and externally. The first element of differentiation is undoubtedly the quality of weapons and the level of military spending , which is highly divergent with respect to how much of its GDP each country allocates for military purposes.²⁸

In view of changing global dynamics, the highest growth in spending on armaments can be observed in Latin America, Central, South, and Eastern Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. In contrast, North

²⁷ Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the twenty-first century, Department of Defense, United States of America, January 2012, www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf

²⁸ SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database

America, Oceania, and Central and Western Europe have been limiting their spending quite visibly, focusing instead on the economic crisis, unemployment, the stagnation of development, and disengaging from further actions on the world stage. The reduction in Europe's military capabilities, coupled with the gradual withdrawal of the US from the region and Europe's reluctance to guarantee its own safety on its territory, has led to the marginalization of not only the European Union on the global arena, but also its member states. Furthermore, it seems necessary to emphasize the fact that we can observe several different models of the international order that are currently taking shape, among which two concepts are moving into the forefront, those presented by Graeme P. Herd in the study entitled "Securing the west in a post-western world order: NATO's third transatlantic bargain?" and published by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.²⁹ One of these concepts points to a possible return of a classic Cold War scenario, with the United States and China being the main actors. The second concept presents a new world order based on the interactions of several or even a dozen countries in a multipolar system, which may be largely based on the legitimacy of regional organizations, and not the United Nations, which in terms of general importance has been in decline for a long time, and with the Security Council has been paralyzed and is almost useless and utterly incapable of action. These scenarios are not, of course, anything new. They are prevalent in literature and research concerning the international order. However, but they do allow one focus on a much more important issue, which also appears throughout this text, namely the fulfilment of elements in the system, in this case the transatlantic system, which are the product of the definition assigned to the international order. First and foremost, successful functioning and fulfilment within the defined framework may demonstrate not simply an ability to exert influence on the international stage, but rather the potential ability to do so. In view of this certain questions must be asked - does the transatlantic system have sufficient capabilities and

²⁹ G.P. Herd, *Securing the west in a post-western world order: NATO's third transatlantic bargain?*, Policy Paper 2013/1, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva 2013.

resources, which it can utilize in pursuing its actions? Is it characterized by internal consistency and the ability to maintain, within a single orbit, interactions and cooperation of all stakeholders within the framework of the transatlantic system? Is it directed by the same values, goals, and more importantly, are the methods and practices for acting on the international stage consistent for all participants within the transatlantic system?; Does the institutional architecture respond to the contemporary needs of the member countries and interacts with their decision-making process and their importance in the global arena? In this regard it seems that only assumptions regarding of institutionalization, democratization, human rights and the desire for world peace converge within the transatlantic system, the other elements vary considerably and one cannot speak of full convergence within the framework of internal policies. Despite the presence of a consistent decision-making process within NATO, such a system does not exist for entire transatlantic system. What is more, the most important participants in this system, namely the United States, Turkey, and the European countries understand the legitimacy of their actions within the international arena, as well as their role and place in global governance, very differently. . Moreover, the modes for exerting influence on the international order by individual countries and organizations, differ considerably from the official channels propagated by the transatlantic system.. In conclusion, the transatlantic system is currently rather limited in its ability to on the global stage, which has been dominated by the policies and activities of individual states. Its importance can be increased. However, this must be done by shifting focus away from a political-military emphasis to a political-economic dimension, by creating a transatlantic free trade zone, and through the development of the economy and economic influences, which will buildup political influence. This of course cannot be done in isolation from military considerations, these however will be relegated to playing a less important role, and will not be a de facto key element holding the system together.

CHAPTER 3

Unia Europejska a imigracje z Afryki i Bliskiego Wschodu w latach 2010–2015

Wstęp

Niekontrolowany napływ imigrantów do Europy to obecnie największe wyzwanie, przed jakim stanęła Unia Europejska. Od 2010 r. osoby całego kontynentu skierowane są na imigrantów z Afryki i Bliskiego Wschodu, którzy desperacko próbują dostać się do Europy, a następnie uzyskać w niej azyl. Od co najmniej czterech lat państwa Unii Europejskiej, także w desperacki sposób, bronią się przed przyjmowaniem imigrantów. Usprawiedliwione wydają się jedynie Włochy, które przez dwanaście miesięcy, tj. na przełomie 2013 i 2014 r., samodzielnie prowadziły na Morzu Śródziemnym operację „Mare Nostrum”, zarzucając przy tym Unii Europejskiej brak solidarności i odpowiedzialności wobec dramatu imigrantów. Które państwa Unii Europejskiej chcą być odpowiedzialne za losy ponad 500 tys. imigrantów, którzy od stycznia 2014 r. do sierpnia 2015 r. nielegalnie przedostali się na jej terytorium? Bo na pewno nie Francja ani Wielka Brytania – unijne mocarstwa, które w obliczu niekontrolowanego napływu imigrantów są po prostu obojętne. Prawdą jest, że żadne państwo członkowskie Unii Europejskiej nie wyraża chęci przyjmowania imigrantów z Afryki i Bliskiego Wschodu, którzy, jak podkreśla przywódczyni francuskiego Frontu Narodowego Marine Le Pen, tylko w meczecie czują się jak u siebie. Europa buduje twierdzę, a tymczasem potrzebna jest zbiorowa odpowiedzialność za życie setek tysięcy ludzi, traktowanych jako nielegalni imigranci, a nie uchodźcy. Co więcej, przez przedstawicieli skrajnie prawicowych partii politycznych definiowani są jako ci, którzy mają powiązania z powstałym w 2014 r. Państwem Islamskim. Wzmagająca się w Europie retoryka na temat „łodzi pełnych terrorystów” to woda na młyn Geerta Wildersa, Beppe Grilla, Davida Camerona i przede

wszystkim Marine Le Pen, zwyciężczyni wyborów do Parlamentu Europejskiego w 2014 r. i kandydatki na urząd prezydenta Francji. Już dziś wiadomo, że w wyborach prezydenckich we Francji, które odbędą się w 2017 r., kartą przetargową w rękach kandydatów ugrupowań zwłaszcza prawicowych i centroprawicowych będą właśnie muzułmańscy imigranci z Afryki i Bliskiego Wschodu, a dominującymi tematami polityka bezpieczeństwa i zagrożenie terroryzmem. Skutki exodusu nielegalnych imigrantów do Europy w mniejszym bądź większym stopniu odczuwają wszystkie państwa członkowskie Unii Europejskiej. Są to skutki zarówno o charakterze ekonomicznym, politycznym, jak i społeczno-kulturowym. Na pierwszym miejscu wymienia się wzrost zagrożenia terroryzmem ze strony fundamentalistów islamskich, a jego przyczyną jest rosnący wpływ Państwa Islamskiego, jak również utrzymujące się zagrożenie ze strony organizacji stowarzyszonych i wspierających Al-Kaidę. Ale polityka zamkniętych drzwi, którą stosuje Unia Europejska, nie uchroni państw członkowskich ani przed napływem nielegalnych imigrantów, ani przed aktywnością terrorystów. Jak podkreślają eksperci, migracja i jej konsekwencje to wyzwanie, w obliczu którego stanęła cała Unia Europejska, a szerzej Europa. To, czy sobie z nim poradzi i w jaki sposób, zależeć będzie od realpolitik największych mocarstw unijnych oraz dobrej woli elit politycznych.

Kto napływa do Europy?

Od rozpoczęcia arabskiej wiosny, czyli od 2010 r., imigracja jest nieustającym i nierozwiązywalnym problemem dla wszystkich nadmorskich krajów południowej Europy. Dane na temat imigrantów z Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu, którzy nielegalnie przedostali na południe Europy, bardzo często są zawyżone. Powodem tego stanu rzeczy jest przede wszystkim brak wyraźnego określenia, kto od 2010 r. napływa na południe Europy. Czy są to uchodźcy w rozumieniu konwencji genewskiej z 1951 r., nielegalni imigranci czy też imigranci ekonomiczni? Polskie oraz zagraniczne media zarówno imigrantów z Afryki, jak i z Bliskiego Wschodu określają terminem

„nielegalni imigranci”. I o ile większość Afrykańczyków przybywających do Włoch i Grecji to nie żadni uchodźcy wojenni czy polityczni, lecz imigranci ekonomiczni, teoretycznie nielegalni, to nazywanie imigrantów z Bliskiego Wschodu nielegalnymi imigrantami jest błędem. Jak wynika z doniesień ekspertów, większość syryjskich imigrantów przekracza granice międzynarodowe nielegalnie, ale w uzasadnionej obawie przed prześladowaniem z powodu rasy, narodowości, religii, poglądów politycznych lub przynależności do określonej grupy społecznej. Pragnę wyjaśnić, że w niniejszym artykule stosuję pojęcie „nielegalni imigranci”, którym obejmuję wszystkie osoby z Afryki i Bliskiego Wschodu, które bez ważnych dokumentów przekroczyły międzynarodowe granice oraz przebywają w danym kraju Unii Europejskiej, począwszy od 2010 r. Zatem nielegalnymi imigrantami nazywam zarówno obywateli państw Afryki, jak i Bliskiego Wschodu. Na potrzeby analizy przeprowadzonej w niniejszym artykule aspekt humanitarny nie zmienia statusu prawnego danej osoby pochodzącej z państwa emigracji i przebywającej na terenie Unii Europejskiej. Już na początku 2011 r. straszono w europejskich mediach napływem ponadmilionowej fali nielegalnych imigrantów z państw dotkniętych protestami. Obawy te były całkowicie bezpodstawne. Z danych Europejskiej Agencji Zarządzania Współpracą Operacyjną na Zewnętrznych Granicach Państw Członkowskich Unii Europejskiej (Frontex), Biura Wysokiego Komisarza Narodów Zjednoczonych do spraw Uchodźców (UNHCR) oraz Organizacji Współpracy Gospodarczej i Rozwoju (OECD) wynika, że od 2010 do 2014 r. liczba nielegalnych imigrantów w Europie z roku na rok się zwiększała, ale nie przekroczyła prognozowanej kwoty. W 2010 r. do Europy przedostało się nielegalnie 75 tys. imigrantów. W 2011 r. liczba ta wzrosła do 110 tys., a w 2012 r. zwiększyła się o kolejne 20 tys. Zdaniem badaczy procesów migracyjnych, w 2013 r. rozpoczął się exodus nielegalnych imigrantów z państw Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu, a problem nielegalnej migracji przekształcił się w kryzys humanitarny. Media w pierwszej kolejności informowały o liczbie osób, które zginęły oraz zaginęły w trakcie przeprawy przez

Morze Śródziemne. Za pomocą zdjęć z akcji ratunkowych obrazowały skalę problemu i ludzki dramat, który mierzy się w setkach tysięcy ofiar. Z danych Biura UNHCR wynika, że w 2014 r. ponad 240 tys. nielegalnych imigrantów próbowało dostać się do Europy przez Morze Śródziemne, a co najmniej 3419 z nich zginęło w trakcie przeprawy. Jeśli wierzyć prognozom, to rok 2015 przedstawia się jeszcze tragiczniej. Na potwierdzenie podam, że w styczniu i w lutym 2014 r. w wodach Morza Śródziemnego utonęło 15 nielegalnych imigrantów. W tym samym okresie 2015 r. liczba ofiar wyniosła już 450 tys. W rzeczywistości znacznie więcej, gdyż niejednego dramatu statystyki nie zdążyły zarejestrować.

