Working Paper

Romania’s Stance in the Issue of the Refugees Crisis.
Preliminary Observations.

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Revised edition

Mihai SEBE
March 2016
Bucharest, Romania
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Preliminary observations

Mihai SEBE, PhD
Bucharest, Romania

Abstract
The present paper is a part of a broader European debate concerning the rise and risks of the refugees crisis in the midst of a European Union tormented by an economic, social and security crisis. The paper will present a brief overview of the Romanian political landscape and the scars that the debate regarding the refugee crisis left, using open sources.

At the EU level we are currently dealing not only with a massive influx of refugees from war torn countries such as Syria and Iraq but also with an increasing number of economic migrants that tend to be mixed together by an overly passionate public opinion and political class. It is important in my opinion to have this distinct approach in order to try identifying the necessary policies.

For the first time after the end of a Second World War, we are assisting to a huge migratory flux in Europe, with persons coming from foreign cultural areas that have triggered a wave of fears and potential conflicts due to difficulties of cultural integration, all on the background of older migrant issues in Western Europe.

Taking into account the fact that migration issues seem to be yet ever more present in contemporary European democracies, this phenomenon is likely to draw further scientific attention, and an increased need for nationally localized studies, such this one on Romania.

Keywords: immigrants, refugees, European Union, crisis, human rights, Romania

1 The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization he is connected to.
2 Mihai Sebe is currently an expert in Romanian and European Politics. With a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Sciences in French Language and in Law he has obtained a PhD in Political Sciences at the University of Bucharest. His main areas of interest are political sciences, international relations, contemporary history of Europe and Romania, the history of the European idea as well as public law and the area of ethics and corporate social responsibility. For his publications: http://ssrn.com/author=1520605 E-mail: mihai.sebe@gmail.com Twitter: @MihaiSebe83 Website: www.europeanpolitics.ro
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I. General context

Europe is currently facing the worst refugee influx since the end of the Second World War – it is a massive wave that includes mainly, but not limited to, refugees from war-torn Syria and Iraq as well as economic migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other regions of Asia and Africa. It was a surge that started in 2010 – 2011 that reached its peak in the second half of 2015.

UNHCR Mid-Year Trends Report 2015 has shown a glooming face of the refugees’ crisis as it shows that 2015 is likely to break any known records for forced displacements. Without taking into consideration the second half of 2015, this report shows an aggravating trend unlikely to stop.

“With almost a million people having crossed the Mediterranean as refugees and migrants so far this year, and conflicts in Syria and elsewhere continuing to generate staggering levels of human suffering, 2015 is likely to exceed all previous records for global forced displacement”¹.

The pressure on the EU Member States is obvious if we take into consideration that “in the first six months of 2015 Germany was the world's biggest recipient of new asylum claims – 159 000, close to the entire total for all of 2014”².

This generated a shock wave across the European Union by splitting the Union in two camps – those who welcome the refugees (lead by Germany) and those opposing based on a series of arguments either objective or subjective (see the case of Hungary).

We have assisted in the last couple of months to a series of extraordinary European meetings dedicated to solving the refugee crisis that have resulted in a series of decisions that often have generated a series of negative reactions on behalf of the Member States, decisions and rules that are not the main topic of the present paper³.

One of the most important decision is that regarding the compulsory quota⁴ of refugees that each Member State must receive which generated a series of heated debates amidst the ranks of national political elites.
### II. Brief overview of the regulations regarding the refugees

The basis for any refugee policy can be found in the *1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* which remains the law in force even nowadays in relations with the status of refugees. This Convention was later one supplemented by a series of international regulations.

As regards the European Union it has created since 1999 a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) which is yet fully operational as the current challenges have shown it needs further reforms and adaptations.

This can be seen clearly in the *2015 European Agenda for Migration* which sets up a series of short and medium term priorities in the area of migration.
Immediate action

- Saving lives at sea
- Targeting criminal smuggling networks
- Using the EU’s tools to help frontline Member States
- Working in partnership with third countries to tackle migration upstream
- A common approach to granting protection to displaced persons in need of protection

Four pillars to manage migration better

- Reducing the incentives for irregular migration
- Border management – saving lives and securing external borders
- Europe’s duty to protect: a strong common asylum policy
- A new policy on legal migration

Responding to high-volumes of arrivals within the EU: Relocation
III. Migrants in Romania. Preliminary figures

Romania has so far, within the European Union Member States, the lowest percentage of the total population formed by immigrants that raised from 0.6% (in 1990) to just 0.9% (in 2013).
This low percentage is due to the low number of persons who filled asylum requests in Romania: from 1991 until December 31st 2013 approx. 25 100 asylum requests were registered in Romania out of which approx. 5 200 were approved.

