

# **Europeanisation, MEPs and the case of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia**

## **Working Paper**

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### **Abstract**

Europeanization is a contested concept, memorably described as a problem to be solved rather than a process to be observed or even instigated (Radaelli 2006). In this paper we outline some particular aspects of Europeanization in a specific context. Our concern is the role of “norms” ascribed to Europe as they have been used in politics concerning the Hungarian minority in Slovakia since the 2006 elections there. In particular we examine the impact the invocation of European norms on these matters have had on domestic and EU political discourse. In doing so we point to instances in which the European Parliament has played a role in the Europeanization of domestic political discourse and policy in Slovakia, as well as ways in which this involvement has reflected back into the European Union and its political discourse. In our examination we look at two instances of “Europeanisation” where the European parliament and its members have been drawn into the issue of minorities in Slovakia. We argue that these cases demonstrate both an evolution in the roles of MEPs and new vectors in the processes of Europeanisation.

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## Introduction

This paper examines an aspect of Europeanisation occurring in the realms of domestic and European discourse in response to a domestic policy of one EU state and the foreign policy of another. It has implications for the treatment of minorities within the European Union. This is an area of particular interest because it is one where the most effective and overt pillar of the European Union in terms of impact on member states, the regulatory pillar, is largely non-existent (Rechel 2009). While the EU has a commitment to human rights, including in treaty statements and case law, it has no binding regulations as yet on the treatment of minorities, let alone specific rules or best practices that member states might be required to follow. What influence the European Union exercises in this area therefore occurs in a more complex and fluid manner than that of straightforward negotiation, and then translation, of supranationally made regulations into domestic public policy and legislation. What we are examining in this paper is the working out and diffusion of norms through political discourse; a discourse taking place between actors at both domestic and transnational levels. A discourse that works to frame, limit, or direct, both domestic and transnational debate about what sort of treatment minorities in Europe have a right to expect. Rights they might, or can, claim in relation to both the European Union and the member states in which they reside. The discourse is also about obligations minorities may owe to those member states.

The above outlines the broad palette before us in terms of the relevance of our project for the study of Europeanisation. However, our inquiries have a narrower empirical focus. We look specifically at issues that have arisen in relation to the Hungarian minority in Slovakia since its accession to the European Union. We have been particularly interested in observing the issues through the lens of the European Parliament (EP), or more specifically the role of Members of the EP (MEPs). These two choices of focus, on the Hungarian minority and the role of the EP, each open up a particular frame of reference in relation to processes of Europeanisation.

The Hungarians in Slovakia present a specific subset of the issue of minorities in the European Union. This is because the Hungarians constitute a national minority in Slovakia, and other EU states, but also have a putative “homeland”, a *nation* state that is a member of the EU. This makes the case of the Hungarians different from minorities without such a state, such as the Roma or the Basque. It also makes them different from those whose home state is not an EU member, for example the Russians in the Baltic states.

Given its place in the framework of relations within the EU, the Hungarian minority's situation brings specific light to bear on issues of ethnic versus civic nationalism. Issues over which the European Union itself suffers ideological contortions or even cognitive dissonance. On the one hand we have the Union's encouragement of cultural autonomy and celebration of heterogeneity, on the other hand the assertion of the equality of *European* citizenry, and alongside these the integrative goal of the EU, to create an internally borderless world. All of this requires a persistence of ethnic identities co-existing alongside the identity of a homogenous civic citizenry. Thus there is both presumed and promoted a variety of identities within one Europe. However, this formulation must also seek to accommodate the continuing existence of member states with politically defined members/citizens and their own frameworks of national identity and identities – identities that can be, and are, mobilised in domestic political discourse. With so many possible identities on the table, coming from various reference points in the social and political constellation that is the EU, the need for some very fine cognitive juggling is immediately evident. The preferred political option has been to handle arising conflicts in identity politics by not directly addressing them at the European level. However, the case of the Slovakian Hungarians has been, and will likely continue to be, a case where looking away is not an option. This is not least because, as will be seen, the very structure of the European Union affords them institutional and discursive means to be visible. Their EU citizenship actually becomes an enabling factor in clashes over policy grounded in claims about identity.

The focus on MEPs and the European Parliament raises more than the usual issues of the democratic deficit and the existing and potential powers of the parliament. We are especially interested in MEPs in this paper as a fascinating case of the “blurring” of European actors<sup>2</sup>. MEPs generally might already be said to be among the more blurred European actors. Joined

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<sup>2</sup> By using the term blurring we are referring to the way in which actors operating within the European polity have not been, and perhaps cannot be, constrained to a field of action that allows for the clear boundaries between fields or spheres that the models and regulations of the EU attempt to set out. In their actual practices the actors on the EU field cannot be fully divorced from their domestic sphere and nor can domestic politics always be divorced from impacts on other parts of Europe or the EU. Even in a formal federal system this would be the case but in a polity still much less formed and so much still a work in progress this is even more the case. The actors' everyday practices lead them to cross lines between domestic, multilateral and European level political fields. This can happen in manners not expected or accounted for by models. In this sense the actors might be said to be ‘blurred’ across fields of action.

to their political groups within the European Parliament, they spend much of their time functioning as European actors, attempting to provide legitimacy, identity and democratic accountability to the nascent European polity. Yet their subjectivity springs from their domestic party affiliations. Their place in the European Parliament is more often a reflection of domestic concerns and ideological dispositions in their home electorates than based on any European-wide perspective (Nugent 2006 p. 266). If they are to discharge their duty to bring some small measure of democratic accountability to the European Union they must think like Europeans yet, perhaps more than any other European officials or politicians, their future lies firmly rooted in their domestic situation. They need to keep a firm eye on both domestic party and domestic policy concerns if they are to survive and prosper. Overall, the very phenomenon of MEP blurring might itself be regarded as a form of Europeanisation. It certainly suggests MEPs may occupy a fruitful role as transmission belts of Europeanisation. In this paper we outline instances where the MEPs blurred nature is an important factor in their capacity to stimulate Europeanisation.