Dla wsiadających na zniszczone drewniane łodzie statystyki zresztą nie mają znaczenia. Liczy się cel – dotrzeć do Europy, która dla większości z nich okaże się drugą ojczyzną. Na oddaloną od wybrzeża Afryki tylko o 113 km Lampedusę od 2010 r. napływają rzesze nielegalnych imigrantów m.in. z Somali, Libii, Erytrei, Senegalu i Nigerii. Tylko od początku stycznia do marca 2015 r. do włoskich brzegów dopłynęło ok. 9 tys. imigrantów z Afryki, prawie dwa razy więcej niż w tym samym okresie 2014 r. Ostatni etap podróży do Europy dla większości imigrantów zaczyna się najczęściej w północno-zachodniej Libii. Największym przemytniczym punktem przerzutowym jest Zuwara – 40-tysięczne miasto u wybrzeży Morza Śródziemnego. Według danych Amnesty International cena za transport, którą pobierają przemytnicy, wynosi od tysiąca do 5 tys. euro. Rynek transportu imigrantów jest podzielony według kryteriów narodowych i rasowych. Uchodźcy z Afryki Subsaharyjskiej płacą średnio po 700 euro od osoby za podróż w ładowni statku. Bardziej zasobnych mieszkańców Bliskiego Wschodu podróż do Europy może kosztować nawet 2 tys. euro. Szacuje się, że w ciągu ostatnich 15 lat uchodźcy i imigranci zapłacili za swoje podróże do Europy 16 mld euro. Ani jednak kwota, którą należy zapłacić gangom przemytniczym, ani skrajne warunki panujące na łodziach nie powstrzymają migrantów przed próbą przedostania się do Europy. W wielu przypadkach dramat na łodziach zaczyna się już u wybrzeży państwa emigracji. Łodzie wypełnione ludźmi w liczbie znacznie

przekraczającej granice bezpieczeństwa toną, zanim przybędzie z pomocą włoska straż graniczna.

3 października 2013 r. w trakcie przeprawy z Libii na Lampedusę zatонуło 366 osób. Tydzień później u wybrzeży tej wyspy miała miejsce kolejna tragedia, o podobnej skali. Uratowanym uchodźcom groziło po 5 tys. euro kary za nielegalne przekroczenie granicy. Niespełna dwa lata później, w nocy z 18 na 19 kwietnia 2015 r., zatонуło 900 nielegalnych imigrantów próbujących dopłynąć z Libii do Włoch. Mimo szybko podjętej akcji ratunkowej udało się ocalić jedynie 28 osób. W świetle powyższych danych rodzi się pytanie, ilu ludzi musi zginąć w poszukiwaniu lepszego życia w Europie, aby bogate państwa Unii Europejskiej zauważyły ogrom problemu. Co jeszcze musi się wydarzyć, aby takie mocarstwa jak Francja, Niemcy oraz Wielka Brytania dobrowolnie zadeklarowały solidarność i chęć niesienia pomocy tym, którzy aby przeżyć, muszą opuścić ojczyznę?

Włoskie działania na Morzu Śródziemnym

„Mare Nostrum” (Nasze morze) to łaciński kryptonim operacji, określonej przez rząd Włoch jako „militarna i humanitarna”. Jej celem było wzmocnienie kontroli w Cieśninie Sycylijskiej, nadzór nad napływem nielegalnych imigrantów z Afryki, a także niesienie pomocy na morzu. „Gdyby operacja »Mare Nostrum« skończyła się, doszłoby do hekatomb. Morze nie jest drogą, gdzie jeśli furgonetka zabrała zbyt wiele osób, zatrzymuje się i ktoś wysiada. Ten, kto wysiada na morzu, jest martwy” – alarmował Giovanni Pettorino w wywiadzie dla włoskiego dziennika „Il Fatto”. Misja „Mare Nostrum” trwała zaledwie rok od października 2013 r. do października 2014 r. Oprócz niepodważalnego sukcesu tej operacji w dziedzinie ratownictwa na wodach międzynarodowych – 150 tys. uratowanych migrantów – w pierwszej kolejności podkreśla się jej koszty. „Mare Nostrum”, a dokładnie działania włoskich sił zbrojnych i straży przybrzeżnej, kosztowały Włochy 9,5 mln euro miesięcznie, cała operacja zaś 114 mln euro .

„Włochy spełniły swój obowiązek wobec uchodźców z Afryki. Jesteśmy dumni z powodu działań wszystkich tych, którzy przyczynili

się do ratowania ludzkiego życia” – konkludował Angelino Alfano, włoski minister spraw zagranicznych, w dniu zakończenia operacji „Mare Nostrum”. Od czasu wybuchu arabskiej wiosny Włochy stały się azylem dla setek tysięcy imigrantów z Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu. Przez dwanaście miesięcy samodzielnie prowadziły operację poszukiwawczo-ratowniczą w regionie Morza Śródziemnego, zarzucając przy tym Unii Europejskiej brak solidarności, odpowiedzialności i bezsilność wobec dramatu imigrantów. Prawdą jest, że Bruksela stanowczo odrzuciła wystosowaną przez włoski rząd propozycję wzmocnienia operacji „Mare Nostrum” za pośrednictwem Fronteksu. Bez odpowiedzi Unii Europejskiej pozostały także apele Włoch w sprawie przeniesienia z Warszawy na Sycylię głównej siedziby unijnej agencji Frontex w celu uczynienia z niej centralnego sztabu koordynującego monitoring Morza Śródziemnego .

W kontekście powyższego słuszna wydaje się teza, jakoby niechęć Unii Europejskiej do nielegalnie napływających imigrantów nasiliła się. Dość stwierdzić, że Unia Europejska nie ma pomysłu, w jaki sposób rozwiązać problem niekontrolowanego napływu nielegalnych imigrantów. Polityka zamkniętych drzwi forsowana przez Unię Europejską okazała się jedynie nieskutecznym straszakiem. Europa boi się imigrantów, zwłaszcza tych, którzy po nielegalnym przekroczeniu granicy oczekują zrozumienia i pomocy. Problem w tym, że żadne państwo europejskie nie chce jej udzielić. Francja, Włochy, Wielka Brytania, Niemcy, Niderlandy, a nawet Szwecja mówią kategorycznie nie wobec przyjmowania kolejnych imigrantów. Czy wrota solidarnej Europy zostały na zawsze zamknięte, a takie pojęcie jak „humanitarność” straciło na znaczeniu?

Europa buduje twierdzę

Europa musi stawić czoła wyzwaniu, jakim jest niekontrolowany napływ imigrantów. Ani Włochy, ani Grecja – państwa stojące w obliczu wyjątkowej presji migracyjnej – nie poradzą sobie bez

pomocy Unii Europejskiej. Położenie geograficzne Włoch i Grecji w bezpośrednim sąsiedztwie trwających konfliktów sprawia, że bardziej niż inne państwa członkowskie są one narażone w najbliższej przyszłości na bezprecedensowy napływ imigrantów. W 2014 r. do samych tylko Włoch przybyło nielegalnie ponad 170 tys. migrantów, co stanowi wzrost o 227% w porównaniu z 2013 r. Również w Grecji odnotowano stały wzrost liczby nielegalnych imigrantów. W 2014 r. do Grecji nielegalnie przedostało się 50 tys. imigrantów, co stanowi wzrost o 153% w porównaniu z 2013 r. Statystyki za pierwsze miesiące 2015 r. potwierdzają wyraźną tendencję w odniesieniu do Włoch. Ponadto w pierwszych czterech miesiącach 2015 r. nastąpił w Grecji gwałtowny wzrost liczby nielegalnych przekroczeń granicy: liczba ta odpowiada ponad 50% całkowitej liczby nielegalnych przekroczeń granicy w roku 2014 .

Według danych Fronteksu środkowa i wschodnia część Morza Śródziemnego była w 2014 r. głównym obszarem nielegalnego przekraczania granic do Unii Europejskiej. To tu odnotowano ponad 75% łącznej liczby nielegalnych przekroczeń granic Unii . Dziesięć lat temu jeden z najpopularniejszych szlaków dla „nielegalnych” prowadził z Sahary Zachodniej i Maroka na hiszpańskie Wyspy Kanaryjskie. Gdy wzmożone patrole na lądzie i oceanie odcięły tę drogę, strumień emigrantów skierował się do Cieśniny Gibraltarskiej. Kolejne szlaki otworzyły się, gdy północą Afrykę wstrząsnęła arabska wiosna. To wtedy media po raz pierwszy zaczęły rozpisywać się o położonej nieco ponad 100 km od Tunezji włoskiej Lampedusie, na którą w ciągu paru miesięcy dopłynęło blisko 50 tysięcy afrykańskich imigrantów .

Szlaki migracyjne w regionie Morza Śródziemnego

Źródło: www.infografika.wp.pl; zob. też Migratory Routes map, <http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/> (dostęp: 7 sierpnia 2015).

Żadne z pozostałych państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej nie wydaje się obecnie znajdować w takiej sytuacji nadzwyczajnej jak Włochy i Grecja. Aktualny stan przepływów migracyjnych w tych dwóch państwach w skali Unii Europejskiej jest wyjątkowy. Zapewnienie odpowiednich warunków przyjmowania i perspektyw integracji imigrantów ze społeczeństwem państwa przyjmującego wymagają zatem okazania solidarności ze strony pozostałych państw członkowskich. Ale zamiast dobrowolnej solidarności Europa buduje twierdzę. W 2013 r. rząd Bułgarii wydał decyzję w sprawie rozpoczęcia budowy 30-kilometrowego ogrodzenia na granicy z Turcją. Ma ono kosztować 5 mln lewów, czyli 2,5 mln euro. Granica bułgarsko-turecka liczy 274 km długości. Na 52 km zapewniona jest kontrola elektroniczna, za pomocą m.in. radarów, czujników ruchu i hałasu oraz kamer wideo. Według wiceministra spraw wewnętrznych Wasylija Marinowa nie chodzi o zamknięcie granicy z Turcją, przez którą codziennie przedostaje się 100 nielegalnych imigrantów, głównie z Syrii, ale o przekierowanie ich do tych regionów Bułgarii, gdzie znajdują się środki dla uchodźców. W czerwcu 2015 r. rząd węgierski zdecydował o zamknięciu granicy z Serbią ze względu na napływ nielegalnych imigrantów i o rozpoczęciu budowy ogrodzenia wzdłuż 175-kilometrowej granicy. Liczba uchodźców na terytorium Węgier wzrosła z 2 tys. w 2012 r. do 54 tys. w 2015 r., co sprawia, że kraj ten jest na drugim miejscu w Unii Europejskiej po Szwecji pod względem liczby przyjmowanych uchodźców w stosunku do liczby ludności. Według węgierskich władz 95% uchodźców przedostaje się przez granicę z Serbią, która nie jest członkiem Unii Europejskiej. 10 mln euro rocznie kosztuje rząd Hiszpanii utrzymanie wybudowanych w 1993 r. murów otaczających Ceutę i Melillę.

Polityka Unii wobec nielegalnej imigracji nie powinna koncentrować się jedynie na kwestiach zabezpieczenia granic, ale również uwzględniać ochronę praw człowieka. Niestety, obecnie polityka

Europą to przede wszystkim budowanie fortyfikacji, bez oglądania się na prawa imigrantów. Unijna polityka migracyjna znana jest z restrykcyjności. Unia stara się kontrolować napływ imigrantów głównie poprzez zamykanie granic dla tzw. obywateli państw trzecich. W związku z ostatnimi wydarzeniami na wodach Morza Śródziemnego jeszcze bardziej wzmocniła działania na południowych krańcach strefy Schengen w celu zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa na granicach oraz niedopuszczenia osób próbujących przekroczyć granicę lądową i morską.

W kontekście restrykcyjnej polityki imigracyjnej Unii Europejskiej należy się zastanowić nad efektywnością działań państw członkowskich ograniczającą do minimum legalną migrację. Działania te nie dość, że nie przynoszą zamierzonego rezultatu, a w praktyce często są niezgodne z międzynarodowymi postanowieniami z zakresu praw człowieka, to w pewnych dziedzinach ich skutek jest odwrotny do zamierzonego. Mianowicie polityka migracyjna Unii Europejskiej w obowiązującym kształcie wiązać się może w przyszłości z jeszcze większym wzrostem migracji nieudokumentowanej oraz zintensyfikowaniem przestępczości zorganizowanej. Migranci z Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu, dążąc za wszelką cenę do poprawy warunków życia, będą przekraczali granicę nielegalnie, przy pomocy grup przestępczych wyspecjalizowanych w przemyśle ludzi.