In 2014 Romania had 1 506 asylum requests (plus 114 access requests to a new procedure) out of which 713 persons received the statute of refugee or another form of protection\(^\text{15}\).

As for the year 2015 Romania received a total number of 1 266 asylum requests\(^\text{16}\).

These figures are going to be supplemented in 2016 and 2017 with a total number of 6 205 refugees relocated to Romania following the European decisions\(^\text{17}\).

\[\text{Asylum requests in Romania}\]

\[\begin{array}{c}
\begin{array}{c}
\text{1991 - 2013} \\
\text{2014} \\
\text{2015} \\
\text{2016 - 2017}
\end{array}
\end{array}\]

\(\text{Figure 3. Number of asylum requests in Romania (1991 - 2015) compared with the number of refugees expected to arrive through the relocation process}\)

\(\text{Source: own graphical representation based upon official data}\)

IV. The refugee crisis in the second half of 2015. Romania’s reactions

IV.1. Presidential administration

In face of this crisis Romania had a rather balanced position despite the numerous media news and online articles that were underlining the dangers posed by the refugee crisis.
The mass-media tone increased as the on the European level took shape the Commission proposal to relocate a total of 160,000 refugees. Following the increasing amounting pressure on Italy, Greece and Hungary the European Commission envisaged a two-step refugee relocation system: in May 2015 it proposed to relocate 40,000 people from Italy and Greece and in September 2015 the Commission proposed to relocate 120,000 people from Italy, Greece and Hungary over 2 years. This relocation scheme is based upon a complex algorithm: “the relocation would be done according to a mandatory distribution key using objective and quantifiable criteria (40% of the size of the population, 40% of the GDP, 10% of the average number of past asylum applications, 10% of the unemployment rate). It applies to nationalities of applicants with an EU-wide average recognition rate of 75% or higher.” Added to this was the proposal for a temporary solidarity clause (if a Member State cannot participate to the relocation decision then it will have to make a financial contribution to the EU budget of an amount of 0.002% of its GDP) as well as the idea of a Permanent Relocation Mechanism for all Member States.

These measures would be adopted by the Council of the European Union on 14 September and 22 September 2015.

One of the exponents of such balanced approach was the president of Romania Mr. Klaus Iohannis who took, even from his early September 2015 speeches, a more nuanced attitude based upon the respect of both human values and the logistical constraints our country had to uphold.

He stated Romania’s solidarity with the EU, yet a conditional solidarity: “solidarity is required, but it is best for each Member State to establish on its own how many refugees it can take. It is what is called voluntary quotas.”

It was on this occasion when he reiterated Romania’s offer of taking into refugees namely 1,785 persons while underlying what has been since the key argument of Romanian officials in rejecting compulsory quotas – the impossibility of integration of refugees: “Romania doesn’t have the capacity to integrate these refugees into society.”

In the later speeches the president once more tried to clarify the distinction between housing the refugees and their integration into the Romanian society. We don’t really have a problem in the housing capacity but our problem runs deeper and is a problem of integrating them.

“We, if we accept migrants, we don’t receive them on a hotel basis, so they stay until the winter is over and then we shall see. We, if we take them, we must assumed them. These people need to be educated, they must learn Romanian, and their children must go to school.
and learn in the Romanian language. They need to be integrated in society. Society is not somewhere above and waits, society is us, they need to go somewhere in a town, there they must be accepted, there they must find houses on their own money, not on the state money, there they must find jobs, because we do not want to create new and new social cases. This means receiving migrants.²⁵

This attitude of favoring voluntary quotas instead of compulsory quotas had as main result the vote against the compulsory quotas by Romania at the JAI Council in September 2015, which placed our country in the same line with Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.

Figure 4. National governments' position in the European Union Justice and Home Affairs Council majority vote to relocate 120,000 refugees (September 2015)

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:2015-09-22_EU_JHA_Council_majority_vote_to_relocate_120,000_refugees.svg
This vote created a difference of opinion between the Presidential Administration and the Government represented by the former Prime-minister Victor Ponta, who, in a speech held in front of the Chamber of Deputies said it was a mistake to vote against it as it put Romania in the same league as Hungary and Slovakia.

“I think we were right to support the principle of not having compulsory quotas, but I also think that we made a mistake by voting along with Hungary and Slovakia, contrary to the rest of the European Union, and I do believe that it is the time to have, I emphasize, a European, constructive and solidary position.” \(^{26}\).