In terms of our specific subject matter we would note here that in Slovakia, where the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK)<sup>3</sup> is able to claim seats in both the state parliament and in the European parliament, there is an additional blurring that their overt ethnic identity both brings and provokes, both inside and outside Slovakia. Their identity is triangulated: they are *Hungarian Slovaks* in *Europe*. The Hungarian state, the Slovakian state and Slovakian public, and the institution of the European parliament are all elements framing their field of action.<sup>4</sup>

However, before examining the specific instances we shall theoretically and historically frame the subject matter of the paper. In the following sections we first elucidate on Europeanisation, showing how this paper utilises that concept and its implications. We then discuss the recent history of minority politics in the European Union and the particular case of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. From there we outline some instances that have arisen since the 2006 elections in Slovakia, which brought to power a coalition government that

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<sup>3</sup> Strana maďarskej koalície - Magyar Koalíció Pártja in Slovak and Hungarian respectively.

<sup>4</sup> The recent split between Hungarian politicians in Slovakian politics, with a group of liberals hiving off from the SMK (to form the Most-Híd party) may complicate matters even further. On the one hand the split diminishes both groups chances of parliamentary representation, on the other the split on other ideological and policy issues arguably dilutes the centrality of their Hungarianness to their political identity.

included as a junior partner the extremely nationalist Slovak National Party. The leader of this party deliberately based much of his electoral strategy upon a discourse hostile to the Hungarian minority. Analysing two instances of response to this leads us to argue that there are new ways in which the European parliament and MEP's are serving to Europeanise the issue of minority rights.

### Europeanisation – the concept and its use in this paper

Radelli formulated the problem of Europeanisation as being the response to pressures of integration coming from the European Union (Radaelli 2006). He was careful to claim that this was not about a process of convergence but rather one of adaptation, thus allowing scope for a degree of heterogeneity between member states in their responses. How each state responded to Europe was an outcome of its domestic political sphere. Domestic actors might use 'Europe' to create impacts in domestic discourse and politics, they might respond to pressure from Brussels or even wrap themselves up in discourses of Europe that changed their own ability to act. Thus, Europe's impact is only as strong as domestic actors might make it (Auer 2009). Europeanisation as a concept is about the way in which emanations from the institutions and imaginaries that make up the Europe that the EU seeks to both be, and bring into being, are translated, or not, into domestic politics.

In this paper we take on board this notion of Europeanisation but we also view it as a highly interactive process. Our research leads us to conclude that Europeanisation is not just a vertical process in which domestic actors respond, adapt or refuse. We argue that there are also horizontal processes of Europeanisation, where altercations between member states take place over bi- or multi-lateral issues. These can also provoke processes of Europeanisation at the domestic and European level. In particular we are analysing a contest *across states* to establish European norms. Norms that will, once established, influence the behaviour of fellow member states.

In conflict over the treatment of Hungarian minorities, Hungarian politicians in Hungary, Slovakia, and the European Parliament, have all invoked the authority of "Europe" to argue for particular norms and policies. In doing so they have engaged in the horizontal and vertical relationships that are afforded them by the EU, both through the mechanisms of member states and through their membership of institutions such as the European parliament. The effects flowing from these interactions are not just adaptation, or not, to European norms.

They also influence what the norms are and the extent of the role allotted to Europe in diffusing and policing them. As a result of such processes the EU thus has to respond to Europeanisation from below. There is a mobilisation of its own discourses and institutions by various domestic actors, in play as part of a dispute across member states, that may effect change in the EU's own norms and maybe even, later, in its actual regulations.

We are thus primarily concerned with the Europeanisation process as it relates to the formulation, or even disputes over the creation of, European "norms". We define norms as covering both first principles, such as rights, and also as processes – ways in which things should be done. To make our perspective clearer it is useful to conceptualise the problem using the elaboration put forward by Brigid Laffan (2001). Laffan took the metaphor of pillars commonly used to outline the institutional structure of the EU and applied it to a description of the EU as a polity. She argued that the European Union should be viewed as a social construction having three pillars, the regulative, the normative and the cognitive (Laffan 2001). The first pillar refers to what might be called the hard core of the EU. This pillar is the binding created by the EU treaties and the regulations and laws, from the *acquis communautaire* down. In short this pillar is made up of the obligations to which member states are required to conform as part of their membership. These rules constitute the skeleton of the social construction. However, it is the second and third of Laffan's pillars that are of most concern to us, since the treatment of minorities by EU member states is by no means set out in the legislation or regulation of the European Union. There exists instead a number of normatively persuasive documents and discourses that have varying degrees of association with Europe and EU.<sup>5</sup> These documents, and discourses based on their stipulations and assumptions, are accessible to actors within the EU polity both domestic and transnational. They can be mobilised to make both normative and cognitive claims that might affect the framework of both the larger EU polity and the range of domestic political possibilities within

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<sup>5</sup> These documents are wide in range and source. They include the actual EU Convention on Human Rights, that includes clauses on anti-discrimination, through case law from the European Court of Justice, all the way to the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. They even include such documents as the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Allowance can also be made for the inclusion various texts put out on the issue by prominent European public intellectuals. How persuasive these documents are in any given context is of course the all important, decisive, political question.

member states. When either or both of these realms are affected we see this as a case of Europeanisation.

Laffan describes norms as providing “the framework for behaviour” (2001 p. 716). An agreed norm would thus also provide a distinction between what is legitimate behaviour and what is not within a given social or political context. From a political and policy point of view the definition of acceptable norms is therefore crucial. The actual debate over what is “the norm” can be the site of a major political struggle or a low level and ongoing series of negotiations. When there is little or no debate over the norm it might be said to have become routinised (see Table 1). In the case of the treatment of minorities within the European Union the accepted norms might be said to fluctuate over time and geography, with the latter two possibilities, low level negotiation or routinisation, being the most common. However, in the case of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, the first two cases, of high or low level politicisation, have been more prominent.