Dyskryminacja, ignorancja czy islamofobia?

Z badań amerykańskiego think tanku Pew Research Center wynika, że w 2010 r. mniejszość muzułmańska we wszystkich krajach europejskich stanowiła ok. 6% całej populacji. Odmienne dane przytacza Organizacja Narodów Zjednoczonych. Według badań jej ekspertów w samej tylko Unii Europejskiej 5% ludności to wyznawcy islamu. Bez względu na rozbieżności w danych liczba muzułmanów w Europie wzrasta. Prognozuje się, że w 2050 r. liczba wyznawców islamu na kontynencie europejskim zwiększy się do 20%, a co piąty mieszkaniec Unii Europejskiej będzie muzułmaninem. Liczba muzułmanów niemal dorówna liczbie chrześcijan na świecie. Niemniej to chrześcijanie pozostaną najliczniejszą grupą wyznaniową.

W 2050 r. będą stanowić 31% globalnej populacji (2,92 mld; wzrost z 2,17 mld w 2010 r.), podczas gdy muzułmanów ma być 29,7% (2,76 mld; wzrost z 1,6 mld w 2010 r.) .

Jak wynika z danych Organizacji Współpracy Gospodarczych i Rozwoju (OECD) opublikowanych w International Migration Outlook 2014, tylko do Francji, począwszy od 2012 r., rokrocznie napływa 163 tys. imigrantów. Najwięcej, bo aż 61% pochodzi z Afryki Północnej, w tym głównie z Algierii, Maroka i Tunezji . Szacuje się, że we Francji mieszka ok. 6 mln muzułmanów. Stanowią oni ok. 10% francuskiego społeczeństwa, ale ich udział może znacznie wzrosnąć zarówno ze względu na strukturę demograficzną mniejszości muzułmańskiej, jak i niekontrolowany napływ nielegalnych imigrantów z państw Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu .

Zdaniem demografów każde państwo Unii Europejskiej dotyka lub w najbliższej przyszłości dotknie problem napływu nielegalnych imigrantów. Zdecydowanie w większym stopniu i w pierwszej kolejności odczują to państwa starej Unii Europejskiej leżące w regionie Morza Śródziemnego. Ale wzrost liczby nielegalnych imigrantów odnotowuje się także w Wielkiej Brytanii. Jak wynika z raportu Brytyjskiej Rady Muzułmanów (Muslim Council of Britain), w 2011 r. w Wielkiej Brytanii mieszkało 2,7 mln muzułmanów, co stanowi 5% brytyjskiego społeczeństwa. Choć odsetek muzułmanów w całości brytyjskiego społeczeństwa, w porównaniu z francuskim, jest wciąż niewielki, to już w perspektywie jednego pokolenia udział ten może się nawet podwoić . W 2013 r. 25% populacji Marsylii stanowili muzułmanie, szacuje się, że w Birmingham stanowią oni 15%. Co najmniej trzy dzielnice w Londynie to dzielnice muzułmańskie , w Paryżu co najmniej cztery , nie licząc przedmieść, na których w 2007 r. miały miejsce brutalne zamieszki .

Jak istotnym problemem jest imigracja oraz obecność muzułmanów dla mieszkańców zachodniej Europy, świadczą wyniki badań oraz sondaży brytyjskiego instytutu opinii społecznej Ipsos Mori, niemieckiej Fundacji Bertelsmanna oraz Biura Informacyjnego Parlamentu Europejskiego Eurobarometr. Wyniki badań Ipsos Mori obrazują różnicę między rzeczywistym i postrzeganym odsetkiem

muzułmanów w wybranych krajach Europy.

Wykres 1. Różnica między rzeczywistym i postrzeganym odsetkiem
muzułmanów
w wybranych krajach Europy

Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie Ipsos Mori, Perceptions Are Not Reality: Things the World Gets Wrong, Great Britain, 29.10.2014.

Ankietowani przez instytut badawczy Ipsos Mori mieszkańcy Francji twierdzili, że odsetek muzułmanów sięga w ich kraju aż 31%, podczas gdy nie przekracza on 10%. Z kolei Brytyjczycy sądzili, że odsetek muzułmanów w ich kraju wynosi 21%, czyli przeszło czterokrotnie więcej niż w rzeczywistości. Wyniki Ipsos Mori określono mianem „indeksu ignorancji”, dowiodły one bowiem, że osoby biorące udział w badaniu nie zdają sobie sprawy ze składu własnego społeczeństwa. Jak wynika z badań niemieckiej Fundacji Bertelsmanna, 55% Francuzów i 46% Brytyjczyków uważa, że wartości wyznawanych przez muzułmanów nie da się pogodzić z zachodnimi. Sądząc po wynikach ankiet socjologicznych, zarówno Francuzi, jak i Brytyjczycy wykazują coraz większą nieufność wobec muzułmanów i islamu jako religii. Opublikowane wyniki badań Fundacji Bertelsmanna nie pozostawiają co do tego żadnych wątpliwości.

Wzrost nastrojów antymuzułmańskich odnotowuje się także w Niemczech. 57% pytanych o zdanie Niemców uznaje islam za „bardzo groźny” lub „groźny”. Dwa lata temu takiego zdania było 53% obywateli. Na pytanie, czy islam pasuje do świata zachodniego, niemal dwie trzecie odpowiada negatywnie. Co więcej, 40% nie kryje, że ze względu na obecność muzułmanów w Niemczech czuje się obco we własnym kraju. Jedna czwarta jest przekonana, że imigracja muzułmanów do Niemiec powinna zostać prawnie zabroniona. Nie ulega wątpliwości, że na taki wizerunek muzułmanów oraz islamu wpływają skojarzenia z Al-Kaidą czy Państwem Islamskim.

Wykres 2. Czy wartości wyznawane przez muzułmanów da się

pogodzić z zachodnimi?

Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie badań Fundacja Bertelsmanna przeprowadzonych w 2013 r.

Z opublikowanego 14 października 2015 r. sondażu przeprowadzonego przez Eurobarometr wynika, że zdaniem 38% obywateli Unii Europejskiej imigracja stanowi największe wyzwanie dla Unii Europejskiej. Imigracja jest najczęściej wymienianym problemem w 20 unijnych krajach, przy czym największy niepokój wywołuje na Malcie i w Niemczech, gdzie wskazuje na nią ok. 60% społeczeństwa. Obawy związane z imigracją ma o 14% więcej osób niż w 2014 r. Wtedy głównymi zmartwieniami Europejczyków były sytuacja gospodarcza, bezrobocie oraz stan finansów publicznych w państwach członkowskich. Wyniki sondaży potwierdzają wzrost obaw związanych z terroryzmem na terenie Wspólnoty. W 2015 r. na problem ten zwróciło uwagę 17% ankietowanych, czyli o 6% więcej niż w roku 2014 .

Modus operandi dżihadystów – wyzwanie nie tylko dla Francji

Wzrost liczby muzułmanów w Europie – będący niekwestionowaną konsekwencją arabskiej wiosny, a co za tym idzie nastrojów antymuzułmańskich – to tylko jedna strona medalu, drugą jest fundamentalizm islamski. Już w połowie lat 90. ówczesny sekretarz generalny NATO Willy Claes przewidział, że fundamentalizm islamski stanowi największe zagrożeniem dla Europy Zachodniej od upadku komunizmu. Claes podkreślił, że państwa, w których mieszka najwięcej imigrantów, są najbardziej narażone na ataki terrorystyczne. Co więcej, to właśnie państwa położone w niedalekim sąsiedztwie Europy, takie jak Irak, Afganistan, Pakistan i Jemen, cechuje aktywny fundamentalizm islamski. W regionie Sahelu – w Czadzie, Nigrze, Nigerii i Mali – działa Al-Kaida Islamskiego Maghrebu. W lutym 2015 r. na łamach tygodnika „Daily Mail” ambasador Egiptu Nassir Kemal ostrzegł rząd Wielkiej Brytanii przed „łodziami pełnymi

terrorystów” , jeśli islamscy fanatycy wzmocnią swoją pozycję w Libii. Zalew imigrantów z północnej Afryki stwarza obecnie nowe zagrożenie, ponieważ Państwo Islamskie kontroluje libijskie przybrzeżne miasto Syrta. To jeden z głównych powodów, dla czego David Cameron, premier Wielkiej Brytanii, w której przed wyborami do Parlamentu Europejskiego w maju 2014 r. wzmogła się retoryka antyimigrancka, otwarcie krytykuje operację „Tryton” koordynowaną przez unijną agencję Frontex. Uważa on bowiem, że tego typu operacje stanowią „taksówkę dla potencjalnych terrorystów, i to taksówkę na żądanie”. Paradoks polega na tym, że Państwo Islamskie ani żadna inna organizacja terrorystyczna nie muszą wyprawiać na łodziach terrorystów do Europy. 35-letni Yassin Salhi – sprawca zamachu przeprowadzonego w czerwcu 2015 r., w zakładach produkujących pod Lyonem gaz przemysłowy, był francuskim muzułmaninem, dobrze zintegrowanym: żona, troje dzieci, etatowa praca kierowcy we francuskiej firmie. Nie stał się terrorystą z powodu biedy i wykluczenia. Podobnie jak Shahzad Tanweer czy Hasib Mir Hussain, brytyjscy muzułmanie, organizatorzy i realizatorzy zamachu na londyńskie metro w lipcu 2005 r.

Operacja „Tryton” rozpoczęta 1 listopada 2014 r., której głównym celem, w przeciwieństwie do „Mare Nostrum” jest patrolowanie i ochrona granic na obszarze zaledwie 30 mil (55,5 km) wybrzeża włoskiego, stanęła w ogniu krytyki państw Europy Zachodniej, a zwłaszcza ich skrajnie prawicowych partii politycznych. Jak podkreśla przywódczyni francuskiego Frontu Narodowego Marine Le Pen, imigranci napływający w niekontrolowany sposób na Lampedusę to problem wyłącznie Włoch, nie zaś Francji. Pieniądze, które Unia Europejska przeznacza na ochronę granic w ramach unijnych operacji na Morzu Śródziemnym, powinna skierować na deportację nielegalnych imigrantów. Francja ma już dość muzułmanów, na jej terytorium mieszka ich od 7 do 8 mln, i to z tego środowiska wywodzili się sprawcy zamachów terrorystycznych na redakcję tygodnia „Charlie Hebdo” . Według oficjalnych danych rząd Francji każdego roku przyjmuje ponad 160 tys. imigrantów, tymczasem, jak zaznacza Le Pen, powinien się skupić na zamknięciu granic, które bez

trudu w jedną i drugą stronę przekroczyli bracia Saïd i Chérif Kouachi, aby kupić broń .

Zdaniem francuskiego politologa Gilles'a Keppela, żaden kraj Europy nie jest tak narażony na ataki terrorystów islamskich jak Francja . Od krwawego zamachu dokonanego w Londynie w lipcu 2005 r. władze w Paryżu utrzymywały czerwony – przedostatni – poziom pogotowia antyterrorystycznego. Powodów tego stanu rzeczy było kilka. Po pierwsze, interwencja zbrojna wojsk francuskich w Afganistanie oraz w Mali, po drugie, udział wojsk francuskich w międzynarodowej operacji militarnej przeciw Państwu Islamskiemu w Iraku oraz Syrii, po trzecie, negatywny stosunek Francji do zasad kultury i religii islamu .