However the decision was accepted as a *de facto* one and Romania gave up any attempt to file a complaint at the European Court of Justice on this topic like the other opposing countries have done: “We shall wait for the results of these complaints”\(^{27}\).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>The non-sustainability of any action regarding the compulsory quotas of refugees in the European Court of Justice</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In accordance to a series of Romanian legal scholars any action at the European Court of Justice is doomed to failure due to the fact that the European law wasn’t breached by the JAI Council decision given the current interpretation of the European law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“European law is revised and enters on the interpretation of general applicable principles, like that of subsidiarity, by delegating the decision regarding the migration policies toward the EU, followed by the taking over at the Members States level of what is discussed; in that case an action in Court would most surely fail from a legal point of view. It is a problem of establishing and reestablishing competency, who has the right to decide, the Commission or the Member States at the national level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The principle of subsidiarity, contained in article 5 of the Lisbon Treaty, establishes in what situations the EU has the competency to legislate and make decisions in the interest of the citizens. The area of security and foreign affairs are in the area of special competences of the EU. The migration crisis can be easily considered as belonging to the area of competence of CFSP. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty has in the article 352 also a flexibility clause that would allow the EU to act beyond the authority given by the Treatises, if the situation requires so.”(^{28}).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*Figure 5. The non-sustainability of any action regarding the compulsory quotas of refugees in the European Court of Justice*
This opened the door to presenting what can be called as the “Romanian vision” regarding the refugees crisis as it results from the official position of the Romanian president who reiterated it in a speech addressing the issue.

Thus we had to address the elephant in the room that nobody’s speaks about – meaning the decision to have boots on the ground. We need to go to the roots of the crisis and have a decisive intervention to the source of the crisis – meaning Syria but not only in order to end this conflict and bring back peace.

Secondly we must reinforce the support granted to the safe areas from around the crisis zone, meaning an increase support for countries such as Jordan, Lebanon or Turkey – helping these countries in dealing with the refugees already there has a greater impact than helping the individual refugees (for instance Romania would offer 300 000 euros, in the following three years for the World Food Programme directed at assisting the refugees)\textsuperscript{29}.

And last but not least dealing with the refugee crisis means dealing with the security issue – and reinforcing the external border of the European Union (and in particular the Schengen area) must become a top priority in conjunction with fighting against the networks of human trafficking that smuggle refugees across borders.

Moreover the so-called “hot-spots” could be transformed into European centers as this is a European issue while creating an integrated mechanism for solving the refugee crisis.\textsuperscript{30}

**IV.2. Actions of the Romanian government regarding the Refugee crisis**

What is to be noticed is the fact that amidst a complicated internal situation both the former socialist government led by Victor Ponta and the Presidential administration had, most of the time, a common position as regards the migration issue.

We had from the very top offices a strong discourse of condemnation of any type of xenophobic speeches of various politicians as Romania wanted to be and still wants to be a part of Europe. Therefore no type of anti-refugees speech is to be encouraged. Moreover the former Prime-minister endorses the President’s speech in regards with the number of refugees that Romania can receive offering an estimate of between 1 500 – 1 700 refugees citing the same concerns regarding their future integration\textsuperscript{31}. 

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It is in this tense context that the Romanian Government finally adopted, on September 16th 2015 the *National Immigration Strategy for the period 2015-2018*\(^{32}\). The purpose of this Strategy is to create a *flexible admission system*, but at the same time to *pay special attention to citizens from countries with migration potential or who may affect national security*.

We have now finally defined more clearly what are the *general policy objectives* that Romania is pursuing relating to migration and thus what is the road map it must adopt in order to fulfill them.

“1. The promotion of legal migration for the benefit of all parties: the Romanian society, immigrants and their states of origin;
2. Strengthening the legality of third-country nationals stay in Romania and the proper enforcement of removal and restrictive measures;
3. Improving the national asylum system in order to improve legal standards and ensure compliance with national, European and international rules;
4. Romania's active participation in the efforts of the international community and the European Union Member States in finding durable solutions for persons in need of international protection, and the social integration of third-country nationals. In this respect, the policy of social integration of third-country nationals is aimed at enabling persons who are resident or are domiciled in Romania to have baggage minimum knowledge and skills, mainly through Romanian language courses, programs of cultural orientation and counseling to enable them to access the services and social policies in conditions similar to those for Romanian citizens.”\(^{33}\).