**Table1:**  
**Status of norms in terms of disputation and therefore level of politicisation.**

<b>Place of norm in discourse</b>	<b>Level of Politicisation</b>
Major political argument, disputes over acceptability, applicability and interpretation.	High
Low level negotiation, dialogue over interpretation and implementation	Low
Routinised – norm now an apriori starting point for issue in question. Unproblematically invoked in political discourse in order to legitimate actions or other aspects of argument or assertions in a relevant discourse.	Negligible

The working out of EU norms and their required degree of application is almost as important to the domestic political discourse of member states as legislation and regulation. Indeed in some ways it could be said to be more important. This is because the incursion of EU norms into the domestic political framework is not de-politicising in the manner that the arrival of regulations or laws are. The demands that domestic policy or law be adjusted to conform with agreed EU law may be met with political resentment by members of the domestic polity but its compulsory nature allows the government and even parliament to sidestep to some extent

political debate around its domestic application. It arrives as an external compulsion that cannot be changed, and for which the government can even excuse itself of responsibility. However, the norms do not arrive in the form of compulsion but in the form of argumentative discourse. They can therefore be made subject to debate. While it may be difficult under pressure from EU institutions, or even other EU states, to refute the applicability of the norm it can nonetheless be reinterpreted or selectively applied. It can also, if it is particularly welcome in the form it arrives, be stretched, made to apply more strongly than would initially seem possible. Any of this entails politicisation, the norm becoming subject to engagements between domestic political actors, between domestic political actors and their public, and between domestic political actors and other actors in the European Union. In doing so the authority, meaning and applicability of the norm all undergo further tests. These will likely determine both its fitness as a norm for Europe, ie. its Europeanisation, and, if it passes the tests, give it an embedded authority that will deepen its routinisation, that is make it less likely to face questioning in the future.<sup>6</sup>

Laffan's third pillar, the cognitive realm, is also important for us because this is the area where, amongst other things, identity is located. Laffan outlines the cognitive pillar as encompassing the frames of thought where meaning is made, wherein lie the rules that constitute the nature of reality (2001 p.717). At bottom our reality is our social subjectivity. She notes that this subjectivity is built upon symbols and identities, items already pre-existing within nation states. For the subjectivity of the European Union to emerge these need to be both reshaped and augmented. Regardless of the desirability or otherwise of this process, we are interested in it because the degree to which a Slovakian polity, or a Hungarian polity, or ethnic Hungarians within a Slovakian polity, align their social subjectivity to symbols and identities based in European discourses again affects the frame of legitimate action they afford themselves. Identities might be conceived as acting in a manner similar to that usually ascribed to conscience. Identity generates rules based in its sense of what makes it a subject or self. If I am this sort of person, facing this sort of context or problem, I *should* behave in this way. My choices are to some extent directed by my identity and by making these choices or

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<sup>6</sup> Wiener (2006 p.47) has pointed out that in terms of legitimacy, of bedding in Europeanisation one might say, this process is actually critical. "... the potential for norm legitimacy rises in proportion to the possibility for norm addressees to contest the meaning of norms". See also Gillespie and Laffan (2006 p.141).

applying these rules I validate my identity. Or, in a more negotiated response to a dilemma, “I have these options open to me and these ones closed off”.

Thus, in the context of our study, the degree to which Slovakian or Hungarian politicians accept that the idea of Europe, of themselves as European, has a place in the construction of their social identity is important. To the extent that Europe has a place we can say there is a degree of Europeanisation occurring at the level of identity. Europe now forms a part of the cognitive framework within which they must work. At the same time, as with the arrival of norms, the contours and elements of that European identity are open to some negotiation even after it is accepted in principle. The identity still has to be interpreted during the process of its diffusion. If the framework as it arrives contains elements difficult to accept the recipients will seek to push back, to re-interpret it. They can be expected to direct such reinterpretation both upwards, towards the European Union, and downwards, to their public. On the other hand, if the framework is useful in terms of their objectives, or even their self-understanding, they can be expected to try and enhance its effects and applicability. They will try to extend its interpretation. In both cases we are seeing the phenomenon of Europeanisation.

#### EP and Europeanisation – the conventional view

The European parliament is often seen as being weak in its legislative function, even when it is acknowledged to have grown stronger over time. Overall its authority, its ability to place a democratic imprimatur on EU regulations, is more important than its capacity for initiative. This function of assent is supposed to aid in the acceptance of EU regulations as legitimate. In particular, since the democratically elected executives of member states have also agreed to the regulations, the additional legitimacy conferred by the parliament might be considered important to the domestic publics of member states in two additional ways. On the one hand by giving them the sense of an additional say over matters, and on the other because it should be building in these publics a sense of identity about the EU as a polity.

This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the efficacy of these arrangements but it can be remarked that the involvement in the EU by MEPs is the involvement of actors who span the domestic and EU realms. As elected representatives, and as members of domestically based parties, the MEP's and their functions should be expected, in terms of their institutional role, to aid Europeanisation and in some cases even encourage it. However, the actual effects in practice have arguably been rather disappointing. Turnouts for EP elections are low,

reflecting low levels of interest and legitimacy, and MEPs are usually less prominent members of their parties than fellow politicians based in a member state's polity. Thus MEPs capacity for reach towards their domestic publics is weaker than might be hoped by those wishing to see the European Parliament as a source of legitimacy, or focus of identity, for Europe.

However, as this paper will show, a focus only on the formal role of MEPs may be misleading. The practices we examine suggest both a greater existing role, and perhaps a much larger potential role, in the Europeanisation of norms by MEPs than a conventional outline of their place in the EU might suggest.

### The Hungarian minority in Slovakia and the wider EU context

In a comprehensive article on the Hungarian state's push to protect and advance the position of the Hungarian minority in surrounding states, Butler noted that one of its pursuits has been an attempt to "EU-ise" the issue (Butler 2007). In the post-Cold War period the Hungarian state, regardless of the government in power, has both institutionally and discursively retained a sense of responsibility for "kin-nationals" living outside the state. In the Hungarian case these ethnic minorities number at least 2.5 million, making them the second largest group of kin-nationals living outside of a homeland state in Europe. Only the Russians outnumber them.

Minority rights were on the agenda during the process of accession to the EU, both formally in terms of the Copenhagen criteria and also ideologically. The latter is reflected in the Union's own historical identity as a refutation and antidote to the horrors of the Nazi era, and in its response to the more recent civil wars that erupted in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. However, minority rights have not been a specific EU issue with regard to member states. In the case of existing member states there was a variety of views regarding minorities and the issue was largely considered one where the principle of subsidiarity held sway. Norms for the treatment of minorities were only outlined in any detail through non-EU European organisations, in particular the Council of Europe (COE) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)<sup>7</sup>. Formal EU laws and norms covered minorities only to the extent that they

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<sup>7</sup> For an overview of the relationship between the EU and the issue of minorities see Kochenov (2008 pp. 1-52) and Rechel (2009).

frowned on discrimination generally. Butler points out that Hungary has pursued a consistent policy before and after accession not only to extend the applicability of these norms but also to make them a higher priority of the EU. In short, membership of the EU should bring with it norms on minorities. From Hungary's point of view the treatment of minorities should be Europeanised.