Po śmierci Osamy bin Ladena – przywódcy Al-Kaidy i organizatora zamachów na World Trade Center oraz Pentagon z 11 września 2001 r. – przywódcom państw Europy Zachodniej wydawało się, że dżihadystów udało się zwyciężyć. W sierpniu 2013 r. prezydent Stanów Zjednoczonych Barack Obama oświadczył, że „główne dowództwo” Al-Kaidy „zmierza do klęski” . Trwające od 2010 do 2013 r. protesty społeczne i konflikty zbrojne w krajach arabskich wzbudziły nadzieję na demokratyzację państw Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu. Stało się inaczej. 29 czerwca 2014 r., na gruzach niszczonej przez wojnę domową Syrii i wykorzystując niemoc władz Iraku, swoje powstanie proklamowało Państwo Islamskie. W Mali oraz w Republice Środkowoafrykańskiej – w szeroko pojętym południowym „sąsiedztwie” Europy – mimo zachodnich interwencji wojskowych, w tym francuskiej, urosły w siłę nowe organizacje dżihadystyczne. W najnowszej historii terroryzmu, dotąd dzielonej na okresy „przed i po 11 września”, zaczął się trzeci etap .

Zamachy przeprowadzone przez dżihadystów we francuskich miastach są dowodem na to, że Francja stanęła w obliczu terroru Państwa Islamskiego, zwanego terrorem trzeciej generacji. Na czym dokładnie polega zmiana sposobu działania terrorystów, wyjaśniają Peter Nesser i Anne Stenersen w specjalistycznym raporcie pt. *The Modus Operandi of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe* . Terrorysty, dotąd zwykle kojarzeni z „klasycznymi” zamachami bombowymi, w

których masowo ginęli przypadkowi ludzie , dziś starannie wybierają cel i grupę docelową. „Soloterroryzmem” lub też taktyką „samotnego wilka” określa się sposób działania dżihadystów, m.in. Mohammeda Merah i braci Kouachi. Oficjalnie „samotne wilki” nie mają żadnych formalnych związków z organizacjami terrorystycznymi, a więc w fazie planowania czy przeprowadzania ataku z nikim nie współpracują. Wiadomo jednak, że są inspirowani, finansowani i szkoleni przez organizacje terrorystyczne. Dowodem na to jest choćby stenogram – zapis rozmów francuskich negocjatorów prowadzonych z Mohammedem Merahem : „Szkolenie odbyłem w pakistańskim Waziristanie. [...] Zrazu kazali mi konstruować bomby. Nie chciałem. Powiedziałem im, że materiały wybuchowe są we Francji pod kontrolą. Mógłbym zostać aresztowany na długo przed zamachem. [...] Poprosiłem ich: nauczcie mnie obsługi broni palnej” . Jak podkreśla Keppel, dżihadyści są groźniejsi od Al-Kaidy. Wynika to z różnic systemu działania i struktury organizacyjnej Al-Kaidy i Państwa Islamskiego. Al-Kaida w przeciwieństwie do Państwa Islamskiego jest organizacją tajną, ma strukturę piramidalną, z odgórnie wydawanymi rozkazami . Zamachy organizowane przez Al-Kaidę cechuje przede wszystkim precyzja, a zamachowców profesjonalizm. Krzysztof Liedel ocenia ataki dżihadystów w Europie jako „źle przygotowane i źle przeprowadzone, ale o olbrzymim społeczno-psychologicznym oddziaływaniu” . Bracia Kouachi nie strzelali – jak zwykli czynić to terroryści – do anonimowego tłumu, np. w hali portu lotniczego, nie podłożyli bomby w restauracji czy w samochodzie pułapce w pobliżu budynku użyteczności publicznej. W dniu zamachu realizowali swój cel, jakim było zabicie dziennikarzy i satyryków, którzy od lat, nie bacząc na pogróżki, kpili z ich przywódców i religii.

Zdaniem Petera Nessler i Anne Stenersen, w ciągu najbliższych trzech–pięciu lat ataki terrorystyczne w Europie będą najczęściej przybierać postać zamachów bombowych bądź – jak we Francji – napaści z użyciem broni palnej . W drugiej dekadzie XXI w. terroryzm stał się jedną z technik prowadzenia działalności politycznej dżihadystów oraz sposobem psychologicznego oddziaływania na

społeczeństwo.

Solidarność na zasadzie dobrowolności

Abstrahując od populistycznych opinii przywódczyni Frontu Narodowego na temat zubożenia Francji, będącego konsekwencją utrzymywania nielegalnych imigrantów, które summa summarum zyskują coraz większe poparcie francuskiego społeczeństwa, Francja boryka się z licznymi problemami ekonomiczno-społecznymi. Na pierwszym miejscu wymienia się stały wzrost bezrobocia, zwłaszcza wśród osób w wieku produkcyjnym, w tym imigrantów. Obecnie stopa bezrobocia we Francji wynosi 10,6%, co oznacza, że bez pracy pozostaje 3,5 mln Francuzów. Ratunkiem dla francuskiej gospodarki ma być rządowy program „Porozumienie odpowiedzialności i solidarności”, który zakłada udzielenie przedsiębiorstwom pomocy finansowej rzędu 40 mld euro w zamian za utworzenie przez nie do 2017 r. pół miliona nowych miejsc pracy. Kogo w większości zatrudnią przedsiębiorcy? Wykształconych Francuzów czy muzułmańskich imigrantów jako tanią siłę roboczą? Wysokie bezrobocie wśród muzułmanów – wskaźnik zatrudnienia muzułmańskich imigrantów jest o ponad 20 punktów procentowych niższy niż Francuzów – to pokłosie zarówno braku kwalifikacji zawodowych, jak i dyskryminującej polityki zatrudnienia Francji. W 2011 r. we Francji dwóch na trzech imigrantów miało wykształcenie niższe niż średnie lub nie miało żadnego wykształcenia, w Wielkiej Brytanii jeden na trzech. We Francji tylko 15% imigrantów ma wykształcenie wyższe, gdy w Wielkiej Brytanii 40%.

Wykres 3. Wskaźnik bezrobocia wśród ludności francuskiej i muzułmańskiej
w 2009 i 2011 r. (dane w %)

Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie: Assemblée Nationale, Les perspectives démographiques de la France et de l'Europe à l'horizon 2030 : analyse économique, <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/rap-info/i2831.asp> (dostęp: 22 lipca 2015); Gilles Kepel, Leyla Arslan,

Sarah Zouheir, Banlieue de la République. Résumé, Institut Montagne, October 2011.

Francja jest na pierwszym miejscu w Europie pod względem próśb o azyl, ze średnią 6,5 tys. podań rocznie. Azylanci, którzy zwykle pozostają we Francji wiele lat, nie mają prawa do pracy ani nie uczestniczą w tworzeniu dochodu narodowego .

Choć modna jest populistyczna narracja o kraju w ruinie, Francję stać na przyjęcie kolejnych imigrantów, pod warunkiem że nastąpi to na zasadzie dobrowolności. Co innego, jeśli przyjęcie nielegalnych imigrantów z Włoch czy Grecji wynikałoby z nakazu Unii Europejskiej, co ta usilnie forsowała na przełomie czerwca i lipca 2015 r. Obowiązkowe kwoty imigrantów, o które najmocniej z oczywistych względów zabiegały Włochy i Grecja, byłyby wodą na młyn Marine Le Pen, która zwalcza zarówno to, co nazywa „dyktatem Brukseli”, jak i samą imigrację.

Wobec wzrostu notowań partii populistycznych w całej Europie, od Hiszpanii po Słowację, od Wielkiej Brytanii po Austrię, podobną do francuskiej logiką działania kierowało się znacznie więcej państw Wspólnoty Europejskiej. Propozycji wprowadzenia obowiązkowego systemu rozlokowania imigrantów w całej Europie ze szczególną zaciekłością sprzeciwiały się Polska, Czechy, Słowacja, Litwa, czyli kraje, którym zamorska imigracja byłaby obca. Akcesu do planu podziału imigrantów w ogóle nie zgłosiły Wielka Brytania i Dania, państwa, których traktat Unii Europejskiej nie zobowiązuje do udziału w unijnej polityce migracyjnej . Minimalne zobowiązania przyjęły Węgry i Bułgaria, które z kolei stawiają czoła gwałtownemu wzrostowi nielegalnej imigracji z Bałkanów.

Zakończenie

Nie ulega wątpliwości, że kwestia imigrantów podzieliła Unię Europejską. Stała się kością niezgody między państwami Zachodu. Premier Włoch Matteo Renzi obwinia Unię Europejską o brak solidarności i odpowiedzialności wobec dramatu imigrantów z Afryki

i Bliskiego Wschodu. Morgan Johansson, minister ds. imigracji Szwecji, publicznie skrytykował Davida Camerona za „moralnie naganną” politykę antyimigracyjną i sytuację w Calais. Rząd włoski krytykuje postawę władz Francji, które nie wpuszczają imigrantów próbujących przedostać się do Francji przez przejście graniczne w Ventimiglia, niedaleko Nicei. W wypowiedzi dla stacji BFM TV minister spraw wewnętrznych Francji Bernard Cazeneuve podkreślił, że „Włochy muszą stosować się do tzw. rozporządzenia dublińskiego, zgodnie z którym wnioski azylowe muszą być rozpatrywane w kraju wjazdu imigranta. Jeśli do Francji przybywają imigranci, którzy przyjechali przez Włochy i tam się zarejestrowali, należy stosować prawo unijne, a to oznacza, że muszą zostać zawróceni do Włoch. Nie mają prawa do wjazdu do kolejnego państwa i muszą się nimi zająć Włochy” . Z kolei rząd Niemiec oskarża Włochy o wypychanie nielegalnych imigrantów na północ.

Dość stwierdzić, że Unia Europejska to wieża Babel, a każde z jej państw członkowskich w kwestii napływu nielegalnych imigrantów mówi własnym głosem. Unia znalazła się rozdrożu. Albo będzie rozumować jak wspólnota i weźmie na siebie zadanie wspólnego rozwiązania problemu napływu nielegalnych imigrantów, albo będzie zwoływać kolejne nic niewnoszące szczyty w sprawie imigracji, które, jak pokazuje rzeczywistość, nie przynoszą wymiernych skutków. Unia Europejska nie ma odwagi przyznać się, że szlaban do Europy jest zamknięty. Unia milczy, imigranci w poszukiwaniu lepszego życia toną w wodach Morza Śródziemnego, a takie mocarstwa jak Francja, Wielka Brytania i Niemcy otwarcie sprzeciwiają się przyjmowaniu kolejnych nowo przybyłych z Afryki i Bliskiego Wschodu.

Unia Europejska musi zdać sobie sprawę z jeszcze jednego, oprócz przyjmowania setek tysięcy nielegalnych imigrantów – to państwa członkowskie poniosą moralną i ekonomiczną odpowiedzialność za zapewnienie im godnych warunków życia w Europie, która stanie się dla imigrantów dożywotnią ojczyzną. I nie chodzi o to, że tych państw na to nie stać, ale o to, że choć nazywane są gettami dobrobytu, rządzące w nich elity nie wyrażają woli.

Conclusion

Political and social changes in North Africa and the Middle East, and permanent crisis in Afghanistan contributed to a growing presence of threats in Europe, affecting in particular EU Member States, but also indirectly causing instability in the Western Balkans, which have become one of the migration routes in Europe. The instability caused by the military policy of the United States, and extensive policy of democratization and promotion of human rights represented by the European Union has become commonplace as previously stable Europe, which with increased strength measure is now both the great migration, resembling a huge population movements from the period of the two world wars and the increasing threats of fundamentalism, terrorism and nationalism. Reckless and unjustifiable attempt to transplantation the only right European concept of democracy and the liberalization of social and economic life, but not only were not reflected in societies which, through revolutions and the overthrow of dictators or failed to implement these how noble principles but plunged into the struggle for power and dominance, strongly destabilizing their countries and the entire region. These events led to increased migration, both due to the risks of security disruptions and inspired economic aspects. Migration has led to the creation of new migration corridors in particular strengthened its previously existing trail through the Western Balkans, which have repeatedly been in danger center. Also all these unstabilities which occur in the Middle East and North Africa led to local conflicts, escalation on internal wars and creation of more terrorist groups. All of these seems to be huge challenge for European Union, United States and other participants of world order which is changing not only on the basis of rivalization between states but also or mainly on the basis of confrontation between asymmetric actors.