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<tr>
<th>Infringement procedures against Romania on asylum issues</th>
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<tr>
<td>We need to mention that Romania hasn’t yet fully implemented the European procedures regarding the asylum policies being the subject of two infringement measures on September 23rd 2015:</td>
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<tr>
<td>“This Directive establishes common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection and sets clearer rules on how to apply for asylum. It applies to all applications for international protection made in the territory, including at the border, in the territorial waters or in the transit zones of the Member States.”</td>
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This Directive “sets out common minimum standards for the reception of applicants for international protection across Member States. It provides a legal obligation for Member States to ensure that material reception conditions are available to applicants when they apply for international protection. These include access to housing, food, health care and employment, as well as medical and psychological care. It also restricts the detention of vulnerable persons, in particular minors.”

The Romanian Government is currently undertaking the necessary steps in order to have them transpose in the national legislation and as soon as the process is done (as it is the responsibility of the Interior Minister) the European Commission shall be notified.

Figure 6. Infringement procedures against Romania on asylum issues

What really brought this crisis was a change in the attitude toward civil society – given the scale of the problem, the government, very publicly, organized for the first time a meeting of the officials with the civil society and local authorities’ representatives on the issue of the refugees on October 2nd 2015.

Given the novelty status of this situation, “our public authorities have not been accustomed to date, we have neither all legal means, nor the logistic ones, we want to prepare ourselves, given that it is a new experience, it will surely be more difficult at the beginning”.

With this opportunity the authorities draw a separation line between the refugees and the economic migrants, while underlining that the first are predominant and that we indeed have a “refugee crisis” that involves children with internationally guaranteed rights as well as other obligations that the state must fulfilled.

Following a positive mindset stating that is a “shame to waste a good crisis” this first formal meeting lead to the conclusion that “we do not deal with a crisis, but with an opportunity to create a functional system for the integration of refugees, both on short term and for the future”.

This being said it was created a so-called “National Coalition for the Integration of the Refugees” reuniting both state authorities and non-governmental organizations with responsibilities in the area of refugees. Having as objective “improving the institutional and legislative framework in the field” the Coalition is an ad-hoc body, having monthly meetings.
Having as core structure a Secretariat within the Coalition “were appointed officials in charge of the major directions of activity: primary logistics, healthcare, education, legislative adjustment, medium and long term integration, public information”\textsuperscript{41}.

This Coalition had its last meeting this year on October 26\textsuperscript{th} where the participants tackle mostly the problem of creating the “mechanisms that allow refugees' access to learning Romanian” as well as “the simplification of the procedure for granting identity documents, including an identification number”\textsuperscript{42}. This was the last meeting in this format as, given the political changes and the approaching of the end of the year, its meetings were adjourned.

We can speak of a Government vision in the issue of the refugee crisis if we take notice of a public speech held by the former Prime-minister Victor Ponta in front of the Chamber of Deputies on October 5\textsuperscript{th} 2015.

First and foremost he reiterated Romania’s decision to uphold all the obligations that it encumbers following the international conventions we are a member of as well as all the European decisions taken, even if we may disagree with them. “Romania must show solidarity towards the other EU members, support and cooperate with them on this issue that represents an enormous challenge for the European Union”.\textsuperscript{43}

Romania’s greatest advantage so far is that it was outside the main migration routes, which allow for a space of maneuver for the authorities and thus allowing them to try to figure out solutions on a calmer basis. We assist here also to a moment of convergence in Romania’s foreign policy as regards the best solution for this crisis with two levels proposals for an end to this situation.

Thus the short and medium term solution is “granting the financial and logistic support for the countries which have already sheltered refugees, mainly Turkey and Jordan. It is easier, cheaper and more efficient to support the financial efforts of those countries than to build walls”.

The long term solution is “fighting against terrorism in Syria, the recovery of the Syrian state structure and the support for Syria’s rebuilding. From the diplomatic point of view, Romania will join EU and USA’s efforts concerning this long term solution”.

As regards Russian intervention into Syria “[it] cannot solve the conflict, but on the contrary just to aggravate it and to create new and new sufferings for the civilian population”\textsuperscript{44}

Romania underwent a major political change in November when the Socialist government led by Victor Ponta resigned being replaced by a new independent government led by Dacian Cioloș, former EU Commissioner on Agricultural Policies\textsuperscript{45}. 

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This new government has so far continued the measures initiated by the former one. The current Governing program\textsuperscript{46} briefly mentions the migration crisis without entering into details and doesn’t have any specific provisions to address it.