Apart from successfully getting the issue onto the European agenda, other efforts made by Hungary to Europeanise minority issues have included having the term "respect for minority rights" inserted into the Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union in 2001 and lobbying hard for minority rights to be given a place in the Convention on the Future of Europe held in 2002-3. The Hungarians have also invoked key terms from the language of the EU, such as regionalism, devolution and subsidiarity, to advance arguments for more protection and autonomy for Hungarians in neighbouring states (Butler 2007 p.1132). This latter approach is notable because it is part of a struggle over (the interpretation and applicability of) norms rather than about an attempt to change the formal rules. Of course success in changing the norms may eventually lead to a changing of the rules.

In Laffan's terms the Hungarians have appealed to the cognitive pillar, the identity of Europe, to advance normative claims (the realm of her second pillar) about the treatment of minorities. Where possible the Hungarian state is even trying to go further, to create wording in treaties and regulations that will advance the attempt to place minority treatment under the regulative pillar as well. Yet it should be noted that exactly because these claims are advanced within a discourse of European identity they cannot be only about the treatment of the Hungarian minority; they must be more universal, they must be in some sense generalizable to all minorities within Europe. Thus Hungary's narrower interest must be couched in wider terms and have wider consequences. This in turn can be expected to increase the volatility of the issue across Europe since many more actors will have an interest in the debate.

The case of Slovakia concerns a fellow EU member state with a large Hungarian minority. It is one with a troubled recent past in which political discourses of ethnic nationalism have maintained a level of prominence (Hloušek and Kopecěk 2008 p.536ff). The issues that have arisen from this, in terms of rhetoric and subsequent policy, present practical problems for the Hungarian minority; problems to which solutions might be demanded from the EU by invoking "European norms" and the "European identity". These problems, and demands for

their solution, have been framed by both Hungarian and Slovakian domestic and EU actors within the larger abstract arguments about the rights minorities should expect within Europe.

When Czechoslovakia broke apart in 1993 the Hungarians in the new state went from being 3% of the population of Czechoslovakia to 10% of the population of Slovakia. This gave them sizable electoral weight, especially since they were geographically concentrated along the southern border. The nationalist government of Mečiar, which ruled until 1998, wended its way in terms of rhetoric and policy between a commitment to Europe that implied acceptance of civic nationalism, and appeals to its electorate based on a Slovak ethnic identity.<sup>8</sup> Creating particular agitation at this time were policies regarding the use of Slovak language in public and official communications, and the teaching of Slovak history.

By 1998 it could be argued that an amalgam of his contradictory positions over Slovak identity and European identity led to Mečiar's undoing. With accession issues looming he was perceived as too anti-Europe by a pro-European electorate and was replaced by a new, liberal coalition government that included as a partner the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) (Auer 2009). The new government, headed by Mikuláš Dzurinda, altered the policy on Slovak language with a new law in 1999 that allowed minority languages back into official use in areas where speakers numbered 20% of the population. In the 2002 elections the SMK became the second largest partner in the ruling coalition and as a result was able to achieve the founding of a Hungarian language state university, the University of János Selye<sup>9</sup>.

In the 2006 elections the liberal coalition government was defeated and a new coalition was formed. It was led by *Smer* – Social Democracy party under Robert Fico. His coalition partners caused immediate concern to those connected to the cause of Hungarian minority rights since they were the Slovak Nationalist Party (SNS) and former Prime Minister Mečiar's People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (L'S-HZDS). Both these partners had

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<sup>8</sup> For a detailed discussion of this see Auer (2009) pp.197ff.

<sup>9</sup> In August 2009 it was proposed by the Slovakian Higher Education Accreditation Committee that the university be relegated to college status for the 2009/10 academic year. This was a consequence of a review that earmarked four institutions in total for a drop in status. This demotion does not appear to have happened due to any specific governmental discrimination against the institution. See <http://www.panorama.sk/go/news/news.asp?lang=en&sv=2&id=31425> (accessed 8 October 2009) and *The Slovak Spectator* 'Four Universities May Lose their Status', 11 August 2009.

a track record of nationalist rhetoric and slurs against minorities. Jan Slota, the leader of the nationalists, was given to using the notion of blood as a national essence in his rhetoric, something that to wider European ears could not help but recall Nazi ideology.<sup>10</sup>

A similar issue had already confronted Europe in 2000 when Austrian nationalist Jörg Haider's Austrian Freedom Party came to power in a coalition government. Here the echoes with the Nazi past were even more acute, and they were given more resonance in the context of the other reminder of (a not so) past European horror, namely the ethnic cleansing recently taking place in Bosnia. Moreover, Haider was openly anti-EU in his political rhetoric. In this case other EU member states responded strongly, with all 14 of them refusing to have bilateral relations with a government headed by him. In terms of Europeanisation this might be seen as a horizontal contribution made by the governments of member states, no doubt responding to domestic feeling. At around the same time a survey of newspapers across five countries found that a similar frame of reference was being used in public discourse against Haider (Gillespie and Laffan 2006 pp.149-50). This can thus be seen as an example of horizontal Europeanisation, in this case at the level of normative discourse. What is notable, however, is that the Haider case did not result in any vertical Europeanisation in the shape of a change of EU regulations. Indeed the member state boycott itself only lasted a matter of months.