**Speech of the Representative of Kurdistan Regional Government
to Poland, Mr. Ziyad Raof given on the conference called:
“Whither the Middle East – the blueprint for the future”
16.07.2015**

**"Kurdowie i Kurdystan- klucz do nowego ładu politycznego na
Bliskim Wschodzie"**

Szanowni Państwo,

Na wstępie pragnę podziękować za zaproszenie na konferencję i możliwość przedstawienia swoich opinii w tak zacnym, międzynarodowym gronie przedstawicieli władz, ośrodków naukowych oraz mediów.

Sytuacja w Północnej Afryce i na Bliskim Wschodzie jest w tej chwili niezwykle dynamiczna i skomplikowana. Bez wątplenia obserwujemy rozpad starego porządku państw i granic, ukształtowanego jeszcze na początku XX wieku przez europejskie imperia kolonialne. Jednym z najważniejszych elementów coraz wyraźniej widocznego nowego ładu są oczywiście Kurdowie, którzy stają przed historyczną szansą.

W swoim wystąpieniu jako Pełnomocnik Rządu Regionalnego Kurdystanu w Polsce chciałbym się skupić przede wszystkim na sytuacji w Kurdystanie irackim, który jest pionierem w ustanawianiu nowego ładu i pozytywnych przemian na Bliskim Wschodzie. Obecnie inspirują one także Kurdów w Syrii i w Turcji. Część swojego wystąpienia poświęcę również przeanalizowaniu zagrożeń, z którymi w tej chwili mierzy się Kurdystan, na czele z Państwem Islamskim. My, Kurdowie, mamy kilka istotnych spostrzeżeń na temat przyczyn urośnięcia w siłę tej barbarzyńskiej organizacji. Na koniec swojego wystąpienia chciałbym wytłumaczyć, dlaczego Kurdowie są kluczem do nowego ładu na Bliskim Wschodzie i dlaczego moim

zdaniem tenże nowy ład może być szansą dla tej części świata na bezpieczniejszą i bardziej stabilną przyszłość.

Szanowni Państwo,

Gdy w 1992 roku Kurdystan iracki stanął przed możliwością samodzielnego decydowania o własnym losie i organizowania własnych struktur władzy, niewielu międzynarodowych obserwatorów wierzyło w sukces. Kraj był zrujnowany dekadami wojny, a przede wszystkim ludobójczą operacją Anfal w latach 1987-1988, gospodarka leżała w gruzach, wyzwaniem było zabezpieczenie mieszkańcom elementarnych potrzeb bytowych.

W ciągu dwudziestu trzech lat Kurdowie odnieśli jednak spektakularny sukces, który wzbudza dziś podziw na całym świecie. Powołane zostały demokratyczne instytucje- Parlament Kurdystanu, Rząd Regionalny Kurdystanu, Prezydent Kurdystanu, organy władzy samorządowej. Wyłaniane są one w wyborach uznanych przez zagraniczne instytucje za wolne i transparentne. Dzięki odważnym reformom i uchwaleniu nowoczesnego oraz liberalnego ustawodawstwa rozpoczął się dynamiczny rozwój gospodarki. Znaczne zasoby ropy i gazu w Regionie Kurdystanu przyciągają największych graczy sektora energetycznego z całego świata, takich jak Chevron, Exxon Mobile, czy Gazprom. Ale pomyślnie rozwijają się też inne sektory gospodarki. W rezultacie poziom życia w tej niegdyś najuboższej części Iraku obecnie znacznie przewyższa resztę kraju. Sprawnie funkcjonująca policja utrzymuje wysoki poziom bezpieczeństwa. Gdy w Iraku praktycznie codziennie wybuchają bomby, w Kurdystanie w ciągu kilku lat doszło do zaledwie kilku ataków, które spowodowały ograniczone szkody.

Iracki Kurdystan jest też jednym z niewielu miejsc na Bliskim Wschodzie, gdzie z powodzeniem funkcjonuje mozaika religijno-etniczna. W pokoju żyją obok siebie muzułmanie, chrześcijanie, jezydzi i mniejszości religijne i narodowe. Kurdowie pokazali swoją otwartość i solidarność z pokrzywdzonymi także w czasie okrutnych prześladowań, jakich doznają obecnie mniejszości religijne na

terenach opanowanych przez Państwo Islamskie. W 2014 roku prezydent Masoud Barzani zaapelował do prześladowanych mniejszości religijnych, aby przybywały do Kurdystanu, bo tam drzwi są dla nich otwarte. Ponad rok, który minął od tej deklaracji pokazuje, że nie były to puste słowa. Ofiarność władz, ale także zwykłych obywateli sprawiły, że pomimo trudności budżetowych spowodowanych wstrzymaniem gwarantowanej przez konstytucję subwencji od rządu centralnego, uchodźcom w Kurdystanie zapewniono dach nad głową, elementarne potrzeby bytowe oraz poczucie bezpieczeństwa.

Wszystkie wyżej wymienione osiągnięcia sprawiły, że w krótkim czasie naród kurdyjski zaczął być postrzegany na arenie międzynarodowej jako przewidywalny i pożądany partner. To znak, że wbrew pozorom wiele krajów regionu dopuszcza możliwość ukształtowania się nowego ładu na Bliskim Wschodzie. W otwarty sposób zadeklarowali to w ostatnich miesiącach znaczący politycy europejskich krajów. W lutym 2015 roku poparcie dla kurdyjskich aspiracji wyraziła minister spraw zagranicznych Szwecji- Margot Wallström. Powiedziała ona na forum szwedzkiego parlamentu, że „nadszedł czas na kurdyjską niepodległość”, podkreślała przy tym poświęcenie i zasługi Peszmergów na wojnie z Państwem Islamskim, szczególnie heroiczne zwycięstwo w bitwie o Kobane.

W maju 2015 roku kolejna deklaracja wsparcia kurdyjskiej niepodległości padła ze strony Victora Orbana, premiera Węgier. Podczas wizyty w Budapeszcie prezydenta Masouda Barzaniego szef rządu oznajmił, że: „Region Kurdystanu ma wszystkie przymioty i spełnia wszystkie podstawowe kryteria aby ogłosić niepodległość i zostać efektywnie działającym krajem [...] Węgry podkreślają swoją sympatię i szacunek dla kurdyjskich starań o niepodległość.

Szczególnie godnym uwagi osiągnięciem jest zbudowanie bardzo dobrych relacji z Turcją. Jeszcze kilkanaście lat temu Turcja groziła, że wszelkie próby organizowania w Kurdystanie irackim kurdyjskich organów władzy spotkają się z jej zbrojną interwencją. Tymczasem dziś jest naszym najważniejszym partnerem gospodarczym. Łączą nas

dobre relacje. Wysokiej rangą tureccy politycy, na czele z Prezydentem Erdoganem, w swoich wypowiedziach dali do zrozumienia, że Turcja dopuszcza możliwość powstania niepodległego Kurdystanu irackiego.

Bardzo istotnym i pozytywnym zjawiskiem jest fakt, że polityczna aktywność Regionu Kurdystanu i jego pośrednictwo między rządem tureckim i Kurdami z Turcji przyczynia się także do stopniowej zmiany ich sytuacji i do poszukiwania politycznych rozwiązań spornych kwestii. Niemal przez całą historię istnienia świeckiej, kemalistowskiej Turcji, Kurdowie doznawali surowych represji politycznych, zwalczano kurdyjską kulturę i język, negowano nawet słowo „Kurd” zastępując je określeniem „Turcy górscy”. Odpowiedzią na surowe represje był zbrojny opór i wybuch przed drugą wojną światową kilku powstań, a potem zbrojnej walki PKK od połowy lat 80. Ostatnie lata to jednak zdecydowana deklaracja zawarcia pokoju, do którego wezwał lider PKK Apo Ocalan.

Powstanie stabilnego i wiarygodnego Rządu Regionalnego Kurdystanu w ramach federalnego Iraku sprawiło, że władze w Ankarze nie mogły już sobie pozwolić na politykę represji i ignorowania kurdyjskich żądań. A z kolei Kurdowie tureccy zainspirowani skutecznością pokojowej, politycznej strategii obranej przez Rząd Regionalny Kurdystanu, sami energicznie zaangażowali się polityczną walkę o swoje prawa. Rezultatem jest najważniejsze polityczne zwycięstwo w historii Kurdów w nowożytnej Turcji. Demokratyczna Partia Ludowa HDP zdobyła w wyborach 13,12% i wprowadziła do tureckiego parlamentu 80 posłów. Ponieważ równocześnie AKP zdobyła mniej głosów i nie jest już w stanie sprawować samodzielnych rządów, Kurdowie stali się „języczkiem u wagi” w parlamencie i stoją przed szansą pokojowego wywalczenia swoich postulatów zwiększenia samorządu tureckiego Kurdystanu.

Kurdystan iracki wspiera ustanowienie nowego ładu także w Rojawie. Losy Kurdystanu syryjskiego pod rządami reżimu Hafiza Asada a następnie Baszara Asada również były bardzo trudne.

Kurdom odmawiano podstawowych praw politycznych, tysiące z nich było pozbawionych syryjskiego obywatelstwa, zamieszkane przez nich prowincje były zaniechane gospodarczo. Gdy w wyniku wojny Syria stała się de facto państwem upadłym, a na jej terenie rozprzestrzeniły się silne organizacje islamskich radykałów na czele z ISIS, Kurdowie musieli wypełnić próżnię bezpieczeństwa i zadbać o bezpieczeństwo zamieszkanych przez siebie prowincji. Na przeszkodzie stały jednak różnice ideologiczne między różnymi ugrupowaniami politycznymi syryjskich Kurdów.

W obliczu zewnętrznego zagrożenia, prezydent Masoud Barzani zaprosił w październiku 2014 roku skłóconych liderów partyjnych w syryjskim Kurdystanie do Duhoku na negocjacje. Ostatecznie udało się wypracować porozumienie, na mocy którego została powołana 30 osobowa rada polityczna zrzeszająca wszystkie ugrupowania polityczne w Rojavi. Jak podsumował po spotkaniu lider PYD Salih Muslim: „Wszyscy Kurdowie są w niebezpieczeństwie, powinni się więc zjednoczyć”.

To właśnie syryjski Kurdystan był też areną precedensowego wydarzenia na Bliskim Wschodzie. Położone przy granicy z Syrią miasto Kobane zostało zaatakowane przez Państwo Islamskie. Heroicznie broniący się syryjscy Kurdowie zostali zepchnięci do obrony przez liczniejszych i lepiej uzbrojonych bojowników ISIS. Odsiecz ze strony Peszmergów z irackiego Kurdystanu pozwoliła na przetrwanie półrocznego oblężenia i pokonanie islamskich fanatyków. Był to pierwszy w historii przypadek operacji kurdyjskich wojsk poza granicami kraju, który odbył się za pełnym przyzwoleniem społeczności międzynarodowej. Operacja zakończyła się pełnym powodzeniem. Jednocześnie nie był to ostatni sukces Kurdów w walce z ISIS. W czerwcu zadali oni terrorystom dotkliwy cios zajmując leżące przy granicy z Turcją miasto Girda Spi, dzięki temu przecięty został główny szlak zaopatrzeniowy z Turcji do Raqqa. W tej chwili Kurdowie są bez wątpienia najsilniejszym przeciwnikiem, który na lądzie stawia czoła siłom kalifatu.