Moreover Romania is actively preparing for the relocation of the refugees as 3 more refugees centers are being planned alongside the 6 already working\textsuperscript{47}. We should add to this the creation of the Interministerial Committee the National Coalition for the Integration of the Refugees who’s main objective is the integration of the refugees\textsuperscript{4849}

As regards any recent explicit declarations we need to mention the participation of the new Prime-minister Dacian Cioloș to the European Council in Brussels in December 2015 where he reiterated Romania’s concern regarding the need to control the migratory flux as well as the fact that our solidarity comes at in certain conditions, namely to treat the cause of the problem and not its symptoms\textsuperscript{50}.

We should also mention the meeting the Romanian Prime-minister had with the President of the European Commission, Jean –Claude Juncker where he reiterated that: “Romania wants to be part of the solution, and not of the problem, given that we outlined many times that we consider necessary that the migration flow to be controlled first through a good control of the EU external borders. Romania undertakes its responsibilities, and I have no doubt in this respect.”\textsuperscript{51}.

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\textbf{Romania’s relation with the neighboring countries in regards of the refugee crisis} \\
\hline
\textbf{Hungary} \\
We have also assisted to a “declaration warfare” between Romania’s and Hungary’s government due to the actions of Hungarian counterparts who have decided to build a wall to stop the migrants an action seen as a non-European one by the Romanian authorities\textsuperscript{52} \textcolor{teal}{This only got worse as the Hungarian project of raising fences at the Romanian border to stop the migratory flux went on\textsuperscript{53}. As the construction progressed and the fears for assisting to a modification of the migratory circuits grew we started to have more and more official reactions to this event.} \\
One of the tensest criticism was brought by the former foreign affairs ministry, Mr. Bogdan Aurescu on September 19\textsuperscript{th} who openly criticized the Hungarian plans for building fences, including at the Romanian borders. “In my opinion, raising fences that would delimitate
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
civilized Europe, within brackets, from the rest of the world is a rather autistic and unacceptable gesture outside the European spirit\textsuperscript{54}. We also had a heated response from the then Prime-minister Victor Ponta who in a public interview disavowed the Hungarian stance while criticizing its leadership for the non-European stance and even expressing concerns regarding a possible unfortunate scenario where Hungarian armed forces open fire upon women and children\textsuperscript{55}.

This generated a fierce and disproportionate reaction on the part of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: “we would expect more modesty of the Foreign Minister of the prosecuted Romanian Prime Minister”\textsuperscript{56}. This spiral of verbal confrontation continued with renewed declarations from both sides and summoning for explanations of the both countries diplomatic representatives by the respective Foreign Affairs Ministries.

**Bulgaria and Serbia**

Romania had a close cooperation with the Bulgarian and Serbian government on the refugee crisis given our geographic proximity and the cooperation relationships that existed at the government level.

One meeting that stand apart was the trilateral meeting from October 24\textsuperscript{th} 2015, in Sofia, Bulgaria, between the Prime-ministers of Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia on the topic of the refugees. The three countries stated their resolve to identify a common, European solution to this crisis. They express the willingness to have an active contribution but only if the burden sharing really works and these countries aren’t left alone to face the refugee flux. It was on this occasion that a first shift of the open door policies appeared given the hint that these three countries, can, if the situation aggravates, adopt a more defensive stance, including building physical barriers and closing the borders. “If there are countries that close their borders, and build walls, then we have the right to equally defend ourselves”\textsuperscript{57}.

This lead to a counter-reaction from Romania’s President, Mr. Klaus Iohannis who publicly stated that the then Prime-minister didn’t have a mandate for this trilateral meeting. “The Prime-minister hadn’t a consultation with me, he had a trip to Sofia, meeting other Prime-ministers, a matter interesting as a week-end preoccupation. Mr. Ponta didn’t have a mandate to engage Romania in any way. These declarations that he had made are totally not binding to me”\textsuperscript{58}.
IV.3. The Romanian Parliament and the refugee crisis

The Romanian Parliament had a relatively low level of implication in the refugee crisis due to its limited attributions in the area of foreign affairs (mostly the area of the Romanian President) and in the purely administrative sector that is more an attribute of the Romanian Government.

However it is worth mentioning the Decision no. 59 of June 30th 2015 of the Chamber of Deputies which stipulates the official position of the Chamber of Deputies.

It is an endorsement of the later one position of the Romanian Presidency and Government as it clearly stipulates that the principle of solidarity must be endorsed by the principle of voluntarism while the measures for burden sharing must be on a temporary basis. Another important topic that is addressed here is that of the democratic control over the envisaged measures, in order to avoid any unnecessary tensions. The reforms must also have in mind a prospective aspect that takes into consideration the European Union security in social and economic terms as well as regards the labor market problems.