The advent of the Fico government in Slovakia seemed to provide another set of practical issues calling for the further Europeanisation of norms regarding ethnic minorities. However, as had the Mečiar government in the 1990s, the new government showed itself aware, and indeed accepting of, the need to respond to the demands of European norms and to position itself within a European identity. In August 2006 it issued a Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic, signed by all ruling parties<sup>11</sup>. It made a firm commitment to a number of then current EU-agendas such as the common currency and Schengen. Engaging with the discourse of Europe it interpreted the EU as primarily,

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<sup>10</sup> See for example his musing in the run up to the 2006 election on the ugliness of Hungarians and the role of Slavic blood in civilising them. [http://www.hhrf.org/hhrf/index\\_en.php?oldal=182](http://www.hhrf.org/hhrf/index_en.php?oldal=182) (accessed 31 Aug 09)

<sup>11</sup> The Manifesto can be found at <http://www.government.gov.sk/9830/9-foreign-policy.php?pg=46> (accessed 31 Aug 09)

“a union of values of solidarity between nations and people, values respecting human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and respecting human rights, *including the rights of individuals belonging to minorities.*” [our emphasis] (Manifesto 2006 p.3)

With respect to the position of national minorities, the manifesto promised that,

“...the Government, in the interest of developing the multiethnic and multicultural character of the society of citizens of the Slovak Republic, will fight against all forms of racial, ethnic, religious and political hatred. ... The Government shall proceed in its relation to national minorities in the spirit of the approved wording of the European Charter of the Regional or Minority Languages and it shall create conditions for establishment of the Office for Minorities in the SR.” (Manifesto 2006 p.45)

This paragraph then continues, refuting categorically, “all manifestations of racism, intolerance, xenophobia, aggressive nationalism, extremism and anti-Semitism.” (Manifesto 2006 p.45) Perhaps in part because of this manifesto there was no widespread reaction from EU member states such as that called forth by the election of Haider. The principle of subsidiarity could be safely left to hold sway.

This does not mean that there was no reaction to the new government nor that the issues regarding the Hungarians in Slovakia went away. Certainly relations between Hungary and Slovakia deteriorated in the years following. In the next section we look at some specific instances of ways in which issues relating to the Hungarian minority in Slovakia underwent at least attempted Europeanisation. The instances involve invocations of European discourses and norms and the European parliament and MEPs as actors or instruments. All were part of a struggle to shift the minorities issue from the domestic level into a European environment or framework.

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## **Instances of Europeanisation over the Hungarian Minority issue**

### **Instance 1 The Suspension of Smer from the EP grouping PES**

Our first instance concerns the reaction by members of the European Parliament in 2006 to the arrival of the Slovakian government that contained an extremely nationalist party, the SNS. This party was led by Jan Slota, a politician with outspoken views on the nature and

place of minorities. SNS had explicitly campaigned on an anti-Hungarian platform with the key topic being “to return Slovakia to the Slovaks” (Pčolinský and Štensová 2007 p.108). The new coalition government was led by Robert Fico, whose social democratic party *Smer* also had EP members. *Smer* was affiliated with then EP political grouping PES (Party of European Socialists<sup>12</sup>). The other member of Fico’s coalition was yet another party with a track record of Slovak nationalism and discrimination against minorities, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (L’S-HZDS<sup>13</sup>). This was a rebadged version of HZDS that had been the ruling party under Vladimir Mečiar in the 1990s.

Fico’s party had received the plurality of the vote (just over 29%) and 50 of the 150 parliamentary seats.<sup>14</sup> That he entered into an alliance with two overtly nationalist parties might seem remarkable if one takes a conventional view of the political spectrum. However, his actions can be better understood if one notes that his alternative partners had been members of the government he had just displaced. Hloušek and Kopeček argue that, in addition to this, these two small parties were willing to give *Smer* greater dominance in the coalition and were not averse to reversals of the policies of the past government. The Hungarian SMK did contemplate joining Fico’s coalition, not least to outflank the SNS, but they also wanted to include one of the Christian Democratic Parties, something unacceptable to *Smer* given its policy agenda (Hloušek and Kopeček 2008 pp.543-4).

The EP based PES was not taking such tactical niceties into account and after the elections the president of the European Socialists Party (PES), Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, wrote a letter to Fico in which he stated that "the composition of the coalition raises many concerns regarding respect for human rights, in particular the rights of ethnic minorities, as well as commitments to democracy, to the European Union and European values and policies."<sup>15</sup> As well as the

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<sup>12</sup> In 2009 this grouping/party altered its name to the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D). Such groupings are often also known as Europarties, though it should be noted they are not so disciplined nor coherent as most domestic political parties.

<sup>13</sup> Formerly know as Movement for a Demcoratic Slovakia (HZDS) it had added the initials L’S, standing for *Ludová strana* (People’s Party), as part of re-badging exercise.

<sup>14</sup> <http://electionresources.org/sk/nrsr.php?election=2006> (accessed 30 Aug 2009)

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.pes.org/en/news/pes-expresses-worries-about-potential-coalition-slovakia> (accessed 1 Sept 2009)

authority of his official position it should also be noted that Rasmussen held considerable personal authority for an MEP, having formerly been the long-serving Prime Minister of Denmark. His choice of phrasing is notable because it explicitly refers to the rights of ethnic minorities as well as raising questions about the Slovakian government's acceptance of a European identity.

As noted above the new government, reflecting no doubt the dominance of Smer, moved quickly to issue its Manifesto, which included a disavowal of extremism and pledged support for the European values of human rights, including the *rights of individuals in minorities*. This in itself was an interesting formulation since it can be seen as attempting to address the minorities question, that was being inserted into the debate by other European actors, while remaining anchored within the existing official EU discourse that is about the rights of individuals. It thus comes across as a hybrid phrase, sitting between individual rights, that are not usually concerned with the rights of groups, and minority rights, that are almost always assigned to groups, even communities, rather than individuals.

The elections had taken place on 17th June 2006, Rasmussen's concerns were expressed at the end of June and the Manifesto was published in August. However, it was not enough to turn aside all opprobrium caused by the creation of the coalition. At a bi-lateral level the Hungarian PM Gyurcsány refused to meet with Slovak PM Fico at the October 2006 15th anniversary summit of Visegrad countries (Butler p.1137). Just two days after this PES also showed itself still dissatisfied with Fico's act of coalition and officially suspended Smer's membership of PES, thus leaving it weakened as an actor in the European Parliament. Invoking a similar discourse to that earlier mobilised against Haider in Austria PES cited the grounds that member parties should "refrain from any form of political alliance or co-operation at all levels with any political party which incites or attempts to stir up racial or ethnic prejudices and racial hatred." (Butler p.1137)