Waleczność kurdyjskich wojsk została doceniona także przez międzynarodową koalicję, która prowadzi z powietrza naloty na

pozycje ISIS. Z początku nieufni wobec syryjskich Kurdów Amerykanie obecnie ściśle koordynują z Kurdami swoje operacje przeciw terrorystom i nie szczędzą Kurdom pochwał. Sekretarz prasowy Białego Domu Josh Earnest powiedział po zdobyciu Girde Spi, że jest to „dowód, jak niezwykle ważne jest dla Stanów Zjednoczonych mieć zdolnego, chętnego i skutecznego partnera w walce lądowej z ISIS”.

Omawiając sytuację w Syrii dotarliśmy do problemu rosnącego w siłę Państwa Islamskiego. Kontroluje ono w tej chwili znaczne terytorium Syrii, w czerwcu 2014 roku rozpoczęło ono ofensywę na północny Irak, co boleśnie odczuł także Region Kurdystanu. Zajęty został Mosul, a następnie cała prowincja Niniwa. W rezultacie Region Kurdystanu zalała gigantyczna fala uchodźców. Obecnie wynosi ona 1,8 miliona osób. Ich utrzymanie jest ogromnym obciążeniem dla Regionu Kurdystanu.

Obarczony ciężarem utrzymania rzeszy uchodźców i kryzysem finansowym Kurdystan iracki od lipca 2014 roku musiał dodatkowo stanąć do bezpośredniej walki z wojskami Państwa Islamskiego, które przysięgły ofensywę, będąc dodatkowo wzmocnione nowoczesnym sprzętem wojskowym amerykańskiej produkcji, zdobytym na irackiej armii w Mosulu. Peshmergowie, dzięki wsparciu międzynarodowego lotnictwa, dostawom broni, ale przede wszystkim- dzięki niesamowitej waleczności i determinacji, w sierpniu 2014 odparli islamistów spod Erbilu, a następnie przeszli do kontrataku. Obecnie Peshmergowie kontrolują sytuację na całym, aż 1200 kilometrowym odcinku frontu.

Analizując problem Państwa Islamskiego moim zdaniem konieczne należy poznać okoliczności, w jakich organizacja doszła do takiej potęgi. Błyskawiczne postępy ISIS w Iraku były szokiem dla światowej opinii publicznej. Ale jako Pełnomocnik Rządu Regionalnego Kurdystanu w Polsce chcę podkreślić, że władze w Erbilu nie były tą sytuacją zaskoczone, co więcej, niejednokrotnie ostrzegaly ówczesnego premiera Malikiego o potencjalnych

zagrożeniach w Mosulu. Premier arogancko odpowiedział, pilnujcie swojego regionu, bo armia iracka jest zdolna stawić czoła każdemu zagrożeniu. Rząd w Erbilu nie ograniczył się tylko do alarmowania władz w Bagdadzie. Już na początku 2014 roku- 6 miesięcy przed upadkiem Mosulu- w rozmowach telefonicznych władze kurdyjskie ostrzegały o nadchodzącym zagrożeniu wiceprezydenta Stanów Zjednoczonych Joe Bidena, a podczas wizyty we Francji, kilka dni przed wydarzeniami w Mosulu, prezydent Barzani również zwrócił uwagę na nadchodzące niebezpieczeństwo. Obawy kurdyjskich władz stały się faktem 9 czerwca 2014, gdy ISIS zajęło Mosul. Po tym wydarzeniu francuski minister spraw zagranicznych zadzwonił do Erbilu podkreślając, że przewidywania Kurdów były słuszne.

Postępy tzw. Państwa Islamskiego bez wątpienia spowodowane są ogólną sytuacją w regionie, a szczególnie w Syrii, ale moim zdaniem dużą odpowiedzialność za ten stan rzeczy ponosi także były premier Iraku Nuri Al-Maliki. W ostatnich latach lekcewał on zasady, na których miał się opierać odbudowywany Irak. Przede wszystkim wspólne rządzenie krajem przez przedstawicieli każdego żyjącego na tej ziemi narodu i religii. Obowiązkiem sprawowania rządów mieli się dzielić Arabowie, Kurdowie, szyici, sunnici, chrześcijanie, jezydzi oraz wszystkie inne mniejszości narodowe i religijne. Fundamentem odbudowywanego Iraku miała być nowa konstytucja, za którą głosowało ponad 80% obywateli.

W praktyce wszystko wyglądało inaczej. W ciągu ostatnich dwóch kadencji swojego rządu Maliki skupił w swych rękach wszystkie resorty siłowe, służby specjalne i podporządkował sobie bank centralny. Bezprawnie i bezkarnie działały paramilitarne bojówki, które eliminowały politycznych przeciwników. Jawnie lekceważono zasady konstytucji i określony w niej federalny ustrój państwa. W ogóle nie został wcielony w życie artykuł 140 ustawy zasadniczej, który był podstawą do rozwiązania problemu terenów kurdyjskich poza obszarem administracji Rządu Regionalnego Kurdystanu. Premier Maliki ignorował również parlament i nie był nawet skłonny stawić się przed nim. Sukcesy ISIL w Iraku są także spowodowane słabością irackiej armii.

Władze w Bagdadzie świadomie zaniedbywały również kurdyjską armię. Od dawna wiadomo było, że Rząd Regionalny Kurdystanu prowadzi pokojową politykę. Lecz przez wiele lat rząd w Bagdadzie odmawiał dozbrojenia kurdyjskich formacji wojskowych. I to pomimo faktu, że zgodnie z iracką konstytucją jest to część irackich sił zbrojnych. Zachód nie potrafił skutecznie przekonać premiera Malikiego do zaprzestania dyskryminacyjnej i dzielącej kraj polityki. W konsekwencji, dziś Irak jest u progu rozpadu.

To wszystko spowodowało ogromną przepaść między różnymi siłami politycznymi i religijnymi oraz podział społeczeństwa irackiego. Niektóre grupy, a szczególnie byli funkcjonariusze partii BAAS, aktywnie wsparli ISIS a terroryści umiejętnie skorzystali z sytuacji i umocnili swoją pozycję. Tak zwane Państwo Islamskie stało się najpotężniejszym ugrupowaniem terrorystycznym w historii.

Szanowni Państwo,

Działalność Państwa Islamskiego to najbardziej wyrazisty dowód na to, że dotychczasowy porządek na Bliskim Wschodzie rozpada się. Sztuczne, odgórnie wyznaczone granice przez Francuzów i Brytyjczyków po traktacie Sykes-Picot przez kilkadziesiąt lat były zarzewiem konfliktów. Stanowiły także podatny grunt pod wzrost opresyjnych reżimów, bo państwo, które nie jest w stanie wytworzyć wspólnej tożsamości i więzi, sięga po aparat represji i przymusu. Jedynym poważnym ośrodkiem oporu stali się religijni radykałowie, którzy otrzymywali wsparcie od mocarstw i krajów regionu. Tymczasem prześladowane przez reżimy siły liberalne, które mogły być rozsądną alternatywą, nie otrzymały z Europy i USA żadnej pomocy.

Erozja systemu Sykes Picot bez wątpienia będzie postępować, niestety obecne wydarzenia w Iraku i Syrii dowodzą, że jest i będzie to bolesny i długotrwały proces.

Ci, którzy próbowali zakonserwować stary porządek w tej części świata, niezależnie od tysięcy ofiar, wspierania niedemokratycznych

praktyk, przemykania oczy na gigantyczną korupcję i marnotrawienie potencjału Bliskiego Wschodu, powinni zauważyć, że zmiany, których tak bardzo się obawiają, takie jak wyzwolenie Kurdów, mogą naprawdę przynieść więcej dobrego niż złego.

Obserwując obecne działania Kurdów w Kurdystanie irackim, syryjskim i tureckim widzimy wiele procesów, które powinny być fundamentem nowego ładu politycznego na Bliskim Wschodzie, stąd moja teza że Kurdowie są kluczem do powstania tego nowego ładu. Powstałby on w oparciu o znacznie zdrowsze zasady niż dotychczas.

Po pierwsze- w oparciu o demokrację. Kurdowie udowodnili, że właśnie w ramach tego ustroju chcą organizować swoje instytucje i organy państwowe. Świadczą o tym kolejne uczciwe wybory w Regionie Kurdystanu. W Turcji Kurdowie również masowo uczestniczyli w wyborach, uznając właśnie demokratyczne instytucje za najlepszy sposób wyrażenia swojego pragnienia zmian- frekwencja wyniosła prawie 85%. Z wiadomych względów najtrudniejsza sytuacja panuje w Kurdystanie syryjskim, lecz i tam politycy deklarują, że po ustabilizowaniu się sytuacji należy powołać demokratycznie wybierane organy władzy samorządowej.

Po drugie- w oparciu o stabilność. Region Kurdystanu już od kilkunastu lat udowadnia że jest stabilnym i godnym zaufania sojusznikiem politycznym i gospodarczym mającym wciąż ogromny potencjał do rozwoju. W przeciwieństwie do wielu państw Bliskiego Wschodu, Kurdystan iracki spełnia wszelkie przesłanki aby zostać silnym państwem prowadzącym przewidywalną politykę wewnętrzną i zagraniczną i co istotne- dzielącym zachodni sposób postrzegania najważniejszych wartości, na jakich ma być budowane państwo. W ostatnich miesiącach Kurdowie ponad wszelką wątpliwość udowodnili też, że są partnerem nie tylko politycznym i gospodarczym, ale także wojskowym- Peszmergowie jako jedyna siła łądowa z sukcesem stawia czoła tzw. Państwu Islamskiemu. Poświęcenie Peszmergów i wymierne efekty ich waleczności są dostrzegane i doceniane przez Europę Zachodnią i USA. Prezydent

Barack Obama podczas zaprezentowanej w zeszłym tygodniu „kompleksowej strategii walki z ISIS” wymienia Kurdów jako „efektywnego partnera, który jest w stanie odeprzeć ISIS”. Prezydent Francji Francois Hollande podkreślił, że „Kurdystan to pierwszy front walki z terrorystami z ISIS”. Z kolei Papież Franciszek powiedział w marcu 2015 podczas spotkania z delegacją KRG, że „Kurdowie zasługują na uznanie i szacunek międzynarodowej społeczności”.

Po trzecie- w oparciu o tolerancję. Bliski Wschód, a szczególnie Irak oraz Syria są w tej chwili areną straszliwych prześladowań mniejszości religijnych. W irackiej prowincji Niniwa, szczycącej się dwoma tysiącami lat chrześcijańskiej tradycji nie pozostał już ani jeden wyznawca Chrystusa, błyskawicznie maleje też populacja chrześcijan w Syrii. Działania ISIS wobec Jezydów noszą wszelkie znamiona ludobójstwa. Jezydzi są mordowani, poddawani wymyślnym torturom, a jezydzkie kobiety są seksualnymi niewolnicami islamistów. Jak już wspominałem, w odpowiedzi na ten horror Rząd Regionalny Kurdystanu zaapelował do mniejszości religijnych, aby przybywały do Kurdystanu irackiego. Tolerancja religijna w Kurdystanie panowała na długo przed exodusem uchodźców, już od 1992 roku mniejszości religijne mają gwarantowane miejsca w kurdyjskim parlamencie a chrześcijanie i jezydzi cieszą się swobodą praktyk religijnych, pełnią praw politycznych oraz gospodarczych.