Moreover it also mentions the Ukrainian issue underlining the potential risk of a massive influx of Ukrainian refugees if the Ukraine’s internal situation deteriorates which would put Romania into the frontline of the refugee flux.

The refugee problem needs to be tackle in the origin countries while also underlining the need for a balanced aid as not to disturb the EU Member States internal balance in the context of the rise of anti-immigration political forces. Other indicators regarding the redistribution should also be take into consideration such as the participation at Frontex and the prior engagements in relocation activities.
In dealing with the Parliamentary proceedings for the adoption of the aforementioned Decision, the European Affairs State Secretary George Ciamba had, early June 2015, a presentation in front of the joint Committees of Foreign Affairs of the Romanian Parliament. Although the document wasn’t publicly available the media had succeeded in obtaining a series of information concerning the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official position. Romania had ever since a reserved position citing the difficulties of integrating African and Middle East migrants given, among other things, the low level of preparedness of the Romanian society in dealing with migrants.

Financing the relocation programme is of outmost concern as there needs to be a balance between the financing v. responsibility sharing. Also the indicators for relocation need to be reevaluated as the asylum capacity is different among Member States and moreover the Romanian state wants to be involved in the selection process of the migrants, due to national security concerns.

What stand apart in this debate was also the attitude toward the Christian minorities from Northern Africa and Middle East that echoed other European opinions regarding this topic. We had for instance a representation of the National Liberal Party (the main opposition party) who criticized the relocation quotas, seen as a bureaucratic solution while opting for individual based granted asylum, based on nondiscrimination. Also he raised the issue of the Christian communities from the above-mentioned area urging the Romanian state to undertake a series of actions destined to help them.

Summarizing briefly the main political parties attitudes toward the refugee crisis I mention the PSD (centre-left, ESP) President Liviu Dragnea who stated that: “Various European states have avoided managing this crisis by trying to transfer it to other States. This modus operandi shows that a major correction of the European level crisis management mechanisms is needed. It is important for us not to lose our humanity, while protecting Romania in the same time”.

As for the PNL (centre-right, EPP) it supported President Klaus Iohannis position in regards the compulsory quotas repeatedly stating that the we need a fair, voluntary quotas
system and the need to address the real causes of the migration and not its effects. (Ramona Mănescu, PNL MEP, September 28th 2015)\textsuperscript{63}. Moreover it underlined the need for clear selection criteria for the refugees that are coming to Romania: “The selection criteria in relocation the refugees are as important as their number” (Ionuț Stroe, PNL spokesman)\textsuperscript{64}.

If the current Romanian officials have a more reserved attitude regarding the compulsory quotas, the former Romanian president, Mr. Traian Băsescu and the current leader of the opposition party \textit{Popular Movement} (\textit{Mișcarea Populară}, in Romanian) has adopted late 2015 a more confrontational attitude toward the issue of refugees and that of compulsory quotas.

By affirming that the refugees are unable to adopt the European values he is trying to tap a potential influent nationalistic electorate that would help his party entry the Romanian Parliament in the 2016 parliamentary elections. Moreover he raised the issue of the unconstitutionality of the compulsory refugees' quotas as he recalled the fact that the Romanian constitution at the article 3 paragraph 4 stipulates: “No foreign populations may be displaced or colonized on the territory of the Romanian State.”\textsuperscript{65}.

His views are endorsed also by some Romanian scholars who beside the above-mentioned article also cite the article 25 paragraph 1 of the Constitution: “The right of free movement within the national territory and abroad is guaranteed. The law shall lay down the conditions for the exercise of this right.”\textsuperscript{66}

In their interpretation: “This right concerns \textit{any human being}, therefore it is regarded by the Constitutional provision as concerning not only the Romanian citizens but any other person that is on the Romanian territory or is transiting it. No refugee or immigrant cannot be stopped inside the borders of the Romanian state against his/her will. If he/she expresses his/her wish to transit Romania’s territory having as destination country another EU state, the Romanian state cannot stop him/her.”\textsuperscript{67}

However this interpretation receive a partial response trough the Court of Justice of the European Union decision which stipulated that “a place-of-residence condition may be imposed on beneficiaries of subsidiary protection if they face greater integration difficulties than other non-EU citizens who are legally resident in the Member State that has granted such protection”\textsuperscript{68}. Its impact is yet to be evaluated yet "The ruling clarifies that it is possible to impose residency requirements and this is important in the context of possible secondary movements,”(Commission spokeswoman Natasha Bertaud)\textsuperscript{69}. 