Note that the language here is not referring to either specific policies or issues of discrimination. Thus it is not grounding itself in a specific reference to EU regulations. These, as we have noted, are about respect for human rights against state actions, they demand the protection of individuals against discrimination. However, the sanction by PES was justified by reference to a related norm, the rejection of hate speech. It justified itself via invoking routinised norms that underpin the EU approach to human rights and also a via an implicit reference to the Nazi history the EU defines its identity against. However, the statement was

not specifically about individuals suffering discrimination but about the direction of hate speech towards groups. Inasmuch as individuals can be grouped, and inasmuch as politicians' hate speech may lead to discriminatory policies, the two discourses are linked. However, at the level of the EU they had been left unlinked. Within the accepted EU discourse individuals should be protected, as individuals, from being treated badly on the basis of their group membership. The PES sanction, and the discourse it was justified by, represented a step towards protecting groups in themselves. It was unacceptable, for the European social democratic discourse that PES saw itself as representing, that minorities should be vilified. This was a position the other major political groupings of the European Parliament made no objection to, indeed the conservative EPP-ED, was later to berate PES for being too soft on *Smer*.<sup>16</sup>

Note also that in its Manifesto the Slovakian government had already anticipated the mobilisation of this norm against it, stating it would “fight against all forms of racial, ethnic, religious and political hatred” (Manifesto 2006 p.45). In doing so it had also been both accepting and promoting this European norm. However PES's actions showed both that the Manifesto was not sufficient to allay its concerns and that in issuing its censure it was extending the discourse to specifically relate to hate speech against minorities. This was a logical step given the language and tactics pursued by Slota's SNS.

After the suspension of Smer from its Europarty group the PES presidency then set up a monitoring group to oversee the treatment of the Hungarian minority and also Slovakia's relationship with Hungary. The group was led by the two PES vice presidents, Hannes Swoboda, an Austrian MEP and Jan Marinus Wiersma, a Dutch MEP. The rest of the group consisted of Smer's MEPs Monika Flašíková-Beňová and Vladimír Manka, and two Socialist MEPs from Hungary, namely: Csaba Tabajdi and Zita Gurmay. The group visited Slovakia and Hungary twice between 2006 and 2008, and produced several reports on the two countries' relationship.

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<sup>16</sup> See, for example, comments by Joseph Daul, the Chair of the conservative European People's Party–European Democrats (EPP-ED), in 2008 after Smer was readmitted to PES. <http://www.epp-ed.org/Press/showpr.asp?PRControlDocTypeID=1&PRControlID=7337&PRContentID=12787&PRContentLG=en>

While it should be noted that this was not a formal monitoring conducted under the auspices of the European parliament it could nonetheless be characterised as a “European intervention” into the affairs of the two member states. The monitoring had echoes of the COE statements concerning rights that played an important role in the process leading up to accession of the new states in 2004 (Auer 2009 p.199; Schimmelfennig 2007 p.128; Rechel 2009 p.4). Thus in some small way the actions of PES took a step toward stating that even after accession monitoring of European standards in the realm of rights had a role to play. Moreover those rights included minority rights. These actions were undertaken by European actors based in the parliament but they were not the formal actions of the parliament itself. However, they can hardly be considered unimportant in the context of the extensions of EP power given in the Treaty of Nice in 2000. Under Article 7 the EP could now join the Commission and member states in charging a member state with a breach of fundamental rights. The EP also now had assent rights in determining whether “there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State” of the *principles* the EU is founded on (Nugent 2006 p.111-12). As a result of this the EP has a potentially expanded role in overseeing compliance with EU norms by member states. The parameters of this role for the EP have yet to be determined by practice but PES’s action could be seen as a dress rehearsal for a role the EP might take in future norm policing.

Of course Slovakian and Hungarian domestic actors were relatively free to ignore this intervention, though, as we have made clear, it actually suited Hungarian policy. However, the point is that the Slovakian government did not ignore it. Moreover, it took the trouble to provide overt grounds for PES to lift its suspension of *Smer*. It thus continued to engage in the discourse, and therefore the process, of Europeanisation. It did so with the issue in January 2008 of a declaration by *Smer* leader Fico and SNS leader Slota called “Diversity enriches us”.<sup>17</sup> The title alone went right to the heart of the matter, this was a statement of commitment to multiculturalism, the opposite of hate speech and discrimination against minority groups. This letter, combined with a report to the PES presidency that Slovakian government policy had been “fully social democratic” in the past year, provided reason enough to lift the suspension. However, when doing so the PES presidency did note that reinstatement remained provisional until full acceptance by the PES Congress in 2009.

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<sup>17</sup> Available at [http://www.pes.org/downloads/Declaration\\_Fico-Slota\\_EN.pdf](http://www.pes.org/downloads/Declaration_Fico-Slota_EN.pdf) (accessed 31 Aug 2009)

So in this instance we have a situation where: (a) EP Political groupings and MEPs have played a role in developing and diffusing the norm of minority rights into domestic and EU discourse; (b) by their actions the MEPs have indirectly extended the realm of action of the European parliament but done so not by acting through the parliament but on their authority as members of it; and (c) the MEPs of several countries, in some cases utilising their blurred status as both domestic and EU actors, have made an intervention in a bi-lateral relationship between two EU member countries. The overall result has been at least a small change in the status of minority rights in the hierarchy of EU discourse. Where previously it had been second order issue, only applicable at the supranational level as a matter of individual rights against discrimination, now the treatment of the rights of minorities, as minority groups, was on the agenda as a European issue to which European norms might apply and in which EU actors might have some say. Thus in many respects this was a uniquely new form of Europeanisation. Moreover, it opens the door to further debate at the level of the EU about what acceptable minority policy should entail.

#### Instance 2 Hungary creates its own forum for MEPs

In September 2004 a new organisation, “Representatives of Hungary in the Carpathian Basin Forum” (Kárpát-medencei Magyar Képviselők Fóruma – KMKF), formally came into being. This organisation, made up of ethnically Hungarian legislators drawn from the countries of the region, was created to provide a place for dialogue concerning the protection of Hungarian minorities. Members included MPs from Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, Croatia and Ukraine, as well as from the European Parliament. Over time the Forum moved from being a place of dialogue to a provider of advice, and an advocate on policy, to the Hungarian state. In March 2008 the KMKF moved a step closer to formal institutional status when it was brought financially under the auspices of the Hungarian National Assembly and recognised as a consultative body attached to the parliament. The effect of this was that elected domestic and EP politicians from a number of member states of the EU were also now sitting in a consultative institution attached to the parliament of Hungary. In the case of MEPs not drawn from Hungary this might be understood as a further blurring of their roles, not just vertically between Europe and their member state but also bi-laterally, across member states. Indeed the presence of Serbian and Ukrainian MPs meant they were also working with actors from outside the EU.