Po czwarte- w oparciu o zdrowe podstawy gospodarcze. Choć cały Bliski Wschód pozostaje regionem niezwykle bogatym w surowce naturalne, to w wielu krajach potencjalny dobrobyt jest marnotrawiony przez rozplenioną korupcję, dyktatorów okradających obywateli i skomplikowane prawodawstwo odstrasżające potencjalnych inwestorów. W Regionie Kurdystanu, gdzie po zniszczeniach Anfal gospodarkę odbudowywano praktycznie od podstaw, staramy się organizować ją na nowych fundamentach, przyjaznych dla zagranicznych inwestorów i zachęcających Kurdów do aktywności, przedsiębiorczości i inwestowania w wykształcenie i

umiejętności. Rezultaty są imponujące. Jeszcze kilkanaście lat temu Region Kurdystanu był najuboższą prowincją Iraku. Tymczasem w ciągu niecałej dekady, od 2003 do 2011 roku PKB per capita wzrósł o 1400%, a do 2014 roku ponad dwukrotnie. Dziś wynosi 7 654 \$ dolary na mieszkańca. Obecnie poziom życia w Kurdystanu znacząco przewyższa resztę Iraku, gdzie PKB per capita wynosi zaledwie 4,485\$. W Iraku prawie jedna trzecia populacji żyje poniżej poziomu ubóstwa, podczas gdy w Kurdystanie jest to zaledwie 3,8%.

Po piąte- w oparciu o renesans idei państw narodowych. Przykłady Syrii i Iraku świadczą o fiasku idei państw sztucznie nakreślonych przez Europejczyków. Osadzenie w granicach jednego państwa skonfliktowanych lub nieufnych wobec siebie narodów miało ułatwić sprawowanie nad nimi kontroli przez Europejczyków, którzy rozgrywali wewnętrzne spory na swoją korzyść. To dziedzictwo czasów kolonialnych, gdy Francja czy Wielka Brytania wciąż jeszcze były przekonane o skuteczności idei „dziel i rządź”. Lecz po drugiej wojnie światowej, gdy kończył się czas imperiów kolonialnych, problem pozostał. Niepowodzeniem zakończyły się płynące ze szczyrych chęci i w wyniku narodowowyzwoleńczych rewolucji plany budowy demokratycznych i pluralistycznych rządów w większości krajów Bliskiego Wschodu podejmowane w l. 50 i 60. Oprócz wpływów obcych mocarstw o niepowodzeniu zadecydował brak wspólnej historii, doświadczeń i wspólnych celów. Sprawilo to, że na Bliskim Wschodzie zaczęli dominować dyktatorzy pokroju Saddama Hussajna czy Hafiza Asada. Niezdolność stworzenia wspólnoty nadrabiali oni przemocą i wojenną retoryką, która miała jednoczyć kraj.

Doświadczenie Kurdystanu irackiego pozwala wysunąć tezę, że nowy ład na Bliskim Wschodzie, oparty na kryterium narodowym, może być nową szansą nie tylko dla Kurdów, ale i dla całego regionu. Kurdystan iracki jest jednocześnie przykładem na to, że państwo narodowe nie stoi w sprzeczności z tym, aby żyjące w jego granicach mniejszości cieszyły się pełnią praw i swobód.

Uwzględnienie kurdyjskich aspiracji na Bliskim Wschodzie, wbrew wciąż wyrażanym opiniom może więc uzdrowić sytuację w tej części świata. Wyznawane przez Kurdów zasady, w połączeniu z ich determinacją pokonania Państwa Islamskiego mogą być fundamentem na którym ustanowiony zostanie nowy porządek polityczny na Bliskim Wschodzie.

Speech of Hajar Bahri on the conference called: Whither the Middle East – the blueprint for the future”, 16.07.2015

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ركش أو امكءاقلللا اذه دق عيف اومها س نيزلا عيمجل ركشلاب هجوتأ
ميركلا روضحلا
قسايزل دسأل راشب يلوت ىلع رم دق نوكيس " زومت 17 " ةعجلا أدغ
ايروس مكح دق بآل دسأل ناكو. اماع 15 دسأل ظافح مدلاول افلخ ايروس
امكح 2000 ةنس ناريزح 10 عيف متافو ىتحو 1970 ةنس نم اماع 30 ةدمل
بيصننتب ةيثارو ةيروتاتكيدىل ايروس ليوح تب هانأ ايروتاتكيد
هل افلخ هنبأ
ناك، ةليوطلا تاونسلا مده لك نيزدسأل ةيروتاتكيد اوناع نم نمضو
مضراً ىلع شيعي يذلاو، يدركلا بعشلا نم نيزيال م ةثالث كانه
لبق "وكيب سكياس" تايقافتا امتقحلا ىتلاو، ناتسدرك ةيخيراتلا
ةديجلا ةيروسلا ةلودلاب ماع ةئام

روضحلا ةداسلا

لكب ةديج ةيخيرات ةلحرم تلخد ابغشو انطو ايروس نأ نوملعت متنا
ىمسي ام لود متدهش ام ةجيتن 2011 ماع راذأ نم 15 ذنم ةملكلا ىنعم
انتويور يطارقميدلا داخاتال بزح عيف انل ناكو دقو، "يبرعلا عيبرل" ب
كارحلا أدب امنيجو، ةروثلا أدب لبق عاضوأل تاروصتو تاروطتل
نم نيزديفتسم لبق تسملل انتويور رولبن انأدب، اعرد نم يبعشلا
يكريمأل خرؤملا هلاق امب أدبأ نأ نكمي ىتلاو، ةيخيراتلا انتءارق
"لادنار ناثانوج" باتك ىلع اقيلىعت لاق يذلاو "نيزكمورف ديفيد"
لاق امذن ع، "امتكل س امك ناتسدرك بورد: قاقش عيف ةم" نونعمللا
اورسخي نأ اوداتعا، سارملا وبعصلا نولتاقملا ءالؤه داركأل " نيزكمورف
نم، لانتقال ناديم عيف تاراصتنا نم هنوققحي ام تاضوافملا ةلواط ىلع
"قضيبتهم نع يتخلوا وأ او عجاتي نأ نود

عيمجلا مامأ اللثام يدركلا خيراتلا ناك ةيروسلا ةروثلا تآدب امنيج
، ةضراعمل اضعب نمو، ماظنلا نم ىربكلا عا دخل تايلىمعل دعستس انكو
قاح ام ركذنتن انك، تاضوافملا ةلواط ىلع رسخن ال يك ةدعلا دغن انكو
ايكرت عيف ناتسدرك ىلع نميمت ىتلا لودلا لك عيف رزاجم نم دركلاب
ناريا قارعلا

ماع ةئاملا براقى ام لبق كروتاتلا امك ىفطصم عدخ فيك ركذنتن
لوليا ةروث ىلع رمأتلا مت فيكو، دمحم عيضاق ناريا تم دعأ فيكو، دركل
ينيمخل عدخ فيك، ارخا سيلو اريخا، ينازرابل ىفطصم اهدئاق ىلعو

ولس ماق روتكدل ةيواسأما ةياملل عضو فيكو ،مبالقنا دعب عيملل
الايغ انييف يف

راضحتسا اذامل عوضومل بلصل لخدنا لبقو نأل نولءاستت امبر
نودو ةعرب مكل املوقا .افأ جور نع ثدحتا نأ نورظنتت متناو ،خيبراتلا
يف مكيل! تددحت الو ،مكنيب نأل تنك امل هذه انتءارق الول ةلاط
ريصم نع ثحبأس تنك امبر افأ جور ةبرجت لوح يلاحلا عوضومل
ملاعلا لوح دركلل نيئجاللا
ميركلل روضحل

نم 1500 نم رثكا كانه ناك ايروس يف يبعشلا كاحل ادب امنيح
،يروسلا ماظنل نوجس يف يطارقميدلا داحتالا بزح ءاضعأو تادايق
نييروسلا نيضراعمل نم ديدعلاو ،ةيدركلل بازحأا ءاضعأ نم تارشعلاو
مئ نمو ،حالصل اب قبل اطم فتت ةيروسلا ريهامجلل تكرحت نأ امو
ةلحرملل دادعتسال ان ادب دق نحن انك ،ماظنل طاقس اب اريخأو ،ريغيغتل اب
نأ حمسن نلو ،انقحب هءاطخأ خيراتلا رركي نأ حمسن نل انلقو ،ةلبقمل
لب ،دحأ ةدايقي تحت كرحتن نلو ،انبعشلا ال ادونج نوكن نلو تُدع ،
ام وهو ،ديدج رصع وحن دالبل ،نييروسلا نييطارقميدلا عم ،اعم دوقنس
رهشأا دعب ةصاخو ،طبضنمل او ،مظنمل او عيرسلا كرحتلا انيلع صرف
انك ام وهو ،ةمسل أو حيلسلا رداوب اهيف حال يتلا ،ىلوالا ةتسل
ام وهو اهحيلستو نيملسل ناولا ةقيرطىل ع ةروثلا ةمسلأ نم ىشخن
لصح

،اديج كلذل ان سفنأ انددع او ،ثلاثلا اريخل اريختخا ربع لمعلا ادب
،ماظنل طاقس اب بلاطنو رهاظتن ان ادبف ،تاينالكم! نم انل رفوت امبو
ءاحي! الو ةيطارقميدلاو ةيرحلل ان بلاطم سكعتو انب ةصاخ ءامسأب نكل
مالسل تاراعش عفرونو عم او جلا مام نم جرخن مل .اهيف يرصنع وأ يفئاط
،انتءارق قفو ،رخأ بناج نم .طقف ةعمجلل موي جرخن ملو ،يسايسلا
نلو ،ةيلهأا برحل او ىضوفلا وحن هجتتس دالبل نأ لوقت تنك يتلا
صاخشأا دادع! بوض ان هجوت ،ةلودلا مساب فرع امل رثا يقبي
لب ،افأ جورب اساسأ نكي مل ايروس يف ماظنل نال ةليدبل تاسسومل او
مل يذلا ملظلاو ىنغل او بهنل او بلسلل اردصم افأ جور تنك سكالعلا ىلع
ادودح فرعي

ح نم 2011 لي ربأ يف نلعأ امنيح متوشرو وأ ماظنل قبلل رجنن مل
يف ممتيسنج مهنم تعزتنا نيذلا نم دركلل نم فآلأا تامل ةيسنجل
ةيجراخلا ةصاخو ،عضراعمل ان عفاي مل كلذل نكل ،1962 ماعلا
،دالبل جراخ امزومر بلغا تاب يتلاو ،يروسلا عقاوالا نع ةعطقمل
اماع ني عبرأ وأ 30 نم رثكا ذنم مهضعبو

بعشلال عورشمل اةيموقلا قوقحل اب فرتعي ال نم حوضوب هانلق وهو، دركللق قح ياب لبقني نأ لحتسي يفانملا يف شيعي وهو يدركلا يف لثمتل ان عورشمو انتيؤر جاتن اذمو، ءطلسل ايسرك ىلع عبرتي داقتال بزح رمؤم يف حرط يذلا، ءيطارقميدلا ءيتاذلا ءرادإلا 2010 ءنس يطارقميدلا

:ءيطارقميدلا ءيتاذلا ءرادإلا

ءرادإلا قيرط يدركلل بعشل راتخا ايروس يف ءروثلا ءقالطنا عم تاسسؤملو ءيبعشل سل اءملا سيسيأت لالخنم مسفن ءرادإلا ءيتاذلا ءيضرأ افأ جور يف تسسأتو ءيдавتقالاو ءينمألا، ءيملعلا، ءيفاقثلا عورشم حرط متو. ءيطارقميدلا ءيتاذلا ءرادإلا عورشمب ريسلل ءيسسأ ءرادإلا نالعب 2014 ريانني نم 21 لما يف للكت يذلاو، ءيلحرمل ءرادإلا 19 يف بعشل ءيماح تادحو تنكو. افأ جور يف ءيطارقميدلا ءيتاذلا، تانوكملا عيمج نمو افأ جور يلاهأ ءءعاسمبو تررح دق 2012 ويلوي نم ءديء ءلحرم أءبتل، يءعبلا ماظنلا زومر اياقب نم ءيدركلا قطانملا مسفن بمسفن بعشل اهيف ريدي، افأ جور خيرات ءيتاذلا ءرادإلا عورشم ءركف بحاص يطارقميدلا داقتال بزح نالكو ءيطارقميدلا