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Finally amidst the most recent documents adopted by the Romanian Parliament is the *Decision no. 82/2015 of October 21st 2015 of the Chamber of Deputies.*

This Decision reaffirms once more the need to use the **principle of voluntary character for any transfer mechanism** as the solidarity cannot be forced. The Parliament also raises the question of the necessity of a permanent transfer mechanism that would imply that the massive flux of migrants would become a permanent one. Also it express the doubts concerning the possibility of “financial sanctions” against the Member States that don’t fulfil their obligations. What is also important is that specifically demands to have a separate approach regarding the issue of children refugees and their social status in order to avoid any risk of exploitation – an issue that can and must be tackle in conjunction with UNICEF. Finally it recommends an EU wide consultation with the business sector and the civil society in order to identify the best solutions for the refugee crisis, by reducing the financial burden on the state budgets and by stimulating the social inclusion of the refugees.

V. The Schengen saga and the refugee crisis

The Schengen area accession has always been a difficult subject to debate in Romania given its sensitive nature. Having fulfilled all the technical requirements for accessing the Schengen area, as recognized by the technical evaluation missions (2009 – 2010 missions), having received the favorable opinion of the European Parliament (2011) and having fulfilled all the complementary measures required Romania is still on the holding list given to be member of the Schengen area (with Bulgaria), to what many perceived as political reasons instead of technical ones.

It is on this background that the refugee crisis has put under stress the Schengen area as it is currently defined. This has put on hold any attempt to negotiate on this topic as the idea on mixing the two of them together raises concerns about the seriousness of Romania’s intentions as the entire Europe is in crisis and the Schengen area as such is under serious strains.

In a series of formal declaration Romania’s president officially declared that the Schengen area is *de facto* not working, while also firmly declaring that there is no causality link between the Schengen area accession and the refugee crisis. “**Schengen file shall not be connexed with the migration file, because they are two different things** and, consequently, it is obvious we shall not discuss Romania’s adhesion to Schengen with this occasion.”
Actually the Schengen area has always been related more or less to the migration issue even from as early as 2011-2012 when first talks emerged about the possibility of a gradual integration of Romania and Bulgaria into the Schengen area – first with aerial and maritime borders. The summer of 2012 Romanian political crisis just added new constraints to the Schengen issue – its correlation with the Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification and the relation between the judicial and legislative power, fighting corruption, etc. 

What came as an evidence was the impossibility to separate Bulgaria and Romania one from the other in regards with the accession to the Schengen area. “The short response is that Bulgaria can be decoupled from Romania only on the long term and under extraordinary circumstances. The long answer proves that this is almost impossible.”

Ever since 2012 the migration issue and more precisely the situation of Greece as a Schengen exclave was the untold issue that hinder the Schengen accession. Greece, due to its geographical location and territorial characteristics (high number of islands, etc.) was in 2012 the entry point for approx. 90% of EU illegal immigration as well as a large refugee camp in open air (with approx. 1,000,000 persons living there illegally) that were estimated to use Romania and Bulgaria (if they entered into Schengen area) to reach the more prosperous Northern and Western European countries.

Yet back then there was still hope as the previsions pointed out toward the autumn 2013 – spring 2014 for the integration into Schengen area with the maritime and aerial borders and the year 2015 for the integration with the terrestrial borders.

After the continuous disappointments generated by the continuous postponement of Schengen area adhesion two major options started to dominate the Romanian debate. Following a series of informal meetings between civil society representatives and government officials these are the following:
Option 1 has as defining premises the fact that things are going to change and the migration issue would become less relevant while Option 2 presumes that the Schengen area as we know it shall dramatically change. Following the informal meetings and the situation on the ground one cannot ignore that the external frontiers of the Schengen area have
all too often violated by the refugee flux and that the harsh criteria imposed to Romania and Bulgaria were not the same with those applied to other states. Moreover **not being in Schengen proved to be an advantage in dealing with the refugees** – who have avoided these two countries.

The Option 2 has the advantage to be a negotiated solution that takes into consideration the refugee crisis and the need for the full involvement of all the Member States in managing the external borders of the Schengen area. Also it does not attract any migratory pressure and eliminates other external conditionality (such as the MCV). Also another important conclusion of these meetings is **that connecting the refugee’s quotas with our admission in the Schengen area would a terrible strategic mistake as the two are separate issues**.⁸⁰

I must also mention the debate generated by the launch of this above mentioned Policy Brief that offered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the opportunity to reiterate that “**Romania’s accession to the Schengen area remains an important objective on the diplomatic agenda.** For its fulfillment Romania shall continue its efforts, underlying the added value our country brought through modernizing the security system of the borders. Also, another aspect discussed was **the reception of refugees on the Romanian territory which is not conditioned by the acceptance of adhesion to the Schengen area**”⁸¹.