The main instigator of the Forum, Katalin Szili, is an important figure in its history since her strategy has consistently included the aim of using European rhetoric and European integration to solve the problems associated with the minority rights of Hungarians. After events such as the formation of the new Slovakian government under Fico in 2006, Szili was to bemoan the lack of sanction from the EU and advocated that the KMKF direct itself towards extending EU involvement in minority rights (Szili 2008). Thus a consistent theme of the KMKF, amplifying the general thrust of Hungarian state policy, has been an attempt to Europeanise the issue of Hungarian minority rights at all levels possible.

As well as seeking to influence the direction of EU policy the Forum has also sought to make itself an actor in European politics, not just through its inclusion of MEPs, but by taking on a consultative or intermediary role between Hungary and the EU. Its website, for example, refers to its consultation with the EU Commission over matters pertaining to the access of Hungarians living outside the Schengen area to Hungary.<sup>18</sup> The website also refers to the Forum setting up offices in Brussels to provide information on the status of Hungarian minorities in EU member states to the EU. Thus a body in which MEPs formally play a role now also lobbies EU institutions including their own. While the impact of this may be small it does still enlarge the role of MEPs since it gives them an additional instrument of agency. An instrument that is located between the supranational status of the EU and the domestic status of the member states they hail from.

The reaction of the Fico government to the KMKF has been both suspicious and hostile. The existence and actions of the Forum have been portrayed as attempts to interfere in Slovakia's domestic affairs and there is great unease at the notion that Slovakian MPs should be involved in an institution with roots in another state's parliament. Not surprisingly, given the imperatives of domestic politics in Slovakia, much of the resentment has been focussed in particular on the involvement of ethnically Hungarian MPs from Slovakia. All the Slovak Hungarian MPs, at both domestic and European level, come from SMK and SMK is the principle object of attack. The critical discourse questions the loyalty of SMK to Slovakia and has made accusations of irredentism against the party. For example in September 2008 Fico accused SMK leader Cásky of discussing autonomy for Slovakian Hungarians with fellow

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<sup>18</sup> [www.kmkf.hu](http://www.kmkf.hu) (accessed 30 Aug 2009)

Forum member, the Romanian MEP and former dissident, László Tökes.<sup>19</sup> Jan Slota of SNS insisted in October 2008 that SMK deputies had violated their oath of office by attending the Forum in September of that year.<sup>20</sup> More recently, in the lead-up to the European Parliamentary elections of 2009, Slovak President Ivan Gašparovic called on voters to choose MEPs who would “defend Slovak interests”. This was something, he said, which had not been true of “all present Slovak MEPs”.<sup>21</sup>

Overall the effects of the KMKF itself, and Slovakia’s reaction to it and other actions by Slovakia’s SMK MPs and MEPs, has been to advance Europeanisation of the issue of Hungarian minorities, and by logical extension, the treatment of all minorities. The Forum can be viewed as taking the sharing of sovereignty foreshadowed by the EU a step further than has previously been envisioned. It brings together EU and domestic political actors in a new way and exerts an influence on the EU in both horizontal and vertical ways. While the Slovakian government may view the Forum as an affront to its sovereignty its recourse is not, and has not been, only domestic. Slovak MEPs criticised the Forum in the EP plenary meeting in Strasbourg in October 2008 and the Slovak foreign minister foreshadowed raising objections to the KMKF in Brussels.<sup>22</sup>

Even more so than in the case of PES’s suspension of Smer the implications arising from the history of the KMKF raise new questions about: (a) the new means by which the minorities issue is being Europeanised; and (b) the role of the European Parliament and its members in this process. The construction of such a blurred institution as the KMKF, and the positioning of it between the EU and member states, means that a new instrument of agency in the EU has been created. The Forum speaks not domestically or just bi-laterally but to European political

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<sup>19</sup> “Slovak PM criticises Hungarian party's alleged effort at autonomy” CTK National News Wire September 29, 2008

<sup>20</sup> Reported in *The Slovak Spectator* 28 October 2008 ([www.spectator.sk/articles/view/33323/10/governing\\_coalition\\_accuses\\_smk\\_mps\\_of\\_violating\\_constitution.html](http://www.spectator.sk/articles/view/33323/10/governing_coalition_accuses_smk_mps_of_violating_constitution.html)) Attendance at this meeting of the Forum caused particular provocation since it included a high level plenary meeting of the Forum with the Hungarian government.

<sup>21</sup> “Slovak President Calls On Voters To Cast Their Votes In Eu Polls” Czech News Agency June 3, 2009

<sup>22</sup> (2008-11-08 12:10:00) Hostia: minister zahraničných vecí Ján Kubiš a poslanec za SMK József Berényi

discourse generally. It does so both horizontally (by virtue of its membership) and vertically (by virtue of its audiences). Whether it will be accepted as a legitimate model for emulation, and whether it will be effective in its objectives, remains to be seen, but in any case it must be admitted by its very existence to have increased the level of Europeanisation about minorities.

In bringing together MPs and MEPs into one body, albeit it only a consultative one, the KMKF has also extended, and perhaps increased, the reach of MEPs. They are taking the authority imbued in them by their membership of one body, the European Parliament, and lending it to another. This moves their agency outside of the parameters formally envisioned in the EP's structure. Moreover, from this new body they are potentially able to exercise influence not just on the European Parliament but also upon other EU institutions. They can do so outside of the formal framework of interaction between parliament and executive(s). The overall result of the creation and actions of the KMKF might thus be seen to be an increase in the messiness of EU politics, to the blurring of actors is added a smearing of the institutional framework. However, given that the EU is more than just a series of interlocking agreements between governments, and takes shape as a unique polity in its own right, is it not something to be expected? After all similar phenomena can be observed at the level of nation states, which also have a multitude of indistinct relations between institutions and actors, as well as many intermediary agents whose embeddedness in the system is in flux. This can be viewed as a natural outcome of the ongoing activity of healthy politics and thus a sign of the development of the EU as a polity.