اوعس لب مهقطانم ريحرب افأ جور تانوكمو دركللا فءككي مل ءلود ءطلس نم ءررحملا مهقطانم اهلالخنم نوربيدي مسفنأل ءرادإلا ليكشتل عم تزامناً ءديداً مشروءاً PYD يطارقميدلا داقتال بزح حرط ئي ح، ئعبلا افأ جور قطانم ءرادإلا لئلنو 2012 ويلوي 19 ءروثل ىلوالا ءيونسل اىركذلا ءيطارقميدلا ءيتاذلا ءرادإلا عورشمب يمس يمسر لكشب

ءرادإلا عورشم دادع! ءنءل نم ءوعءبو 2013 ربمسيدي نم 2 لما يفو يف يئائلا اهءمءءا ءرادإلا عورشم زانء ءعباتم ءئيه ءءق ءيلحرمل نم هزائء! مءام ءشقانم سلءملاءاضع ءيبلاء روضحب ولشماق ءنيءم اهلحارم ىلع ءرادإلا لامعأ لوءءل واستكمالاً، ءرادإلا قئائو دادع! ءنءل لبق لثمت ءيطارقميد تاءاخءنا ىل لوصولا نيءل يئمزل لوءء نمض ءءزوملا مهلبقءتسمو مهءاعلءتت يف نينطاوملا ءءارا

نم عورشملا مسا رييءء وه نوءمءءملا هيلع قفاءم زربأ نالكو ءيتاذلا ءرادإلا عورشم ىل ءكءءشملا ءيلحرمل ءرادإلا عورشم ءيطارقميدلا

:يلى ام ءمءءال يف ررقتو

ينابوك، ءريءءل، ئالءل تاعطاقملا نم ءعطاقم لك موقت نأ -1

قرادى لىكشيت نود لىق تسم لكشيب ةيتاذلا اهترادى لىكشيتب ”نيرف عو
ثالثا تاعطاقم لىكشيتب

زاجن ةعباتم ةئيهو /يسيسأتلا ماعلا سلجملا/ نيسلجملا جمء-2
”تقؤملا يعيرشيتلا سلجملا“ ىمسم تحت قرادىل عورشم

ةئيه” عورشملا زاجن ةئيه نم ةقثبملا قرغصملا نجللا رابتعا-3
”ةيطارقميدلا ةيتاذلا قرادىل عورشم دادع

ثالثا تاعطاقملا يف تارادىل ةيمست-4

قرىزجلا ةعطاقملا ةيطارقميدلا ةيتاذلا قرادىل ا-

ينابوك ةعطاقملا ةيطارقميدلا ةيتاذلا قرادىل ب-

نيرف ةعطاقملا ةيطارقميدلا ةيتاذلا قرادىل ت-

سلجملا ءانثتساب عورشملا ىل مضمنت تامظنملا او بازال تارشع

يىدرىل ينطول

يتلا تاىصخشلا او بازال، تامظنملا نم تارشعلا كلذ دعب تردابو
،ةيطارقميدلا ةيتاذلا قرادىل عورشملا مامضنلا اب افأ جور تانوكم لثمت
نم ةعومجم نع قرابع وهو، اىروس يف يىدرىل ينطول سلجملا ءانثتساب
،ةحلسملا تاعومجملا اب ةطبترملا ةيجراخلا ةضراعملا عم تنواعت بازال
لازى ام وهو، قرىسلا او يجراخلا معدلا ىلع نهارو، قرصنلا ةهبج اهنىب نم
ماوعأ 4 ذم اذه نهار يف ارمستم

لكشو تاباختنالا نوناقو يعامتجالا دقلا قاثيم ىلع ةقداصملا

قرادىل

2014 ريانى 6 يف ىرخأ قوطخ ةيطارقميدلا ةيتاذلا قرادىل عورشم اطخو
قداص نأ دعب ادوماع قنىدمب تقؤملا يعيرشيتلا سلجملا عامتجا يف كلذو
قرادىل لكشو تاباختنالا نوناقو يعامتجالا دقلا قاثيم ىلع
ةعطاقم يف ةيتاذلا قرادىل زكرم ولشمق رابتعا عامتجالا لالخم مت امك
تاغللك ةيببرعلا او ةيىدرىل، ةينايىرسلا تاغللاب فارتعلا او قريزجلا
ةعطاقملا يف ةيمسر

مامأ مفتوحاً سلجملا ىل مامضنالا باب ءاقبإ عامتجالا يف ررقتو
ةئيه فىلكت متو، 2014 ريانى 14 خيرات ىتح تاسسؤملا او تامظنملا
سلجم لىكشيتب تقؤملا يعيرشيتلا سلجملا ناويدو عورشملا دادع
نيرف هيلع يعيرشيتلا سلجملا ةقفاوم دعب قفاوتلاب تقؤم يذيفنت
جورل مئاد يذيفنت سلجم اهقفو بختنى افأ جور يف تاباختنا ءارج
افأ

افأ جور قرادىل مامظنك ةيطارقميدلا ةيتاذلا قرادىل نالع

قرادىل رىخال لكشلا نع يمسر لكشبو 2014 ريانى 21 يف نلعو

سلجملا عامتجا يف يذيفنتلا سلجملا ءاضعو ةيطارقميدلا ةيتاذلا

تاو طخلا مهأ ربتعت يتلاو ،ادوماع نيدم يف دقع يذلا يعيرشتلا
افأ جور ةروث يف ةيخي راتلا

ءاسؤرو هيبئانو يذيفنتلا سلجمل سبيئر يدأ عامتجال اذه لال خو
مامأ ةيطارقميدلا ةيتاذلا ةرادإلا يف يروتسدلا مسقلا 22 لئائيل
ثالثلا تاغللاب بتك يذلاو ةيتاذلا ةرادإلا يعيرشتلا سلجمل
أرق امك ،”ةيناي رسلو ةيبرعل ،ةيدركل“ ةريزجال ةعطاقم يف ةيمسرلا
مألا مت غلب لك مسقلا ءاضعألا

ةيتاذلا ةرادإلا اهرصدأ يتلا نين او قلا مهأ

نينطاوملا نوؤش رييس تو يحوونلا فلتخم نم ةايحل ميظنتلو
اهب رمه يتلا فورظلا لظ يف مهتدعاسمو مهتانا عم نم فيفختلاو
راصلحلا لظ يف لكل ذلكو ماظنلا تاوقو ”شعاد“ ةقزترم تامجه نم ةقطنملا
نم ديدعلا ةيتاذلا ةرادإلا تردصأ ،ةقطنملا يلع ضرورفملا يداصتقال
:تارارقلا كلت مهأ نمو ةعطاقملا يف لمعلو ةايحلل قمظانلا نين او قلا
تامظنملا نوناق ،ةيطارقميدلا ةيتاذلا ةرادإلا يف تايديلبل نوناق
ةايحل نوناق ،راثألا ةياعم نوناق ،يئاملا يعيرشتلا نوناق ،ةيبابشل
ةيساسألا ءدابملا ،ةيرادإلا قطنملا ةيحلحمل سلجمل نوناق ،ةيفاقثلا
عون نمضتي يتلاو نيومتل نوناق ،ةأرملا ءصاخلا ءماعلا ماكحلأو
نوناق ،ةفلأخملا عون اهب جوتسي يتلا تابوقعلو تامارغلأو تافلأخملا
ةيتاذلا ةرادإلا قطنم يف ةيعانصلل عيراشملا نوناق ،حالسلأ صيخرت
خيبرات لبق ءبكت رمل مئارجلا نعا ماعلا وفعلا نوناق ،ةيطارقميدلا
،ةق اطلأ رامثتسا نوناق ،ةيساسلا بازحلأ صيخرت نوناق ،24/7/2014
رهاظتلا ميظنت نوناق ،ةيندملا تامظنملاو ةيريخل تاي عمجل نوناق
نوناق ،يعارزلا يعيرشتلا نوناق ،تاباختنالا نوناق ،تاعمجتلاو
”نين او قلا نم رخأ و عددأ رامثتسالا

ييلاتلا لكشلا يلع وهو ،ايروس لكل لحو جومن ةرادإلا تعضو امك
ةيساسلا يوقلا لك عم متشقانمو دمتعمل لجال عورشم حرط -الو
لاصيا لاه عم شاقنلاو ءانثتسا نودب يطارقميدلا يملسلا لجال ءنمؤملا
ةيئانلا مت غيصى لئلا عورشملا

دقعو ةيساسلا يوقلا هذه نم نكمم عمجت ربك ليكشت - ايناث
عقاولا ضرا يلع هقبيبطتو عرشملا اب ريسلل اهليلثملا عسوم عامتجا
يطارقميدلا لجال مالسلا رمؤم) يروس ينطو رمؤم دقع -انثلاث
و يملسلا لجال ءنمؤملا ةيساسلا يوقلا ءفاك هيلل عدي (يروسلا
ةدحتملا ممالا ةياعربو ةيعمتجمل تايلاعفلأو يندملا عمتجمل تاسسؤم
عم تانوكملا لك نمو تايحالصلأ ددحم رمؤملا نمو سلجم بابختنا :رابعأ
:مهام نمو رمؤملا مامأ مسؤولاً نوكيو ،ةببشلاو ءأرملا ليثمت ءبسن ءاعارم

1. رانلا قالط فقاو ىلع لمعلا
 2. ثادحأل اءىفلخ ىلع نىسائسلا نىلقءملا حارس قالط
 3. ءءءملا مملأو ءىروسلا ءمزالاب ءىنءملا لودلا عم لصاوتلا
 4. ءماع ءاباءءنالا باءنلا نىءل ءلءملا ءراءل
 5. ءءسم ءءاىص اءءمهم ىلوالا نىءنءل لىكءءب سلءملا موقى
- ءىنءنءل او. ءىطارقمءىءلا ءىروسلا ءلوءل ءىلع قءءم ءىطارقمءىء روءءء
اىروس ءىف ءماعلا ءاباءءنالا لكشو ءىلأ ءىءءء
ءاءءنالا عم ءىروسلا ءىطارقمءىءلا سلءملا مامو ءاىءالص ءىءنءء: ءامسأ
اىروس ءىف ءىلءا ءنالا ءلءملا

ءبءءء لءءمء افأ ءور ءىف ءىطارقمءىءلا ءىءاءنالا ءراءلءا ءبءءء نأ
ءاعومءم ءىف لءا ءءءء ءىءل او ،مءلا ءىف قراءلا ءلبلا اىروس ءىف ءءىرف
قرفى ال ءىءاءنالا ءراءلءا ءءومن نأ. ءءشب ءىفءءاط ءاىفلخ ىلع ءرىءك
ضرعم ءءومنالا اءه نل. ءىموق وء ءىنءى وء ءىفءءاط ساسأ ىلع نىنءاوملا نىب
ءانبأ ءءا ءءىو. ءىبءءرءل "شءاء" ءمءنم لبق نم رىبء ءىءءءل نأل
ءىءمءو "شءاء" ءامءء ءرل بءءل ءىءمء ءاءءو مءءوق عم افأ ءور ءاعءاقم
ءب ءقو ،لاضنالا اءه ءىف مءمءءى ءرءب رءل ملاءلا. نىنءاوملا ءفاك ءوارأ
مءءءءالا نم ءىءملا ءالءى بءءى نكل. ءىنابوك ءمواقم ءىف اءضاو ءلء
ءاعءاقملا مءب ءارءءالا بءى. ءىرءسءلا وء ءىسائسلا نىمءءلا مءىءءو
ءىءمء ىلع ءرءق رءكءا ءبصء ءىكل بءءل ءىءمء ءاءءو ءىلءسءو ،ءىلوء
مءاقء ىلع ءىبءءرءل "شءاء" ءرو نىنءاوملا

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Authors

Pawel Olszewski – Phd, European Department, Institute of Political Studies Polish Academy of Science

Artur Wróblewski – MA, Lazarski University

Daria Orzechowska – Phd, European Department, Institute of Political Studies Polish Academy of Science