**VI. Instead of Conclusions**

The refugee crisis acted for all the Member States, and the European Union as such, as an indicator of the structural stress the European construction can endure. We have seen in the same both the worst and the best of European ideals put into practice.

This crisis had also a similar effect on the Romanian political landscape as it made us reevaluate our own values and ideals and have exposed our fears as well as dreams. We have assisted to the increase of the lack of confidence of citizens in the state and European institutions given the sometimes more than chaotic approach of the refugee crisis and there are fears that this could favor the anti-European political parties and movements. This is obvious if we take into consideration the dramatic increase of the percentage of Romanians who are **against receiving refugees in Romania**: from 52.6% in September 2015 to more than 75.8% in December 2015.
Figure 10. Percentage of Romanian citizens who are opposed to the idea of receiving refugees/immigrants in Romania within the quota system envisaged by the European Commission

Source: own calculations based upon the data provided in INSCOP Opinion Polls

Opposing the compulsory quotas of refugees/immigrants in JAI Council

Figure 11. Possible reasons for voting against the compulsory refugee quota
Currently Romania received on March 3rd 2016 its first 15 refugees that are going to stay in the Galați Refugee Centre. It is a small number that currently corresponds with the housing capacity available of approx. 1 500 places\(^8\)\(^4\).

![Figure 12. Romania’s refugee centers and their housing capacity](image)


The situation is for the time being contained as the upcoming elections and internal debates seem to have taken out from the public agenda the refugee crisis. Moreover the opinion polls suggest a clear victory of the main political parties (PSD and PNL) who have so far adopted a moderated tone regarding the refugee crisis\(^8\)\(^5\).

Another plus registered in the last couple of months is an increase of the number of debates tackling the refugee crisis, that try to offer to a wider audience more information about the topic and the things that need to be done by us as a society\(^8\)\(^6\).
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22 Press conference of Klaus Iohannis, Romania’s President, September 7th 2015, available online at http://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/agenda-presedintelui/conferinta-de-presa-sustinuta-de-presedintele-romaniei-domnul-klaus-iohannis1449683916 Last visited on December 30th 2015. [“Este nevoie de solidaritate, dar este mai bine ca fiecare stat membru să stabilească singur câți refugiați poate să primească. Este ceea ce se numește cote voluntare.”].
23 This number was established following a pure administrative procedure: “These places are available in six welcoming centers, that exist in nowadays Romania” Press conference of Klaus Iohannis, Romania’s President, September 7th 2015, available online at http://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/agenda-presedintelui/conferinta-de-presa-sustinuta-de-presedintele-romaniei-domnul-klaus-iohannis1449683916 Last visited on December 30th 2015. [“Aceste locuri sunt disponibile în şase centre de primire, care există în România în ziua de astăzi.”].
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instanță în mod sigur va eșua din punct de vedere juridic. Este o problemă de stabilire și restabilire a competenței, cine are dreptul să decidă, Comisia sau statele membre la nivel național?

Principiului subsidiarității, cuprinși în art. 5 al Tratatului de a Lisabona, stabilește în ce situații UE are competența de a legifera și a lua decizii în interesul cetățenilor. Domeniul securității și al politiciiexterne intră în sfera de competențe speciale a UE. Criza migrației poate fi ușor considerată ca aparținând domeniului de competență al PESC (Înalta Rezprezentant pentru Politică Externă și Securitate Comună). Mai mult decât atât, Tratatul de a Lisabona cuprinde în art. 352 și o clauză de flexibilitate care îi permite UE să acționeze dincolo de puterea atribuită prin tratate, dacă situația impune acest lucru.”].


48 The Committee was supervised by the State Secretary Adrian Marius Dobre within the framework of the Labor Ministry and had a rather discreet agenda with some complaints that it didn’t held the monthly meetings as it was supposed to be doing (See http://www.euractiv.ro/politice-intern/coalitia-nationala-pentru-integrarea-refugiatilor-nu-s-a-intalnit-niciodata-de-la-infiintarea-ei-3618 from February 24th 2016). Since then Mr. Dobre is no longer a


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With the financial support of the European Parliament.

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