### Conclusions

The issue of a European norm for the treatment of minorities has been placed firmly on the agenda of the EU despite the fact that it is likely many member states would prefer that it was not. This is in part because of a number of changing contexts, of which the case of Eastern enlargement, and the inclusion of Hungary in particular, is highly significant. While Germany may have traditionally had concerns with kin-Germans its history and comparatively unique position, including that many kin-Germans before enlargement resided outside the EU, meant it was not pursuing a specific minorities policy for the EU outside of that institution's foreign policy. Moreover the Council of Europe, embracing many more countries, was deemed a more appropriate venue for such policy.

The question of norms in policies towards minorities always had the potential to become a matter of Europeanisation. However, Hungary's policy of pursuing societal security, defined as relating not just to state citizens but to kin-nationals, has changed the equation<sup>23</sup>. They have been vigorous in importing European norms, broadly defined, into the formal discourse of EU norms. Moreover, they have also acted to co-opt whatever regulations and institutions that do exist within the EU to their cause. The attempt has been made to make the authority of these stretch into norms that will exert pressure on the domestic policies of member states. Finally, they have utilised the EP in a manner that potentially widens its range of activity. The inclusion of MEPs and the use of their authority and visibility to take part in a Hungarian initiative, the KMKF, subverts both the usual alignment of borders that define the EU as a polity and the usual channels where the vertical flows of Europeanisation occur. Alongside the actions of PES in suspending *Smer* it represents another extension to the realm of potential action by MEPs.

We would also argue that it is precisely because these actions have been undertaken by MEPs and the European Parliament that there is an increased likelihood that the EU will find itself creating and diffusing (if not enforcing) norms on this issue. It would be extremely difficult politically for the Commission or the Council to act on minority matters. This is because action by them is more likely to generate high levels of political backlash. Action by the Council explicitly involves ministers of member states and the Council and Commission together have a stronger track record in creating binding regulation. By comparison the EP has only recently obtained initiative powers in legislation and lacks the ability to pass or veto law on its own. Given the stakes entailed in the creation of EU regulations governing minority treatment it would be a major feat of politics in the Council or even the Commission for sufficient consensus to arise to initiate action on this matter. Only a clear outrage against a minority would be likely to mobilise sufficient support from the governments of member states for action to be taken in concert at the EU level. We note that even in the Haider case it was left to individual states to act.

However, for the European Parliament the political temperature is lower, because of both the limited powers of legislative initiative and the greater political distance the parliamentarians have from member state governments. Thus, when the EP and MEPs act on an issue that may

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<sup>23</sup> For a full elaboration on the concept of societal security see Butler (2007) esp. pp.1115-1118

be vexing they are much less immediately threatening to other European actors. However, they do have strength in their ability to generate a discourse of arguments for, and concerning the place of, norms. We would suggest that, paradoxically, the comparative weakness of the EP in relation to regulation allows both it and its members to take initiatives and bring issues such as minority rights onto the agenda without immediately activating a strong backlash to suppress the issue at a European level. The issue can enter the EU agenda and gather momentum with less initial resistance. It has a chance to develop *politically*.

How much influence the MEPs actions in the instances we have examined have had on the situation in Slovakia is difficult to measure. However, it is not unreasonable to suggest that they have been influential in keeping policy and rhetoric about minorities in Slovakia within a “European” framework. They may even have played a role in strengthening the hand of Fico’s *Smer* against its junior partner, the SNS. At the very least they have kept the question of whether policy and rhetoric in Slovakia on this issue meets European standards very much alive. This is an act of Europeanisation in itself.<sup>24</sup>

At the same time, precisely because we are talking about an EU institution and EU actors, this strategy has, quietly and in a comparatively non-threatening manner, taken the issue of the treatment of minorities onto the EU agenda. It has made the treatment of minorities more of an EU issue and thus potentially less of simply a member state issue. Again this is an example of Europeanisation, and one coming from an unexpected vector. A vector that utilises both horizontal and vertical links simultaneously by acting through the blurred agencies that exist in the European Union. The dual nature of MEPs, the existence of EU citizenship simultaneously with state citizenship, and the commitment to a borderless Europe are all parts of this.

Nonetheless, such a change in the discursive realms occupied with the issue of minorities can be expected to result in a number of reactions across Europe. There may be reactions from

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<sup>24</sup> We note that recent political upheavals and concerns in relation to the amended language law brought into force in Slovakia on 1 September 2009 has reopened these issues of Europeanisation in new directions again. We are already planning future work analysing how this issue is playing out. We will be assessing events against the framework and concerns we have elaborated in this article. How Europe is both involved and invoked in this new instance provides more fuel for the development of our thoughts concerning the existing and potential role of the European parliament, and the sources and place of norms in this debate around minority rights.

states with Hungarian minorities, who may resent perceived interference in their sovereignty, and from domestic political actors within these states who are likely to utilise this issue to garner votes. Likewise other member states, with their own minority issues, are likely to respond with concern, if not objections, to the raising of minority rights and policy at the European level. The wide variety of approaches to the issue of minorities in various states guarantees this.<sup>25</sup> However, it should be noted that even such a backlash would nonetheless contribute Europeanisation of the issue.

Let us note finally that the actual political context of the early 21st century makes the minorities issue a key dilemma at both the domestic and EU level. Major economic problems appear likely to continue in the immediate future and these will be coupled with immigration and internal migration pressures. Such a scenario suggests that the politics of identity may gather even more prominence in the years ahead. When one also takes into account the levels of economic control member states have ceded to the EU one can see why politicians may be further tempted to chase votes around identity issues. The room to distinguish and market oneself around economic policy has suffered some shrinkage as EU integration has proceeded. Identity politics offers an alternative playing field.

Yet a key part of the EU's identity is as a bulwark against identity politics that encourage discrimination on the basis of race, religion or ethnicity. Thus a sort of feedback loop can be envisioned, as domestic policy and discourse become more concerned with identity the EU can be expected to be brought more into play. In some cases, where belligerent domestic political actors have an upper hand, the "interference" of the EU may also play a role in increasing the rhetoric around identity. This in turn may create even further pressure on the EU to react. Thus, regardless of the outcome of such debates, the pressures all point towards Europeanisation of the issue of minority rights.

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<sup>25</sup> The positions member states have on minorities are quite broad, for example France and Greece dismiss the existence of minorities, everyone is just a citizen. Austria, Germany and Italy, all with kin-nationals abroad, take a different view. See Malová and Világi (2006); Butler (2007) pp.1129-30.

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